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NAVAL ATTACHE'S REPORTS

O.N.I.

SEPTEMBER *1914*

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89

September-1914

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N.N.I.33.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.] Sept. 1, 1914. S9 .1 (1)

Germany

SUBJECT GERMAN STAND IN REGARD TO INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE SEA.

From Z *No.* 222 *Date* September 31, 1914. *19*

Replying to O. N. I. No. -------- *Date* Need not be returned. *19*

SEP 24 1914
RECEIVED
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

NOTE

REGARDING THE APPLICATION of the LONDON DECLARATION

ON THEn INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA.

I.

In answer to a question raised by the Ambassador of the United States, the Imperial German Government on the 7th of August 1914 expressed its willingness to ratify at once the London Declaration on the International Law of the Sea of the 26th of February 1909. The Imperial German Government also replied to the Ambassador in answer to a note of the 8th of August 1914 that she will observe the London Declaration, if the other powers at war will observe them; accordingly she again submits a copy of the German regulations governing the taking of prizes in the sense of the London Declaration.

II.

According to late news Great Britain and France have in several important points neglected to observe the London Declaration.

1. The British and French Governments have designated aeroplanes and parts thereof as absolute contraband of war, while according to Article 24, No. 8, they are to be considered only as relative contraband.

2. The British naval forces have repeatedly violated Article 35 of the London Declaration, by confiscating objects, which were designated from the British side as relative contraband, from ships travelling to a neutral harbor. For instnnce they have confiscated from the Dutch ship "TUBANTIA" bound for Amsterdam an consignment of gold designated for German private banks, from the Norwegian ship "KYLEMORE" bound for Rotterdam a shipment of asphalt of the German Trinidad Asphalt Co.; from the Norwegian ship "FERM" a cargo of coal of the German firm Krabbenhöft & Bock, bound for Caleta Coloso, Chile. These confiscations are further a violation of Article 33 of the London Declaration, because the shipments were designated for private parties and not for the German forces, or for German administrative places, in consequence of which the term "contraband" is out of place. These actions also cannot be justified as "requisitions", as according to the General Report of the Editorial Commission of the London Conference on International Law of the Sea, requisitions on board neutral ships on the open sea are not permissible; See Section 3 of the Remarks to Article 39.

3. The British and French naval forces, have, contrary to the principles enumerated in Article 45, No. 3, and Article 47 of the London Declaration, taken Germans from neutral ships

who were of service age for war, but who were not enrolled in the German forces. Thus they have taken (the British) German subjects liable for military service from the Dutch ships "TUBANTIA" in Plymouth, and "POTSDAM" in Falmouth, from the Italian ships "Re VITTORIO" and "ANCONA" at Gibraltar, as well as from the Norwegian steamer "NORWEGA" at Bergen. The French naval forces have taken the same measures with the Spanish steamer "SISTER" in Marseille". In all these cases the hostile naval forces have violated the regulations of the London Declaration, for, as the General Report of the Editorial Commission states in the first Section of the remarks to Article 45 expressly that from judicial as well as practical reasons the whole Conference agreed, that only active military persons, but not such persons which are proceeding home to serve their time in the Army or Navy, are subject to be captured and held as prisoners of war on the high sea.

III.

In this situation the German Government considers it of great interest to be instructed at once, if England, France and Russia, are desirous to comply with the stipulations of the London Declaration. If they intend to do that, it would be absolutely necessary for the British Government to return the German property confiscated on neutral ships at once, and the British and French Government would have to liberate immediately the Germans captured on neutral ships. Otherwie the German Government would be compelled to also ignore on her part the London Declaration, which xrxx is not in all parts for her military interest. The German Government therefore would be glad if the Government of the United States would cause the other powers at war to give expression as to their attitude to the London Declaration.

The German Government would be further thankful to be informed what position the American Government herself assumes towards the London Declaration, especially if she is willing to allow the violation of this Declaration by the Naval forces of England, France and Russia.

Berlin, August 27, 1914.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900)

(2)

Need not be returned.

SUBJECT Condition of Italy - Outbreak of the War -

August 2d. - September 1st.

From T *No.* 224. *Date* September 1, 1914.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ——— *Date* ———

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
RECEIVED
SEP 25 1914

1. At the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Germany on one side and France and England on the other, Italy was in a very delicat position. There was a large party who felt Italy's duty lay with the obligations of the Triple Alliance, and it was commonly reported that Mi San Giuliano, Minister of Foreign Affairs, would resign from the cabinet owing to his strong pro-Austrian attitude. Luckly for Italy the majority of the people and of the Government were absolutely against helping Austria. The Government insisted that the Triple Alliance was a defensive treaty, not an offensive one, and also that Austria shoulf have consulted her before declaring war on Servia, and cited several cases in recent years where the advice and consent of both, Austria and Germany was requested by Italy on questions dealing with a possible declaration of war. Italy was absolutely unprepared. The Lybian Campaign had been a great drain not only on her treasury, but on her military equipment, so at the outbreak of the war only an army of about 500,000 men fully equipped could be put into the field. Other points which assured Italy either remaining neutral or fighting against the Triple Alliance were, that she had 50,000 men in Africa dependent upon her for subsistence, and the threat of the Socialists that the calling of the first man to fight France, would be a signal for a revolution throughout Italy.

2. Preparations for war have been steadily going on, so that at the present time Italy is about ready. Within one week after the war broke out, six ships left for America in balast to bring back the most necessary stores. Among those most desired were 100,000 tons of coal, the same of grain, fuel oil, steel, and about 500,000 pairs of army shoes, besides the same number of gray uniforms. At this time the shoes have nearly all been provided, and the arrival of coal from England and America, has permitted the uniform factories to work night and day, resulting in an output of 10,000 suits daily. It is reported that 250,000 tons of coal have arrived in Italy between the 11th and 26th of August, and most of it has come from England who is doing all in her power to get Italy prepared. There was also a very old order for field guns which was far from completion, but I am told that the order will be completed within twenty days.

3. The Navy Department is well prepared. It has plenty of coal and is not lacking in any necessities. At the present time the fleet is concentrated at Taranto under the command of the Duke d'Abruzzi. It is keeping a watchful eye on the operations intthe Adriatic. Daily part of the fleet goes out for exercises or target practice, which, I am unable to learn, and ships return singly to anchor. It is a curious thing but I hear from a reliable source, that since August a year ago there has never been more than 4 ships together for an exercise.

4. In the meantime the spirit of the people is working towards war. Ten days ago the changing of the guard called out only those that would always follow a military band; but now the guard and band are followed by a wildly cheering patriotic crowd of many thousands. These demonstrations, in fact, became so alarming, that an order was given on August 26th, that the guard would be changed at 10 o'clock in the morning. The previous time was 6 o'clock in the evening when the streets were crowded with people returning home from work. A large anti-Austrian demonstration took place in Milan a few days ago.

5. Italy will never gain by remaining neutral; therefore she will fight to command the Adriatic. The taking of Cattaro by England will upset the balance of power in the Mediterranean, so Italy figures that Vallona must be hers, thereby giving her the command of the Adriatic.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.) Need not be returned. 39 (3)

SUBJECT ..... Changes in High Offices - Italian Navy.

From T *No.* 226. *Date* September 1, 1914.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ——— *Date* ———

1. The following changes are noted:-

Rear Admiral [illegible] O - Resigned as Minister of the Marine, owing to ill health;

Vice Admiral [illegible] VIALE - from President Superior Council of the Navy to Minister of the Marine;

Vice Admiral [illegible] d'ASTE [illegible] - from Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet to President Superior Council of the Navy;

S. A. R. Vice Admiral LUIGI DI SAVOIA, DUCA degli ABRUZZI, from Command 2d. Squadron to Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet;

Rear Admiral CORSI [illegible] from Command of the Naval Academy, to Commander of the 1st. Division of the Fleet.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
RECEIVED
SEP 25 1914

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900)

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Need not be returned.

SUBJECT A Proposed Canal between Brindisi on the Adriatic and Taranto.

From T *No.* 228. *Date* September 1, 1914.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ——— *Date* ———

1. The following information I have from an excellent source and it has never been published. The Italian Government after the outbreak of the present war, looked into the possibilities of Valona as a future Italian fortified base. Strategically, it is very important, but the report on the cost of making it impregnable to both land and sea attacks required an expenditure of One billion Lire (1,000,000,000) a sum totally out of reach of the Government. A substitute was then proposed in a canal between Brindisi which is now a torpedo boat base and Taranto. The Canal to be large enough to accommodate the largest vessels of the Fleet. After a careful survey, it was estimated that it would cost about 200,000,000 Lire, and strategically be as valuable as Valona.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
RECEIVED
SEP 25 1914

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

59
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Need not be returned.

Subject ... Proclamation of Blockade of Kiaochow.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
RECEIVED
OCT 16 1914

From W. *No.* 63. *Date* Sept. 2, 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. XXXXX *Date* XXXXXXXXX

On the 27th of August, 3rd year of Daisho (1914), I proclaim that I will blockade, and maintain the blockade, with the naval forces under my command the whole coast from 120° 10' E. and 35° 54' N. to 120° 36' E. and 36° 7' N. (the whole coast of the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay), that I will allow 24 hours for vessels of friendly countries and those of neutral countries lying within the area of the blockade to leave it, and that any vessel attempting to break the blockade will be treated in accordance with international law and the treaties between Japan and neutral countries.

On Board H.I.J. Suwo, this 27th day of August, 3rd year of Daisho (1914).

Sadakichi Kato,

Commander-in-Chief of the Second Squadron.

Need not be returned.

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TREATY SERIES. 1915.

No. 1.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
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FEB 18 1915
6075

DECLARATION

BETWEEN

THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA,

ENGAGING NOT TO CONCLUDE PEACE SEPARATELY DURING THE PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR.

Signed at London, September 5, 1914.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.
January 1915.

LONDON:
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TREATY SERIES. 1915.

No. 1.

DECLARATION

BETWEEN

THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA,

ENGAGING NOT TO CONCLUDE PEACE SEPARATELY DURING THE PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR.

Signed at London, September 5, 1914.

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T. FISHER UNWIN, LONDON, W.C.

1915.

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DECLARATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, ENGAGING NOT TO CONCLUDE PEACE SEPARATELY DURING THE PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR.

Signed at London, September 5, 1914.

THE Undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, hereby declare as follows:—

The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war.

The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other allies.

In faith whereof the Undersigned have signed this Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London in triplicate, this 5th day of September, 1914.

(L.S.) E. GREY,
His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic.

(L.S.) BENCKENDORFF,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

LES Soussignés, dûment autorisés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, font la déclaration suivante:

Les Gouvernements britannique, français et russe s'engagent mutuellement à ne pas conclure de paix séparée au cours de la présente guerre.

Les trois Gouvernements conviennent que lorsqu'il y aura lieu de discuter les termes de la paix aucune des Puissances alliées ne pourra poser des conditions de paix sans accord préalable avec chacun des autres alliés.

En foi de quoi les Soussignés ont signé la présente Déclaration et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

Fait à Londres, en triple original, le 5 septembre, 1914.

(L.S.) E. GREY,
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté britannique.

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON,
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de la République française.

(L.S.) BENCKENDORFF,
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie.

Miscellaneous.

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United States.

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Ottoman Dominions.—Rules of Court, March 9, 1914, for His Majesty's Courts in the. Made pursuant to "The Ottoman Order in Council, 1910." Price 9*d.*, post free 11*d.*

State Papers. British and Foreign. Vol. 102. 1908–1909. (1913.) Price 10*s.*, post free 10*s.* 6*d.*

N.N.I.33.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Germany

Need not be returned.

SUBJECT EUROPEAN WAR 1914- SITUATION TO SEPTEMBER 5th 1914.

From Z No. 336 Date September 5, 1914. 19

Replying to O. N. I. No. ——— Date ——— 19

Reference:- Z-317 of August 31, 1914.

No information is given out that indicates any change in the disposition of the main parts of the German Fleet.

The following version was given to me with regard to the action off Helgoland on August 28th 1914 :-

The English force consisted of the First Battle Cruiser Squadron (4 ships) , a squadron of four armored cruisers , two flotillas of destroyers (about 40 boats) and a large number of submarines.

The object of the move was supposed to be an attack by submarines on some of the principal ships of the German Navy. Through the vigilance of the German look-out ships this attack failed. During the fighting the English submarines fired a number of torpedoes at several German cruisers, but failed to score a hit.

The Navy Department does not know the circumstances governing the loss of the "MAINZ" and "COELN", except what has been published in English newspapers.

The affair to my point of view is however, that the blow was a well directed one against the German scouting force which was overbold,and was successful in depriving them of several of their most effective scouts. The English force may have hoped to find some armored ships out from behind the mine fields, but they could hardly have expected to do so.

With regard to the general conduct of the war, the situation is well in hand in Belgium and France, but it has been necessary to reinforce the troops on the Eastern frontier. A very large force, reported to be one million men

are being shifted. Yesterday through Potsdam the troop trains passed continuously, most of the regiments having been in the battles about Liege and Namur.

The victory of Tannenburg in East Prussia relieved the situation which threatened Königsberg. At this battle the Russian troops were caught in a lake region with only narrow avenues of escape. Their losses on absolute reliable authority were 70,000 killed and wounded, and over 90,000 prisoners. That particular Army passed out of existence.

Every German regiment that went to the front left a detail of officers and men to build up the replacement regiment, which was at once formed from the reserve. These regiments are now about ready to take the field, so that in spite of the great armies on the frontiers every garrison town is swarming with troops only awaiting for the word to go.

I passed through a number of such towns yesterday and saw this.

N.N.I.33.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.] *Need not be returned.*

Germany

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SUBJECT STAFF OF NAVAL STATION CHIEF.

From Z *No.* 997 *Date* September 8, 1914. *19*

Replying to O. N. I. No. ---------- *Date* ---------- *19*

In principle, the Chief of the Naval Station of the Baltic Sea and of the Naval Station of the North Sea, the two great shore commands, correspond to a Commandant of Naval Station and Naval District. The similarity is general only, as the scope of the German shore command is more comprehensive than we have yet developed it. The German Chief of Naval Station exercises general command-in-chief over things naval on shore, in distinction to the command afloat exercised by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. Neither is subordinate to the other , the spheres of authority being distinct and not conflicting; but the shore command exists and is responsible for the maintenance of facilities and resources requisite to the continued efficiency of the force afloat - the fleet.

The Chief of Naval Stations cognizance embraces material, personnel, communication, and local defense.

Each of these general branches is under one or more responsible heads, captains or rear admirals, or civilian officials of like degree of responsibility. The Station Chief's office is the controlling coordinating authority.

His staff consists in time of peace of a senior captain or a rear admiral as Chief of Staff, and three admiral staff officers, who are lieutenant commanders or lieutenants. Besides these the Chief of Naval Station has several adjutants, who assist with current routine business and attend to ceremonial affairs.

The Station Chief's Staff at Wilhelmshaven has been increased for war conditions to seven, besides the Chief of Staff. The business is divided among them as follows:-

(a) Communications - two.
(b) Orders - One.
(c) Local Defense - one.
(d) Personnel - officers - one.
(e) Personnel - men - one.
(f) Material - one.

Communications and orders (a) and (b), belong directly to the Station Chief's Office. These three officers work in close touch, so as almost to make one sub-division, but they do make two.

Local Defense (c) is in the hands of a rear admiral at Wilhelmshaven and a major general of Marine Infantry at Kiel.

Personnel - officers (d), is under the Station Chiefs immediate cognizance, the business being similar to that done in the Detail office in our Bureau of Navigation.

Personnel - men (e), is partly under a rear admiral who controls men of all ratings for general service, and partly under the Torpedo Division Chief, a captain, for all torpedo craft. Besides there are the usual hospitals and dispensaries.

Under material (f) there are a dockyard, with a rear admiral as chief director, various intendanture establishments, for clothing, subsistence, pay, civil engineering work, etc., under civil officials..

The responsible heads of branches relieve the station Chief of all details. Only general matters and those affecting other branches require his attention. His Staff is organized and sufficiently numerous to cope with these.

Sept. 8, 1914. Sq .8 (3)

Office of Naval Intelligence, Copy

October 12, 1914. NHL

Italy - Territorial waters.

Translation

Royal Embassy of Italy

Manchester, Mass., September 8, 1914

No. 1426.

Mr. Secretary of State:

With reference to Your Excellency's note dated August 17, last, I have the honor to quote hereinbelow the text of the provisions contained in Article 2 of the Royal Decree of August 6, 1914, in respect to the limits of Italian territorial waters in bays, coves and gulfs, for the purposes of neutrality:

Article 2. In bays, coves and gulfs, territorial waters for the purposes set forth in the foregoing Article, lie within a straight outward line tangent to two circumferences with a 6 mile radius and their centers at the extreme points of the opening of the bay, cove, or gulf, provided the distance between the said points does not exceed 20 nautical miles (37,040 metres).

If the distance between the extreme points of the opening exceeds 20 nautical miles, the territorial waters lie within a straight line drawn between the two outermost points of the bay, cove or gulf separated by

a distance of 20 nautical miles at least.

Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my highest consideration.

R. BORGHETTI.

To His Excellency

The Honorable William J. Bryan,

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Need not be returned.

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(1)

SUBJECT TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE.

SENT TO GENERAL STAFF, WASHINGTON, D.C. Sept. 10, 1914

From Y *No.* 49 *Date* March 13, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date*

1. The Officers detailed by the War Department as observers in France during the present war have compiled and forwarded, on March 14, 1915, to the Chief of the War College Division, General Staff, Washington, D.C., their report on the Battle of the Marne, September 6th-10th, 1914.

2. This is a confidential document, but I have been permitted to read and study it, and have been informed that a copy of it can probably be obtained by application of the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of War College Division, General Staff, Washington, D.C.

3. The Battle of the Marne is probably the greatest battle in history, and with the exception of this report I have never seen anything authoritative which has been published about it. At this particular time I consider this report would be of great interest to the students at the Naval War College.

580
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147

APR 21 1915
6-5
Naval War College

CONFIDENTIAL

Office of the Military
Observers with the
French Army.

March 1st 1915.

Translation of Notes and Orders furnished the Military Observers by The French General Staff.

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Contents

Battle of the Marne
Operations of the Vth French Army°
" " " 1Xth " " °
" " " English Army °
" " " VIth French Army°
" " " IVth " " x
" " " IIIrd " " x
Operations in the north from 18th Sept. until 11th Nov.1914.°
Operations between the Oise and the North Sea, including summary of events up until the end of October 1914.°

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Note-
° Translated by Captain N.E.Margetts,6th Field Art.,Mil.Obs.
x " " " J.W.Barker, 3rd Inf., Mil. Obs.

580 - 9 - 147
ENCLOSURE 6-6
APR 21 1915
Naval War College

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B A T T L E O F T H E M A R N E.

General situation the 5th September 1914.

Commanded by General Joffre.

(PRELIMINARIES)

(I)

The check of the offensive of the French Armies, between the forest of the Ardennes and Thionville, had decided the General in Chief to order the withdrawal of the Allies' left wing (English Army and Army Lanrezac) which was threatened on the Sambre with envelopment by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd German Armies (Composition given further on).

The intention of the Commander in Chief was, after escaping this enveloping movement, made by forced marches by the 1st German Army of the Oise, to retake the offensive as soon as the circumstances would permit, in supporting at the same time the fortified position Verdun-Toul, and also the City of Paris, which was to serve as a base and point of support to a new army formed near Amiens: an Army which would have for its mission to limit the overflowing movement of the Germans.

The rapid march of the German right wing did not permit the formation of this Army on the left wing of the Allied Army (Army Maunoury) in time to be of use in the region of Amiens. The elements which had arrived there received in consequence orders to withdraw to the defenses of Paris, where it would constitute definitely the Army of Paris.

The Commander in Chief decided to withdraw the main body of the French fordes to the south of the Marne and of the Ormain, where they would prepare to retake the offensive.

The situation of the Allied Armies the evening of the 4th September 1914.

The evening of the 4th September 1914 these movements were executed and the Allied forces occupied the following positions:

The Army Sarrail holding the front from the Meuse to Vessincourt.

The Army Langle established to the south of the Ormain from Revigny to Vitry-le-François.

The Army Foch from Camp de Mailly to Sezanne.

The Army d'Esperez from Sezanne to the plateau to the north of Provins.

The English Army in the region of Crécy en Brie. and finally on the left wing -

The Army of Paris covered to the north east and to the north the entrenched camp of Paris, to the left supported by the junction of the Oise and of the Seine.

A detachment of the Army (Territorial) had been withdrawn to the region to the east of Rouen.

The offensive of the Armies in Lorraine secured the right of the Allied Armies.

German Offensive.

After the combats delivered on the Sambre, the Armies of the German right wing, proceeded and covered by the Cavalry Corps, had pursued their offensive with energy.

The 1st Army and a Cavalry Corps, by the north bank of the Oise in the general direction of Paris, had a series of engagements with the English forces, and some French detachments of Active, Reserve and Territorials, who fell back before it either on Rouen by Amiens, or on Paris by Beauvais, or toward the south by La Fére.

To the left of the 1st Army the 2nd Army and a Corps of Cavalry advanced by Guise (where it received a serious check) the 28th August on Laon and Epernay, further to the left the 3rd Army advanced from Rocroi on Rethel and Rheims.

The retreat of the main body of the Allied Armies on the Marne must put the German Commander under the obligation to pursue with the main body of his forces, thus neglecting Paris; or to realize in spite of all the attack and the occupation of that City, which would seem to be for him a military result, but more especially a political result particularly wished for.

In the first case, the German Armies would be able to co-operate in a common action while covering Paris, but their right wing found itself menaced with envelopment on a terrain cut by numerous water courses (Marne, Petit and Grand Morin).

In the second case it was necessary to consecrate to the taking possession of Paris, in spite of the imperfections of the defense of the Capital at that moment, important forces, and to weaken their centre, there creating spaces of which the Allies would be able to profit in retaking the offensive.

The conviction that the Allies were in definite retreat, that their Army on the left wing had been beaten and put in disorder in the combats delivered in the region Amiens, Peronne, Roye, that the English Army was in no state to act, and that it was necessary to pursue the annihilation of the main body of the adversary, caused without doubt the choice of the first solution; that is to say, to pursue with all their forces toward the south in accentuating the overflowing movement of the right wing by Meaux and Coulomniers, neglecting Paris and the forces which were found either at Paris or at Melun, and that seeing their supposed material state it would be sufficient to observe them.

Composition of the German Armies at the commencement of September 1914.

The Armies consisted of Active Corps and a certain number of Army Corps of the Reserve, in principal of the same origin as the corresponding Active Corps. From right to left of the Allies the German Armies were opposed to them in the following order:

5th, 4th, 3rd, 2nd, 1st:

They had the following composition:

1st Army)	2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th,	Active Corps
Von Kluck)	4th Reserve and 9th Reserve,	Reserve Corps
	(The 9th Reserve reinforced by certain elements of Landwehr invested Mauberge).	
	1 Cavalry Corps.	
2nd Army)	7th, 10th and Garde,	Active Corps
Von Bulow)	7th Reserve, 10th Reserve,	Reserve Corps
	1 Cavalry Corps	
	(The 7th Reserve Corps maintained near Rheims)	
3rd Army)	12th, 19th,	Active Corps (Saxon Army)
Von Hausen)	12th Reserve	
	Division Saxon Cavalry	
4th Army)	6th, 8th, 18th,	Active Corps
Duke of)	8th Reserve, 18th Reserve	Reserve Corps
Wurtemberg)		
	1 Division Cavalry	
5th Army)	5th, 13th, 16th,	Active Corps
Crown Prince)	5th Reserve, 6th Reserve	Reserve Corps
	1 Division Cavalry	

For memory, in Lorraine was found the 6th and 7th Armies, reinforced with certain elements drawn from the mobile garrison of Metz and Strasbourg.

Their advance elements had attained Dammartin in Brie, Mortcerf, Hautefeuille, Touquin, Vaucey, Champcouelle, Saint-Bon, Escardis, Chatillon sur Morin.

2. Situation of the Allied Armies the evening of the 5th September 1914.

5th Army: 18th Army Corps, Center at Villiers St. George in front of the 3rd and 9th German Army Corps.

English Army: Between Mormant and Tournan, faced to the north east holding the edges of the woods east of the Forest of Crécy.

6th Army: Face toward the east between La Therouanne and the Marne, supported from the heights of Dammartin and Montgé.

3. General intentions of the French Commander-in-Chief for the 6th September 1914.

General offensive on all the front, concentration of forces on the German right wing, attack on the front by the 5th French Army and the English Army, on the flank by the 6th French Army on the west bank of the Ourcq and by Meaux in the direction of Haute Maison.

4. Resumé of the movements of the 5th French Army: 5th Army, General Headquarters at Romilly-sur-Seine, the 6th September 1914.

Morning: The 5th Army is in contact on all the front, Courtaçon, Cerneux, Montceaux, Esternay, Lachy.

The 18th Corps to the left is engaged against the 3rd and 9th German Corps. Its extreme left has in front of it the 5th German Division and the Division of Cavalry of the Garde.

The 4th German Corps threatened toward the Forest of Jouy.

About 10 a.m. The 2nd and 4th German Corps moving toward the north, the 2nd and 9th Divisions of German Cavalry were called toward Courtaçon in order to fill the hole which was opened in the middle of the First German Army.

About 4 p.m. The combat is engaged in advance of the front of the left and of the centre. The 18th Corps to the left, the 3rd and 1st in the centre, the 10th Corps to the right. At first very violent from the German side, it slowed down and the 5th Army had the advantage.

Intentions of the Commander-in-Chief: To push back the enemy on the Grand Morin, in the general direction of Montmirail.

5th Army, General Headquarters, Romilly-sur-Seine September 7th 1914.

At 8 a.m. The 1st German Army in retreat in six columns, the 5th French Army in pursuit.

At 11 a.m. The left crossed the route Esternay-Courtacon. The corps of English Cavalry and the Cavalry of the Corps passed to the west of the enemy, seeking to overrun it toward the north east.

The 10th Corps received the order to support the left of the 9th Army engaged toward Villeneuve and Soizy, remaining in touch with the 1st Corps which marched on Esternay-Montmirail, after which the 10th Corps will march on Vauchamps. The 1st Corps will occupy Esternay and march on Montmirail.

The 3rd and 18th Corps marching toward the north, the left by the route Sancy, Meilleray, Montolivet.

At 6 p.m. The 10th Corps had reached with its main body Charleville, Le Rue le Comte; it supported on its right

the 42nd Division (9th Army) strongly engaged at Soizy: It had in front of it the 9th Reserve Army Corps, which received during the evening the order to retreat.

The 3rd Corps and the 18th Corps are on the line Trepols-Montils.

The 5th Army has made about 1000 prisoners and captured a number of caissons, and a Company of machine guns.

Intentions of the Commander-in-Chief: To pursue the offensive, general direction Montmirail.

5th Army, General Headquarters, Romilly-sur-Seine, September 8th 1914.

Morning: The 5th Army continued to force back before it the 3rd and 9th German Corps, who could not make a stand, and whose losses were very heavy, the 6th and 7th.

The 18th Corps progressed on Meilleray, Montolivet, Monteuils. The 3rd Corps progressed toward Rieux. The 1st Corps progressed toward Maclaunay: the 10th Corps ~~progressed toward Maclaunay~~ supported still with its right the 42nd Division heavily engaged but who maintained itself and even progressed.

The early afternoon: The enemy is entrenched at Montmirail and on the Petit Morin. The 5th Army has attacked all along its front.

In the evening the 18th Corps crossed the Petit Morin and has a foothold at Marchais en Brie, on the Plateau west of Montmirail.

The evening: The General Headquarters is installed at Villiers St. Georges.

The intentions of the Commander-in-Chief: To pursue the 1st German Army keeping in touch with the English Army on the left, and supporting the effort of the left of the 9th Army which has reached Corfélix.

5th Army, General Headquarters, Villerés St. Georges September 9th 1914.

Morning: The 2nd and 9th German Corps are in full retreat. The 18th, 3rd and 1st French Corps pursuing them in the general direction of Château-Thierry, as well as the Cavalry Corps (4th, 8th, 10th Divisions of Cavalry and Light Brigade of the 2nd Division of Cavalry).

About 12 noon: Halt on the Plateau de Viffort.

The 10th Corps did not wish to lose contact with the 9th Army, still heavily engaged on its right.

The 5th Army left the 51st Division of Reserves which relieved the 42nd Division; the latter passing in reserve of the 9th Army toward Linthes.

The evening: The 9th German Corps is reported passing to the west of the 3rd Corps.

B A T T L E O F T H E M A R N E.

On the Front of the 5th French Army,
Commanded by General d'Esperey.

(Information Complementaire)

Order of the General-in-Chief to all the Armies the evening of the 5th September.

"The moment has arrived to advance, cost what it may, and to die in the attempt rather than to fall back."

The 5th Army had the order to engage the battle if the enemy showed an indication to halt, without permitting him the time to organize solidly, and also to dispose his troops in such fashion as to be able to employ the forces of his right to support the 9th Army.

Resumé of the movements of the 5th Army the 6th and 7th September.

Day of the 6th: Depart at 6 a.m. for the attack.

The 6th at 11 a.m. The 5th Army reached the south bank of the Aubetin, St. Bon, Chatillon-sur-Morin, Les Essarts, in immediate contact with the enemy on the line Cerneux, Montceaux-les-Provins, Courgivaux, Esternay: it is in communication at Villeneuve-les-Charleville with the 9th Army (General Foch). The Cavalry Corps to the north of the Forest of Jouy assured the communication with the English Army.

The 18th Corps reinforced by the Artillery of the Divisions of the Reserve attacked Montceaux-les-Provins in masking Cerneux.

The 3rd Corps at his right supported at

first with its left the attack of Montceaux, then attacked on Courgivaux. The 1st Corps occupied Esternay with the support of a detachment of the 10th Corps, which attained the Noue, while the main body of the 10th Corps proceeded to co-operate in the action of the 9th Army.

Day of the 7th:The attack recommences at the break of day.

At 11 a.m. the 1st German Army in retreat traversed the route Esternay, Courtacon. The Cavalry Corps and the English in pursuit beating toward the north east.

The evening the 1st Corps reached Morain, after having had an affair with some elements of the 9th Corps.

The 3rd and 18th Corps are on the line Trefols-Montils.

The 10th Corps reached with its main body Charleville, La Roconde. Light elements on the Petit Morin, it supported on its right toward Soizy-aux-Bois the 42nd Division heavily engaged, it had before it the 10th Reserve Corps (German).

Day of the 8th:The 5th Army continued its movement in advance toward the Petit Morin in contact with the rear guards.

The 10th Corps co-operated in the combat delivered by the 9th Army, which was seriously attacked by the main body of the 2nd Army and by the Saxon Corps.

The losses caused the 7th by the 1st, 11th, 9th and 10th German Reserves are much greater than we had supposed.

Day of the 9th: Before the 5th Army the rear guards retreated during the night.

The 5th Army marched on Ste Surmelin.

The evening of the 9th it occupied the position following:

General Headquarters at Vielmaisons.

10th Army Corps: Region St. Prix, Bayes, Fromentiéres, Corfelix, engaged faced to the north east, and to the left of the 9th Army.

1st Army Corps: Region Margny, Janvilliers, Vauchamps, supporting the 10th Corps, with its Corps of Artillery and a Brigade of Infantry.

3rd Army Corps: Region Vardon, L'Echelle de France, having thrown back the enemy's rear guards, faced to the north.

Reserve Division: Region Montlevon, Artonges.

18th Army Corps: After a combat during the night at Marchais pushed an advance guard on the right bank of the Marne at Château-Thierry, the main body between Château-Thierry and Viffort, a detachment at Bonneuil.

The Cavalry Corps: Main body to the south of the Marne, a Division on the north bank toward Château-Thierry.

BATTLE OF THE MARNE.

Engagement of the 9th Army,
Commanded by General Foch.

(III)

Composition: The 9th Army had been organized with the 9th and 11th Army Corps, the 42nd Division of Infantry, and the Morocco Division, the 52nd and 60th Divisions of the Reserve, and the 9th Division of Cavalry. It was commanded by General Foch.

Situation the evening of the 5th September, and instructions received.

The 5th September the 9th Army prolonged the front of the 5th Army to the east of Sezanne, and received instructions to hold the front that it occupied until the moment when the movements of the 5th Army on its left, and the 4th Army on its right would permit the 9th Army to participate in the movement in advance.

Movements of the 6th, 7th & 8th September.

From the 6th the Army Foch was seriously engaged on the front, La Villeneuve-les-Charleville, St. Prix, the exits to the south of the Maris de Saint Gond (swamps), course of the river Somme to Ecury-le-Répos against the 10th Corps the Garde and the 12th German Corps.

But the 8th September the German effort succeeded in causing the right of the 9th Army (11th Corps) to fall back on Courgancon. General Foch prepared at once a counter offensive with his elements of the left liberated by the offensive of the 5th Army.

This counter-offensive permitted the 11th Corps to momentarily move in advance.

Movements of the 9th & 10th September.

But the 9th of September a new attack, more violent still, obliged the 11th Corps to fall back again to the south of Courgançon, and even to Salon, and threw back the 9th Corps, centre of the Army Foch, on the line Allemant-Connantré. General Foch persisted in the attack, he threw on the morning of the 10th the 42nd Division on Fére-Champenoise which was finally occupied.

Numerous German wounded were abandoned here, and the Garde suffered heavy losses as well as many prisoners.

The resistance of the enemy was broken and General Foch established his Headquarters at Fére-Champenoise at 10 p.m. that night, which had been held that morning by the Prussian Garde.

L a Poursuite.

The 9th Army supported on its right by the Cavalary Corps of General de l'Espee (6th and 9th Divisions) pursued the enemy energetically, making many prisoners, and capturing caissons and equipage.

The 12th, the Marne was crossed without difficulty between Tours sur Marne and Sarry.

B A T T L E O F T H E M A R N E.

On the front of the 9th Army

(Renseignements Complementaires)

Situation of the 9th Army the evening of September 5th 1914:

Post of the Commander at Pleurs, Headquarters left further to the south.

11th Corps: Region Semoine, Sommesous, Lenharrée.

9th Corps: Region Fére-Champenoise, and to the north, advance guard toward Morains-le-Petit and to the north of the Marais (Swamps) in the region of Toulon.

42nd Division and Moroccan Division. Region Mondement, St. Prix, La Villeneuve-les Charleville.

9th Cavalry Division. At Mailly.

Divisions of the Reserve: To the north of l'Aube (river).

The 10th Corps: (5th Army) stationed in the region of Sezanne.

Intentions of the Commander-in-Chief.

To support toward the north-west the offensive of the 5th Army, and to hold on the rest of the front in waiting until the progress of the 5th Army, and that of the 4th, would permit to attack all along the front.

Resumé of the instructions given:

The 11th Corps: To establish itself defensively from Morains-le-Petit to Lenharrée, on its right

- 11 -

the 9th Division of Cavalry was to march toward Vatry, holding the direction Chalons, Sommesous, to fall back eventually on Sommesous. This division to assure besides the communication with the 4th Army.

The 9th Corps: To establish itself defensively on the line of the Marais de St. Gond (Swamps), de Oyes to Bannes (inclusive) and maintaining to the north of the Marais an advance garde strongly organized troops available and ready to debouche on Champaubert.

The 42nd Division: To attack at the right of the 10th Corps, which was to march on Montmirail and to the east, direction of attack of the Division, Vauchamps-Janvilliers.

Day of September 6th 1914.

The 9th Army is engaged all along its front.

To the right: The 11th Corps has resisted on the front Morains-le-Petit, Ecury-le-Répos, Normée, the attack of forces of all armies, supported by a numerous Artillery.

During the night Morains-le-Petit is on fire, Ecury-le-Répos and Normée violently bombarded, have been evacuated by the fractions of the 11th Corps which is firmly established in the woods to the south.

The 9th Division of Cavalry has had an engagement in the region of Coole on the route Sommesous, Vitry, with forces of the enemy's Cavalry (probably the Saxon Division) supported by Artillery and Infantry.

The Centre: The 9th Corps, after having established its advance guard to the north of the Marais de St.Gond,

has had to fall back and holds the exits south of these swamps.

The Left: The Moraccan Division and the 42nd Division holding the loupe de St. Prix, the edge of the woods north of the wood of St. Gond, Soizy-aux-Bois, la Villeneuve-les-Charleville, with their advance guards organized defensively.

The communication is assured with the 10th Corps of which the elements of the right hold Charleville.

Days of the 7th and 8th September.

Instructions given for the day of the 7th:

The 42nd Division and the Moroccan Division conserving their offensive mission in communication with the 10th Corps.

The 9th Corps has a defensive mission at the southern outlets of the Marais de St. Gond, holding itself ready to take the offensive.

The 11th Corps will maintain the possession of the front held the 6th, and will endeavour to debouche first on Clamange, then on Colligny.

It will cover its right by a Division of the Reserve, who will hold the heights, which, to the south-west command the exits from Lenharrée, Vassimont and Haussimont.

The 9th Division of Cavalry at Sommesous conserves the mission previously given. It will seek communication with the 4th Army toward Le Meix-Tiercelin and the Camp de Mailly, where are the elements of the left of that Army.

The 18th Division is held in reserve of the Army.

Events which happened.

The 9th Army was violently attacked the morning of the 7th.

The 42nd Division and the Moroccan Division were violently engaged in the region of Villeneuve-les-Charleville, Soizy, Mondement, and in the woods, and in touch with the 10th Corps. They have re-occupied, the evening of the 8th, St. Prix, and thrown back the enemy to the north of the Marais-de-St.Gond.

The 9th Corps maintained itself to the south of the Marias-de-St. Gond.

The 11th Corps, after having resisted the 7th, was forced back the 8th to the south of the Maurriene (front Congy, Gourgançon, Semoine).

In the evening of the 8th, aided by a counter-attack executed on Fére-Champenoise by the Division of Reserve, put at the disposition of the 9th Corps, the 11th Corps re-occupied the heights to the north of Euvy.

To the right of the 11th Corps the 9th Division of Cavalry, in the region of Mailly, is in communication with the left Corps of the 4th Army, which had attacked in the afternoon of the 8th in the region of Sompuis.

The post of the Commander of the Army is removed further to the south at Plancy.

Day of the 9th September 1914.

Events which happened.

Morning: Strongly attacked since the morning the 11th Corps has had to withdraw its right as far as Gourgançon and even Salon.

In the centre the 9th Corps has been very

violently attacked to the south of the Marais-de-St. Gond, and has withdrawn on the line Allemant Connantré.

The Moroccan Division maintained itself in the region of Mondement.

To the left the 10th Corps put at the disposition of General Foch progressed in following the general movement of the 5th Army, and reached the region to the west of Champaubert, between the Petit Morin and Fromentiéres.

The 42nd Division was relieved in the morning by a Division of Reserve of the 5th Army, and was put in general reserve in the region Linthes-Pleurs.

Evening: At 4 p.m. the 42nd Division received the order to counter-attack on Fŕe Champenoise.

Orders are given by the Commander of the Army in order that that counter-attack be the signal for the re-taking of the offensive all along the front of the Army.

That order was no sooner received than execution commenced, which assured the left of the 11th Corps, very strongly pressed by the troops debouching from Fére-Champenoise.

The evening of the 9th September the situation of the Army is the following:

To the right: The 60th Division of Reserve to the south of Semoine, having on its right the 9th Division of Cavalry at l'Arbre de la Justice (to the south of Mailly).

The 11th Corps (reinforced by the 18th Division) in the woods to the south of Gourgançon.

The 9th Corps has its right toward Connantré,

its left supported by the wood of Allemant, which is occupied by the Moroccan Division, which finished by taking definite possession of Mondement.

The 10th Corps has reached Fromentiéres and Baye.

The action of the 4th Army on Sompuis has commenced to make itself felt.

Day of the 10th September 1914.

Instructions given:

Offensive at 5 o'clock in the morning on all the front in the general direction of Sommesous and Morains-le-Petit.

The 10th Corps still at the disposition of the 9th Army attacking to the north of the Marais-de-St.Gond, in the general direction of Bergéres-les-Vertus.

Events which happened.

The 11th Corps, still having at its disposition the 18th Division, attacked to the south east of the line Oeuvy-Lenharrée: it occupied Gourgançon toward 9 a.m. Behind its right the 60th Division held itself ready to act with the 9th Division of Cavalry on Mailly, which was to be reconnoitred during the morning.

The 42nd Division marched on Féré Champenoise, which it occupied about 9 a.m.

The 9th Corps progressed to the north of the railroad, Sezanne, Féré Champenoise, against the objectives, Normée, Ecury-le-Répos, Morains-le-Petit. The enemy yielded on all our front.

At 1 p.m. the Army occupies the front, Sommesous-Morains-le-Petit.

The order is given to the Army Corps to reach by evening the front, Vatry, Germinon, Villeneuve.

To the 10th Corps to halt in the region Bergéres-lés-Vertus, Colligny, faced to the north. Its advance guards to the north of the route Champaubert-Chalons, in communication at Petit-Voipreux with the 9th Corps.

To the 9th Division of Cavalry, to push on Chalons and cut the retreat of the enemy, who, in the morning, was still at Sompuis.

The General Headquarters of the Army were transferred to Fére Champenoise.

Information of the enemy during the days from the 6th to the 10th of September.

The 2nd German Army after having passed the Marne by Dormans at Epernay and having reached the route of Chalons between Montmirail and Bergéres the 5th toward 11 a.m. has gained contact with the French Army on the general front La Villeneuve-les-Charleville, St. Prix, Morains-le-Petit, Ecury-le-Répos.

The Corps of the 2nd Army was disposed as follows:

From right to left:

10th Reserve Corps: Region from Montmirail, where General Headquarters is established, and to the east, 10th Corps active region of Bannay-Congy.

The Garde: From Bois Toulon to Ecury-le-Répos.

The 7th Corps: In échelon in rear to the right, will cross the Petit-Morin at Montmirail and to the west.

The 3rd Army to the left of the 2nd Army, after having crossed the Marne at one place and another from Chalons, was disposed from right to left as follows:

12th Corps: Which attacked on the front Normée - Lenharrée.

12th Reserve Corps: Toward Sommesous.

19th Corps: Which marched toward the south will engage at Sompuis and at Meix-Tiercelin.

Day of September 6th 1914.

The 10th Corps of Reserve. Right of the 2nd Army marched from Montmirail on Esternay by the region of the Forêt du Gault.

The 10th Corps has attacked La Villeneuve-les-Charleville, Soizy, and has taken possession of St. Prix, Villevenard and Joches.

The Garde has attacked to the north of the Marais de St. Gond and is there strongly entrenched.

The advance guards of the 12th Corps have gained contact at Normée and Lenharrée.

For memory, to the extreme right the 7th Corps appears to have made movement from Montmirail toward Meilleray; certain of these elements have returned to the west of Montmirail the same night.

Day of the 7th September 1914.

An account rendered from the 9th Army (morning) reported that the advance guard of the 12th Corps is entrenched to the north of Lenharrée and has established some heavy Artillery near Clamanges (the heavy Artillery of the Garde was in position at Colligny), one of its divisions has been reported between Clamanges and Pierre-Morains in march toward the south west.

The heavy Artillery of the 9th Army has engaged the batteries in position at Clamanges, Pierre Morains and Colligny.

An account rendered in the evening reported that the

10th Corps of the Reserve is in the region Forêt de Gault, Charleville and to the north.

The 10th French Corps has captured a battalion from the German 10th Corps of the Reserve in the Forêt de Gault.

Day of the 8th September 1914.

The German forces take the offensive along all the front.

The 10th Corps which had been violently attacked the 6th and 7th debouched to the south of the Marais de St. Gond, as well as the Garde.

Information received at 8 p.m. made known that the 11th Corps had been compelled to yield before the attacks of fractions of the Garde, the 12th Corps and 12th Reserve Corps.

To the right the 10th Reserve Corps has conserved a defensive attitude, that has imposed a withdrawal of the 1st German Army.

Copy of an order of the 2nd Division of Reserves of the Garde found on a wounded German Officer.

(The 10th Reserve Corps consisted of the 19th Reserve Division, and the 2nd Division of the Garde).

10th Reserve Corps: Order for the day of the 8th: The 8th September 12.05 midnight, General Headquarters at Fontaine-au-Bron.

All the enemy's attacks against the 10th Corps have been repulsed with success.

A Division of the enemy's Cavalry has retired toward the south before the 19th Reserve Division.

The 2nd Army remains in its positions.

The 13th Division (7th Corps) to the north of Montmirail, the 19th Division of Reserves to the right of the 2nd Division of Reserves of the Garde. The left wing of the 10th Reserve Corps in front of Charleville.

The 10th Reserve Corps holding its positions in order to facilitate the mission of attack of the 10th Active Corps.

The 2nd Division of Reserves of the Garde will hold itself at 5 a.m. in its entrenched positions prepared to make a decisive defence.

The reserves in formation will be entrenched very close in the rear.

The 2nd Uhlans will send at 4 a.m. some patrols toward the preceding objectives in the service of reconnaissance far and near, and will locate in particular the Cavalry Division of the enemy.

Combat trains remain at Vauchamps.

1st and 2nd trains at Orbais.

Regimental trains at the junction d'Orbais faced toward the north.

I will be at 6 a.m. at the junction to the south of Fontaine-au-Bron.

Day of the 9th September 1914.

In the morning: The Cavalry of the 2nd Army (Richthopen) who employed to the left of the Army during the operations to the north of the Aisne (action against the convoys of the 5th Army after the battle of Guise) had not been engaged during the first days of the battle, received the order to organize defensively the north bank of the Marne to the north of Chézy (south west of Château Thierry).

This order was not received until the commencement of the action.

At 5:30 a.m. Richtopen reported that a violent combat is engaged toward Montreuil and that at noon two columns of Infantry were seen toward Viffort and Essises.

During the day: The German attacks (about 3 Corps, the Garde, 12th Corps and 12th Reserve Corps) to the east of the Marais de St.Gond, have been able to progress to the left on Gourgançon and beyond there toward Salon.

In the centre, where a great effort had been made by the Garde at Fére-Champenoise, the line of combat reached the foot of the heights of Allemant and the edge of the woods north east of the village of connantré.

But to the right, the 10th Reserve Corps had been thrown back on Vauchamps, the 10th Corps has had to yield some ground, and in the evening we were able to see great columns marching from Bonnay et Baye towards the north.

To the right the 7th German Corps, who had remained to the north of Montmirail, received the order to fall back on the Marne (withdrawal of the Army probably). This movement was executed during the night by Vauchamps-Orbais, in crossing or going beyond the columns of troops and the parks of the 10th Reserve Corps. It crossed the Marne towards Dormans and Châtillon.

Day of the 10th of September 1914.

Toward 9 a.m. the 1st Army made known to the 2nd Army that it was forced to withdraw in haste.

Toward 12 o'clock noon the 2nd Army is advised that on the south bank of the Marne, movements of the enemy's troops are observed toward the east.

In front of Château Thierry the enemy is in movement by Epaux and Bézu.

The general order of retreat has had to be given.

At noon the movement of withdrawal is general.

The 7th Corps by Romigny will canton towards Arcis-Pensart, this movement will conduct it towards Craonne to the north of the Aisne.

The main bodies of the 2nd and 3rd Armies will withdraw in the direction of Berry au Bac and of Rheims.

Day of the 11th of September 1914.

The rear guards offered but a weak resistance, before them the Allied forces reached the front: Forêt de Compiégne, Villers Cotteret, Fére-en-Tardenois, Bajoches, Epernay, Chalons.

B A T T L E O F T H E M A R N E.

Resumé of the Operations on the front of the English Army, Commanded by General French.

The English Army (1st, 2nd 3rd Army Corps, and a Division of Cavalry) started the 6th September from a front marked about by a line Rozoy-Lagny. It attacked in the general direction of Rebais and moved the same evening its advance posts on the south bank of the Grand Morin.

The 7th & 8th September: It continued its march forcing back the enemy's rear guards and reached the Marne between La Ferte St. Jouarre and Nogent l'Artaud.

The 9th September: The English forces debouched to the north of the Marne, en eval of Château Thierry. It brought thus an effective aid to the 6th Army, in taking from the flank the forces with which the latter was engaged on the Ourcq. This action contributing to the determination of a rapid retreat by the Germans who were fighting faced to the west.

The 10th September: The English Army pursued the enemy in retreat toward the north. It captured seven cannons, several machine guns, more than 1000 prisoners and numerous equipages.

The 12th September: It crossed the Aisne between Soissons exclus and Longneval.

B A T T L E O F T H E M A R N E.

Resumé of the daily movements of
the English Army.

Day of the 6th of September 1914.

Morning: The 2nd German Corps attacked all along the line Vaudoy, Pezarches, Hauteville (Artillery).

Some German columns (4th Corps) are in march to the east of Vaudoy towards Provins and St.Just.

About 10 a.m. These attacks ceased and a German movement in retreat seemed to commence toward the north, the columns east of Vaudoy seemed also to retrograde.

The English Army moved in advance towards the east, in the direction Courtaçon, the left supporting itself on the Grand Morin.

About noon: The Germans have retreated towards the north without letting themselves be approached, re-crossed the Grand Morin toward Coulomniers and to the east (4th Corps), two columns have been reported moving toward Trilport-Changis (2nd Corps).

The evening: The English reached the line Choisy (1st Corps) Coulomniers (2nd Corps), Crécy and Villiers S. Morin (3rd Corps) with their advance guards. The enemy after a light resistance has retreated toward the north.

The 2nd German Corps found itself still in part to the southeast of Meaux.

The 4th German Corps is in the region of Rebais.

The remainder of the 1st German Army (3rd Corps, Division of Cavalry of the Garde, 9th Corps) is engaged

against the 5th French Army.

Day of the 7th September 1914.

Intentions of the Commander:

The English Army will continue to march in conversion, the right in advance by échelons toward Rebais.

About 10 a.m. The main body reached:

1st Corps: Dagny

2nd Corps: Coulomniers

3rd Corps: Maisoncelles (Marshal French)

The enemy fell back covered by his Cavalry.

The Cavalry Corps of Marwitz holding the Grand Morin from Chauffry á Pomeuse, one Division of Cavalry at Pomeuse Mourroux, one Division of Cavalry at Boissy-Chauffry, one Division of Cavalry in the centre six kilometres north of Coulomniers.

Marwitz was ignorant of what had become of the 2nd German Corps.

Late afternoon: The 4th German Corps commenced to cross the Marne toward Charly in the direction of Montreuil aux Lions. Large bodies were reported near Viels-Maisons and Hondevilliers.

The German Cavalry is grouped to the south east of La Ferte S. Jouarre toward Orly, St.Cyr and Bussiéres: it had crossed about 12 noon the Grand Morin to the east of La Ferte Gauche.

The evening: The Division of English Cavalry is to the east of Choisy. The 1st Corps is to the north west of Choisy, five kilometres to the west of La Ferte Gauche.

The 2nd Corps is to the east of Coulomniers.

The 3rd Corps is at Maisoncelles, Giremoutiers, northwest of Coulomniers.

Day of the 8th of September 1914.

Intentions of the Commander:

To march in conversion, the right in advance toward Nogent-l'Artaud, limited on the east by route Rebais, Hondevilliers Nogent l'Artaud, on the west by the route Jouarre-la-Ferte sur Jouarre.

6 a.m. The head of the column had attained:

1st Corps: Saint Remy.

2nd Corps: Boissy le Chatel.

3rd Corps: Hautemaison

About 1 p.m. The English Aeroplanes reported the movement in retreat of the Germans toward the north and north east. The German forces opposed to the 5th Army crossed the Marne between Chesy and Charly, and those opposed to the English Army passing between Charly, and La Ferte S. Jouarre.

A strong rear guard occupies the line Sablon-niéres-Orly, and engagement seems probable towards La Tretoire, some German trenches are reported toward Ussy (west of La Ferte sur Jouarre), some Artillery in position at Joignes.

The route from Hondevilliers toward La Ferte sur Jouarre is encumbered. The troops and convoys are piled up to the east of La Ferte sur Jouarre.

At 1 p.m. The 3rd English Corps attacked between

Signy Sugnets and Jouarre, in the direction of La Ferte sur Jouarre. It is supported by a Battalion of French Field Artillery with which it acts in liaison.

The 2nd English Corps reaches the Petit Morin between Jouarre and Archet-St-Cyr.

Between these two Corps the heavy Artillery and howitzers fire on the bridge of La Ferte sur Jouarre where the retreat is precipitated.

The 1st Corps attacks between St. Cyr and La Tretoire where the struggle is most lively.

Marshal French wishes to occupy the plateau north of the Petit Morin and to push on the Marne.

Late afternoon: The English force the passage of the Petit Morin and reach in the evening the front La Ferte sur Jouarre-Viellemaisons.

The evening: Some English skirmishers attacked the German 2nd Division of Cavalry at the moment when they were making camp and forced them to beat a retreat.

Day of the 9th of September 1914.

Intentions of the Commander:

To cross the Marne, the right toward Château Thierry and push toward the north, the right in advance.

Morning: The 1st and 2nd Corps passed the Marne toward Nogent l'Artaud, Charly, Nanteuil sur Marne, Saacy, Suzancy, but the 3rd Corps is halted in the environs of La Ferte sur Jouarre, where the bridges are down.

About noon: The enemy is reported in force on the line Château Thierry, Maugny en Arxois.

Marshal French asks that the 18th Corps of the 5th French Army support toward Château Thierry the 1st English Corps.

About 4 p.m: The enemy has not held and has retired on the line Bussiéres, Soicy, Belleau, Etrepilly (to the west of Château Thierry).

At 6 p.m: Aeroplanes report that there is no enemy in the zone Viffort-Pargny as far as the Marne, neither in the zone Forêt de Fére, between Mezy sur Marne and Fére en Sardenoise.

All the 1st German Army is therefore in retreat to the west of Château Thierry.

The evening (7 p.m.): The 1st Corps (General Headquarters at Charly) has its advance posts on the line Château Thierry, Le Thiolet, Coupru.

The 2nd Corps (General Headquarters at Saacy) has its advance posts on the line Coupru south of Montreuil aux Bois Chamoust.

The 3rd Corps (General Headquarters at Tareterel) holding Chamigny and La Ferte sur Jouarre where a bridge will be finished during the night.

The Germans are in rapid retreat in the region Jaignes, Mary, Lizy sur Ourcq, Coulombs, toward the north in numerous columns.

Day of the 10th September 1914.

Intentions of the Commander:

To continue the movement of conversion and of pursuit in the direction of Neuilly sur Front and La Ferté-Milon.

The 10th the movement in pursuit was executed as foreseen and the evening of the 10th the English right arrived toward Neuillt St. Front.

GENERAL RESUME.

of the operations of the 6th French Army,

General Maunoury commanding.

The intentions of the General-in-Chief, indicated elsewhere, bu his general order to take the offensive, the role of the 6th French Army was to be decisive. It was the 6th Army, taking advantage of the adventuresome situation of the 1st German Army, and acting on its right flank, that had decided its movement in retreat.

The 6th Army had been created with divers elements, assembled at first in the region of Amiens, and reinforced by two Active Corps, the 4th and 7th.

The 5th of September, in the morning, the 6th Army was in position on the front Claye-Souilly, Dammartin-en-Goele. It was put in movement toward the Ourcq and arrived in the evening, with its advance guards, on the front Penchard, St. Soupplets, Ver. It met with energetic resistance on the part of the 4th German Reserve Corps, which had remained alone to the north of the Marne to protect the German right flank. As soon as the offensive made itself felt, the Germans, appreciating the danger they were running, made an effort to parry it by calling to the north of the Marne their 2nd and 4th Active Corps. These latter coming to reinforce on the Ourcq the 4th Reserve Corps.

The 6th of September, the Army Maunoury continued its offensive, its objective was to reach the Ourcq between Lizy and Neufchelles. With this object in view it reinforced its left in the direction of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, in seeking the envelopment of the German right. In the evening it had reached the front, Chambry, Marcilly, Puisieux, Acy-en-Multien.

The 8th Division, which remained to the south of

the Marne, progressed toward the Bois de Meaux.

The 2nd German Corps marched to the right of the 4th German Reserve Corps, reaching in the evening with its first elements Etavigny.

The 7th of September the offensive of the 6th Army was pursued against the German forces who continued to reinforce, and arrived at several kilometres from the Ourcq.

In order to maintain the enemy's right in the dangerous position where it was found, the 6th Army received the order to gain ground toward the north. It pushed the 61st Division and its Cavalry toward Villers-St-Genest and Bargny.

During the days of the 8th and 9th September the 6th Army had to support a counter-offensive of great violence on the part of the Germans, who continued to reinforce their right without cesse. They brought up the heavy artillery with which they commenced a bombardment of frightful intensity. The 8th of September the Germans succeeded in occupying Betz and Thury-en-Valois, the 9th of September they took possession of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin.

The troops of the 6th Army succeeded, however, to hold good on the greater part of the front. Only the left had to fall back on Silly-le-Long.

The 9th September in the evening, the 8th Division having become useless at his right, General Maunoury brought that division to the north of the Marne, he destined it for a new attack on the 10th September. That attack did not take place because of the withdrawal of the Germans, who retreated toward the north.

Nanteuil and Etavigny were re-occupied.

The 6th Army commenced the pursuit of the Germans who retired toward Crépy-en-Valoise, and Villers-Cotterets.

B A T T L E O F T H E M A R N E.

Daily resumé of the engagement of the 6th French Army.

Order of the Battle of the 6th French Army.

The 5th September the 6th French Army comprised:

2 Active Corps, 4th and 7th.

1 Reserve Corps, composed of the 55th and 56th Divisions.

The 45th Division.

3 Divisions of Cavalry.

It was reinforced during the course of the combat by the 61st and 62nd Divisions of Reserve drawn from the Garrison of Paris.

Day of the 6th September 1914.

At break of day: The 6th Army occupied St. Soupplets and Monthyon, made several hundred prisoners, and captured a certain number of guns.

At 8 a.m. Communication established by the 8th Division with the 3rd English Corps, eight kilometers to the south of Meaux.

About 10 a.m. Two German Columns (Infantry and Artillery) moving from the south towards Vareddes and Lizy-sur-Ourcq.

About noon: The army is engaged on the line Chambry Brégy against the 4th German Reserve Corps, which has been thrown back toward the east.

Afternoon: The two columns reported marching

toward Vareddes and to Mary belong to the German 2nd Corps.

About 5 p.m. Three of the enemy's columns are in retreat in the Bois de Meaux before the 8th Division. The main body of the 6th Army is engaged on the line Chambry, Barcy, Marcilly, Puisieux, Acy-en-Multien, against the 4th German Reserve Corps, as well as the 2nd Corps, coming to its support to the north toward Etavigny in front of our left.

The end of the day: The 6th Army has progressed in throwing back the 4th German Reserve Corps, which is maintained on the west bank of the Ourcq, and that the 2nd Corps has commenced to support to the north after having crossed the Marne to the west of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre.

Information of the enemy's movements on the 6th September 1914.

The 2nd Corps, which during the morning of the 6th September had taken the offensive against the English Army in the region Touquin-Pezarches, and the edge of the woods north of the Forêt de Crécy, broke off the combat at 10 a.m. leaving only a rear guard in contact with the English, and marched toward the north. The main body of the Army Corps in position in the evening in the region south east of Meaux, its advance guards supporting the same night the right of the 4th German Reserve Corps towards Etavigny. In the 2nd Corps the 3rd Division seemed to be withdrawn by the Bois de Meaux in order to reinforce the left of the 4th Reserve Corps, to the east of Vareddes, while the 4th Division marched on Etavigny.

The 4th Corps (Active) which had attacked to

the east of Vaudoy, taking as direction the front of Jouy, had also broken off the engagement, and had withdrawn to the region of Rebais, its advance guards on the Marne toward La Ferté-sous-Jouarre.

Day of September 7th 1914.

Intentions of the Commander:

To act on the left with the 61st Reserve Division (transported by rail) and with all the Cavalry.

Morning: Continue the action of attack against the 4th Reserve Corps. The left wing to prevent the entry in line of the 2nd Corps towards Etavigny in awaiting the arrival of the 61st Reserve Division.

About 4 p.m. The French attack has reached the crest to the west of Etavigny.

At 4 p.M. General attack. The 61st Reserve Division reached Villers-St-Genest.

The Cavalry Corps reached Bargny to the north of Betz, in moving towards Ouvergnon.

The evening: The 6th Army has progressed against the 4th Reserve Corps and the 2nd Corps, who seemed to have withdrawn their main bodies to the east bank of the Ourcq.

Large bodies of the enemy are reported towards Les Essarts, Coulombs, St. Quentin. Some German Battalions of station troops coming from Creil and Pont-Ste-Maxence have united at Senlis and are moving toward Crépy-en-Valois.

The 8th Division occupying St. Fiacre and Villemareuil is still engaged against the enemy, who occupies the edges of the Bois de Meaux and holds the exits to the south of these woods.

Information of the enemy's movements during the 7th of September 1914.

The evening large bodies of the enemy are reported toward Les Essarts and further to the north. It seems that these troops must belong to the fourth Active Corps reported the previous day in the evening in the region of Rebais.

All the routes north and south are reported covered by long columns in retreat on the Marne.

Day of the 8th September 1914.

Intentions of the Commander:

To attack with the 45th Division toward Etrepilly and to outflank toward the north with the 61st Division of Reserves.

Morning: Continuation of the offensive all along the front.

The 45th Division commenced its attack on the front: Barcy, Marcilly, direction Vareddes-Etrepilly.

Towards 8 a.m. the 8th Division co-operated with the English left on the front Villemareuil, Pierre-Levée.

About 10 a.m. The offensive of the 45th Division is stopped by a violent cannonade from the region Vareddes. The centre is stationary, the German line is entrenched and reinforced.

Towards Etavigny, Bar, Bouillancy, violent counter-attacks by the Germans against the 7th Corps. Betz is occupied by the Germans. The French Cavalry Corps is behind our left.

The General commanding the 6th Army moved in advance on his left, the 61st Reserve Division which engaged three regiments in the first line.

He held in reserve the 7th Division.

The Cavalry received the order to over-run by

the left and to work toward the east.

The 8th Division coming from St. Fiacre and Villemareuilpushed on Trilport-Changis, upon a report that the Germans are crossing the Marne on pontoons.

The cannonade is intense.

About 2 p.m. Large German reinforcements on Lizy, May and Rozoy-en-Multien.

Some masses of the enemy are recognized toward St. Gengoulph and Brumetz, and on the Ourcq towards Neufchelles; Thury-en-Valois is strongly defended.

About 5.30 p.m. A Division of German Cavalry is reported near Thury-en-Valois.

At 6.15 p.m. The right is stationary; to the left the 61st Division of Reserve is heavily engaged.

The 7th Division is thrown in between the 61st Division of Reserve and the 7th Corps who were strongly pressed.

Information of the enemy's movements during the 8th of September 1914.

Towards noon General Von Kluck, commanding the 1st Army, ordered the blowing up of the bridges over the Marne.

This order was not able to be immediately executed because of the encumberment of the German columns at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and to the east.

At 1.40 p.m. some Artillery of large calibre, pieces of 15 c/m is placed in the bend at Vareddes, firing on Marcilly and Barcy.

At the same hour, attack on Bouillancy by German reinforcements, who seemed to belong to the 4th Active Corps.

During the night it seemed that the 3rd German Corps had some elements in the region east of the Ourcq towards St. Gengoulph.

Day of the 9th September 1914.

Intentions of the Commander:

The Military Governor of Paris will send the 62nd Division of Reserve in support and "comme repli éventuel", in order to permit the continuance of the offensive the 9th of September.

Morning: The German Army attempted a last effort in order to disengage its extreme right, but the 6th Army, well covered to the north by the 4th Corps, held easily and continued to press the enemy on all the line.

The Cavalry Corps advancing to the north reported the presence of a German Cavalry Division which was falling back.

About 11 a.m. The Germans abandoned Betz and commenced to beat a retreat.

About 5 p.m. The aeroplanes report numerous German columns in retreat towards the north east. One column, of all arms, 15 kilometres in length, marching from Coulombs towards the north east; a Column of Cavalry followed the same direction, a Column of three groups of Artillery is in march from Lizy toward Ocquerre, three Columns of all arms are in retreat from Mary and from Jaignes toward the north east.

In the evening: In order to disengage their right wing, which was menaced, the Germans threw a strong column of Infantry in the direction of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin supported by Artillery. The French left met this diversion.

The 8th Division received the order to move toward Silly-le-Long; upon its arrival the left will take the offensive.

During the night of the 8th & 9th: The Military Governor of Paris has made a coup de main by sending some Zouaves by auto to Senlis and Creil, where they made some prisoners. This region is cleared of the enemy.

Information of the enemy's movements during the 9th September 1914.

At 8 a.m. The Commander of the 1st German Army received bad news from his Cavalry Corps under Von der Marwitz, who was endeavouring to hold the English offensive to the south of the Marne.

He has had to abandon the line of the Petit Morin as the enemy has crossed at Orly and at Villeneuve.

At noon he announced that some strong columns were in march via Charly and Nanteuil-sur-Marne, towards the north, he was going to try to throw them back and cover his flanks by the occupation of the heights to the south of Cocherel and of Monbertoin.

At 4 p.m. Marwitz had a violent engagement on the front marked by the great route of Lizy to Château Thierry.

At 8 p.m. An order to beat an immediate retreat is given to the 1st German Army.

From outside information received we are informed that the confession of the Commander of the 1st German Army was to the effect that the latter had need of several days to re-organize.

Day of the 10th September 1914.

Intentions of the Commander.

The retreat of the Germans is certain: the 6th Army will continue the offensive on its extreme left.

Night of the 9th & 10th: The enemy continued his movement in retreat toward the north, to theeast of the Ourcq, continuing to cover himself against the 6th Army.

Morning of the 10th: Under the effort of the 6th Army, Nanteuille-Haudouin is abandoned by the Germans, then Etavigny.

The German losses toward the right, Barcy, Chambry, have been enormous.

About noon: The 6th Army continued the offensive with its left on Lévignen.

The right 45th Division mounted the Ourcq astride the valley, supported on the right by the Brigade of Reserve Cavalry (Gillet) in touch with the English Army.

8 p.m. The enemy has continued his retreat, covered by a Cavalry screen. His main body has arrived during the night to the north of the Forêt de Villers Cotterets, and halted in the region Retheuil-Mortefontaine, Montgobert. A Column is grouped from Sery - Fresnoy la Riviére to the north of Crépy-en-Valois.

The rear guards holding Bonneuil-en-Valois, Vez, Largny, and to the south of the Forêt of Villers Cotterets, Autheuil-en-Valois.

Resumé of the operations on the front of the

4th French Army.

Commanded by General de Langle.

The 4th Army halted the 6th of September on the heights of Vitry to resist the German advance, after a retreat of several days executed in immediate contact with the enemy, and marked by daily combats.

The Army Corps (4 Corps) which composed the 4th Army suffered from fatigue and by the losses experienced during the preceding days, they were not allowed any respite to rest or re-organize.

Attacked the 6th and 7th September, the army maintained itself on the front Humbauville, Chateau Beauchamps, Bignicourt, Blesmes, Maurupt-le-Montois.

The 8th and 9th September it resisted with the same obstinacy, during which General de Langle started toward the left of the Army, in the region of Sompuis, the 21st Corps which had just been put at his disposition.

The 9th of September the order was given to the 4th Army to progress vigorously by its left in order to disengage the 9th Army. The 10th of September the action of the 21st Corps, reinforced by all the reserves that it had been possible to draw from the Corps on the right, was able finally to make itself felt, and the 11th of September the Germans retreated.

They had present against the 4th Army:

The 19th Corps)
The 8th Corps) Active (Saxons)
The 18th Corps)
The 12th Division of Reserves
The 8th Reserve Corps
The 18th Reserve Corps

With these considerable forces the Germans delivered a desperate struggle.

They made use of a formidable Artillery. Certain villages, Courdemanges, Maurupt and Ecriennes, had been taken and retaken several times with the bayonet.

In spite of these considerable losses, especially in Officers, the Army had maintained intact until the end its moral and was still after several days of struggle susceptible of retaking the offensive which had assured its final success.

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of Von Hausen (the 3rd) had energetically directed the 19th Corps Active (Saxon) and 12th Corps Active (Saxon) against the 17th French Corps.

Situation on the Evening of the 5th.

(A). The Army of Langle has on the evening of the 5th, its left (17th Corps) at Humbauville - Glaunes - Huiron - Courdemanges, - its centre (12th Corps and Colonial Corps) at Vauclerc - Dompremy - Blesmes,- its right (2nd Corps) at Maurupt and Sermaize.

(The 12th Corps has been the hardest pressed and has hardly six battalions in a state to go on with the fight: the remainder needs to be completely reformed.)

Its headquarters is at Brienne.

The post of the Commander at Chavanges.

(B) Facing the Army of Langle are found the following Army Corps, from his right to his left:

- the 18th Corps comprising the 21st and 28th divisions: it has been very hard pressed and has been reinforced and little by little replaced by the
- 18th Corps of Reserve, which follows it in échelon to the left.
- the 8th Corps of Reserve, in the region of Ponthion,
- the 8th Corps toward Vitry-le-François.
- the 19th Saxon Corps coming from Châlons by the left bank of the Marne, toward Maisons-en-Champagne.
- finally, the 12th Saxon Corps, leaving the 32nd Division to march via Germinon and Villeseneux against Foch's army, comes with its 25th Division via Vatry-sur-Coole, to attack in the direction of Sompuis.

Day of the 6th September.

The 2nd Corps, on the right, commanded by General Gérard sustained a most violent attack, but held all of its positions.

In the centre, the Colonial Corps holds firm and even progresses slightly.

On the left the 17th Corps has overcome the German line and thrown back the 19th Saxon Corps.

Day of the 7th September.

The battle continues furiously all along the line. The German Corps are all engaged, the 18th Corps of Reserve enters the line to the left of the 18th Active Corps, and makes an attack on Sermaize and Contrisson at the extreme right of the 2nd Corps; the 23rd Division of Reserve (of the 12th Saxon Corps) enters the line at our extreme left, in the direction of Sompuis, against the 17th Corps, which has succeeded in gaining ground against the 19th; at the centre, the 8th Corps and the 8th Corps of Reserve, which had progressed, are vigorously counter-attacked by the Colonials who gain ground toward Vauclére and Reims-la Brûlée; in the late afternoon, the enemy has taken Sermaize and violently attacks Pargny-sur-Saulx and the farm of Sorton, along the railroad.

Day of the 8th September.

Toward 9 o'clock the 2nd Corps, pressed at Pargny and on the right by the 18th Corps of Reserve, which passes by Sermaize and Contrisson, asks help of the 3rd Army; the 15th Corps directs a brigade on Robert Espagne, oriented toward the West and the bulk of the 15th Corps pushes in the direction of Contrisson, while the 5th Corps pushes beyond Laimont.

Toward 10.15, the 17th Corps is very violently attacked on its left by the 23rd Saxon Division, which progresses

at the West of Coupure du Puits, while the 19th Saxon Corps attacks to the East of this brook.

At 2 p.m.-The 46th Brigade of the 12th Saxon Corps is engaged to the south of Sompuis.

-The 19th Corps between Humbauville and Courdemanges.

-the 8th Corps against Frignicourt and Vauclére.

-the 8th Corps of Reserve against Favresse and Blesmes.

-the 18th Corps against the railroad as far as Sermaize, via Pargny-sur-Saulx.

-the 18th Corps of Reserve from Sermaize as far as to the South of Andernay, and Mognéville.

At 3 p.m.-the enemy is completely engaged but we maintain our positions almost everywhere.

At 10.30 p.m.- the 17th Corps has lost a little ground, and its left is slightly enveloped, but it is in good position in spite of all, the more so as the 21st Corps, which the General-in-Chief has sent to reinforce the 4th Army, has debarked in the region of Vassy - Montier-en-Der, and is marching toward Chavanges; the 13th Division is assembled at Mts. Marains; the 43rd Division reaches Dampierre after a march of 50 kilometers. The 21st Corps is expected to enter the line on the 9th.

Day of the 9th September.

At 8.55 a.m.- The 15th Corps resumes its attack against Vassincourt - Contrisson - Mognéville.

- The 2nd Corps pushes against Andernay and Sermaize.
- The Colonial Corps and the 12th Corps hold well in the centre.

- The 17th Corps maintains itself between LeMeix Tiercelin and Courdemanges; on its left the 13th Division of the 21st Corps leaves Mts. Marains and La Fé l'Epine and attacks in the direction of Pimbraux Fé and Ormet the 23rd Division of the 12th Saxon Corps: the latter had received the order to form in line with its two brigades to attack between Humbauville and the wood to the West of La Custonne Fe; it had a battalion in reserve to the south east of Ormet and two battalions to the South of Ancienne Croix d'Etienne Person; the engagement is extremely violent: in spite of the heavy Saxon artillery in position to the North East of Sompuis, the Saxon line yields to the effort of the 13th Division; the 108th and the 11th Battalions of Saxon Chasseurs, heavily engaged, receive the order to retreat, which they do in great disorder under the fire of our artillery. Our 43rd Division (21st Corps) advances via Les Fenus and La Folie, but is not yet engaged.

6.30 p.m. - Our left has progressed toward Sompuis to the edge of the woods South of the village.
The march of a column of the enemy is reported from Maillyin the direction of Trouan-le-Petit.
Otherwise the enemy seems to concentrate forces in the direction of Coole - Maisons-en-Champagne; the 49th Brigade (Landwehr mixed) (116th, 118th, 1 Squadron and 2 battalions) of the 18th Corps is reported near Vitry.

- The situation on our right and in our centre being very good, General de Langle, who has received the order to attack with his left with

all his available troops, transfers to the west of the Marne one Division of the Colonial Corps and one Division of the 2nd Corps.

In the evening of the 9th we find thus to the west of the Marne, the 21st Corps entire, the 17th Corps, 1 Division of the Colonial Corps and 1 Division of the 2nd Corps.

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Day of the 10th September.

At daybreak the engagement is resumed to the west of the Marne. Under the pressure of our forces, the Saxons yield and fall back toward the North, the 19th Corps toward Coole - Maisons-en-Champagne, the 23rd Division of the 12th Saxon Corps toward Coole - Soude Ste. Croix. Our left wing progresses but our centre is stopped to the South of Vitry by strong defensive works, reinforced by heavy artillery in all the region South of Vitry (Glaunes - Frignicourt - Marolles).

- To our right the 18th Corps of Reserve has been thrown back by the 15th Corps which occupies all the Northern borders of the forest of Troisfontaines: We have retaken Andernay - Sermaize, the crest of Vassincourt and made a great number of prisoners.

- In the afternoon, the 23rd Division of the 12th Saxon Corps follows the movement in retreat started by the defeated 12th Saxon Corps of Reserve, following the withdrawal of the Army of Von Bülow, defeated by General Foch, and reaches that night the Marne to the South of Châlons.

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Day of September 11th.

- On our right the 15th Corps has reached the canal between Contrisson and Neuville-sur-Orne this morning and pushed patrols to Revigny; in the late afternoon it occupies

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Allian-celles, Rancourt, Revigny and pushes toward Brabant-le-Roi.

The 2nd Corps in maintaining contact with it, holds the Ornain from Etrépy to Sermaize.

The Colonial Corps reaches the Saulx between Heiltz-l'Evêque and Buisson.

- On our left, the 21st and 17th Corps have energetically pursued the enemy in his retreat toward the North East; they have threatened to envelop the works of the defensive line of Vitry, which the enemy has had to evacuate at 11 a.m.

The 12th Corps pursues so as to reach Pringy and Couvrot in the evening, while the left wing continues its turning movement, falling back on the Marne; in the late afternoon the 17th Corps reaches the Marne toward Songy and the 21st Corps between Mairy-sur-Marne and Togny-aux-Boeufs.

The enemy demoralized and in disorder, has recrossed the Marne without being able to try to stop us.

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Day of the 12th September.

The 21st Corps, the 17th Corps and the 12th Corps cross the Marne between Mairy and Vitry and march in the direction of Courtisols - Poix - Somme Yévre; the Colonial Corps and the 2nd Corps have received the order to cross the Saulx and to march on Possesse and Charmont.

The manoeuvre executed on his left by General de Langle has now completely succeeded and the defeat of the Saxons and of the 4th German Army is the incontestable result of it.

3rd. A R M Y.

P R E L I M I N A R I E S.

The 3rd Army comprised, under the orders of General Ruffey, the 4th, 5th and 6th Corps, plus a group of reserve divisions (65th, 67th, and 75th under General Durand), and the 7th Cavalry Division.

The 20th of August it took the offensive and marched on Longwy and Virton; then, on the order of the General-in-Chief, it commenced the movement in the general retreat, but it executed this retreat when and in what manner it wished, repulsing easily the enemy's attacks. The 1st and 2nd of September notably, an attack of the 5th and 6th Res. Corps in the region of Montfaucon was energetically repulsed and these two Corps were thrown back on Cierges and on the right bank of the Meuse. They had need of several days in order to re-form.

The 3rd of September the rear guard of the 3rd Army was at the height of Varennes, the 4th September at the height of Clermont-en-Argonne, the 5th September at the height of Triaucourt.

During the movement in retreat, the 4th Corps had been sent to Paris, and the 42nd division of the 6th Corps had been assigned to the 9th Army, formed under the command of General Foch. The54th division of Reserves, coming from the 4th Corps had left one of its brigades at Verdun, another with the 3rd Army, then commanded by General Sarrail.

SITUATION THE 5th of SEPTEMBER.

The 3rd Army had its headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois: it comprised: -

Its right:- The Group of Divisions of reserve, (65, 67, 75).

Its centre:- The 6th Corps, diminished by the 42nd

Division, but augmented by a brigade of the 54th reserve Division.

Its left:-The 5th Corps, the 7th Cavalry Division in communication with the 4th Army.

The 3rd Army had in front of it from its right to left the following German Corps, forming the Army of the Crown Prince:

5th Reserve Corps, on the right bank of the Meuse, in the region of Consenvoye.

6th Reserve Corps, on the left bank of the Meuse, in the region of Montfaucon.

16th Active Corps: marching by Varennes, Clermont-en-Argonne, on Froidos.

13th Active Corps: Marched by Ste.-Menehould to Triaucourt.

6th Active Corps: Marched by the Islettes on Passavant and Charmontois.

Besides two Corps were reported descending from Ste. Menehould toward Somme, Yévre and Possesse, but the 3rd Army believed they would be engaged by the 4th Army. (de Langle). They were the 18th Active Corps and the 18th Reserve Corps of the Duke of Wurtemberg's Army.

INTENTIONS OF THE FRENCH COMMANDER.

In execution of the order for the general offensive, given by the General-in-Chief, for September 6th, the General commanding the 3rd Army decided not to lose contact with the fortified City of Verdun, and to maintain communication on his left with the 4th Army (which was then to the south of the Ornain); in refusing his left in such manner as to find himself in strength on the right of the line of battle and to menace the Army of the Crown Prince on his left flank.

In consequence, the 6th Corps received the order to

attack in the region of Beauzée where it was in position, on the front Nubécourt - Sommaisne: the 5th Corps would act to the south of the Forest of Belnone, in the region Laheycourt, Villotte-before-Louppy; two of the divisions of reserve from the group Durand were placed behind the right of the 6th Corps toward Souilly, the 3rd in reserve at Chaumont-sur-Aire; the 54th reserve division was toward Rembercourt-aux-Pots; the 7th Cavalry Division marched to l'Isle-en-Barrois.

General Contonceau commanding at Verdun, sent the 72nd Division of reserves toward Souheame-la-Grande.

INTENTIONS OF THE GERMAN COMMANDER.

At 8 p.m. September 5th, the Crown Prince issued an order for attack on the 6th September in the general direction Revigny - Bar-le-Duc.

He indicated that the 4th Army (Wurtemberg) would support the action of the 5th Army, notably with the 18th Reserve Corps, which was at St. Mard and at Givry.

The 6th Corps was ordered to march from Charmontois and Triaucourt on Laheycourt and Villotte and take possession of the bridges of Revigny and Neuville.

The 13th Corps from Triaucourt and Evres was to march on l'Isle-en-Barrois and Rembercourt and take possession of the bridges of Mussey, Varney and Fains.

The 16th Corps, intervening to the east of the two first Corps, will take Bar-le-Duc.

The 4th Cavalry Corps (3rd and 6th Divisions, under General Von Hollen) from the region of St. Mard-sur-le-Mont, will enter in action and push its reconnaissance in advance of the 5th and 4th Armies on the line Dijon - Besançon - Belfort; information was given to the 4th Army that its right wing would overrun and pass by Vitry-le-François and Montrer-en-Der.

In that which concerned the investment of Verdun, the 6th Reserve Corps will hold the line St. André - Avocourt: the Division of the Landwehr of the 6th Reserve Corps from Avocourt to the Meuse, in order to assure the liberty of action of the Corps acting on the middle Meuse.

Thus the Crown Prince did not doubt for a single instant the continued retreat of the French, and did not suspicion the possibility of the manoeuver that was about to break his offensive.

DAILY RESUME OF THE OPERATIONS.

7 a.m: - After a calm night the action recommenced toward Noyers to the West and toward Beauzée to the North.

10 a.m: - The 72nd Reserve Division from Verdun attacked some convoys and parks on the route from Julvécourt to Ippécourt.

The 6th Corps is engaged on the line Sommaisne - Nubécourt.

The 7th Cavalry Division is engaged toward l'Isle-en-Barrois.

The 54th Reserve Division is engaged toward Rembercourt-aux-Pots.

The 5th Corps saw its left thrown back from Laheycourt on Laimont, where it was violently cannonaded.

The 6th Corps has taken Revigny and its Artillery acted on the left flank of our 5th Corps.

The 5th Corps received orders to hold at any cost Villotte and Laimont.

There was no news of the 8th Chasseurs who were at Contrisson.

Evening:- Our front passed by Vassincourt - Neuville - Laimont - Villotte - Les Merchines - Sommaisne - Deuxnouds - St. André - Osches and Ville S/Cousances.

The 3rd Army awaited with impatience the 15th Corps,

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of which a Division ought to come between Longeville and Ligny-en-Barrois.

7th of September 1914.

The combats continued all day of the 7th all along the front with alternating successes and reverses, but without any decisive results. We had identified, in front of our extreme left, some troops of the 18th Reserve Corps; in front of our left, the entire 6th Corps; in front of our centre, some elements of the 13th Corps and one Brigade of the 6th Reserve Corps, which had come by way of the Islettes and Brizeaux, and had slipped in between the 13th Corps and the 16th Corps, and finally in front and on the right of the 72nd Reserve Division, the 6th Reserve Corps was engaged in order to protect the line of supply and communication of the Army.

Heights of the Meuse: Much information had arrived concerning the movements of the enemy in the Woevre and toward the heights of the Meuse (Haute de Meuse).

7 a.m.- Some patrols of Uhlans marching on Vigneulles, St. Murice, Hannonville.

10:30 a.m.-Some German Infantry (Chasseurs á pied) and some Uhlans arrived at Viéville-sous-Les-Cotes.

4 p.m.- Some Infantry is marching on Vigneulles, St. Murice and Hannonville.

6:40 p.m.-One regiment of Cavalry arrived at Hannonville.

7 p.m.- 2000 Infantry and Artillerymen arrived at Hannonville coming from Wadonville; another column coming from Saulx-en-Woevre arrived at Combres; some French cyclists were driven from St. Rémy, from where ten shots of Artillery were fired on Mouilly.

8:40 p.m.-The enemy arrived at Mouilly, here the Postmaster destroyed his instruments and apparatus.

INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY.

The 5th German Corps, which had suffered very much at Virton, had come to Marville, and had embarked at Thiouville for Russia; but news of events in Occidentale Prussia was received and the movement of this Corps was stopped toward Audun-le-Roman, from whence the 10th Division was sent toward Etain and Conflans. It arrived the 4th in the region south west of Conflans toward Labeuville.

The 7th September the 10th Division marched in two columns toward the heights of the Meuse (Hauts de Meuse), from Harville on Combres, and from Jouville on St. Maurice.

The 7th September four pieces of Austrian heavy Artillery of 305 m/m drawn by tractors passed Harville marching toward Manheulles.

8th of SEPTEMBER 1914.

About 9 a.m. - The 15th Corps, which had commenced to detrain theevening of the previous day, marched one Brigade toward the west in the direction of Robert Espagne.

The main body took the general direction of Contrisson.

The 5th Corps progressed on Vassincourt, Laimont and Villers-aux-Vents.

The 6th Corps repulsed an attack coming from Triaucourt.

The 2nd Division of Reserves resisted on the line Nubécourt-St. André.

The order was given to cut the bridges over the Meuse because of the menace made by the enemy on the Hauts de Meuse.

About 4 p.m. - Before the 5th and the 6th Corps the enemy seems to be short of ammunition.

9:40 p.m. - The 3rd Army has maintained all its positions. The 15th Corps has reoccupied, without a combat, in the evening the ground which had been lost in the morning to the left of the 5th Corps.

The 6th Corps had destroyed two batteries of the 16th Corps, which had been located by our Aviators.

The 7th Cavalry Division marched on the Meuse in order to parry the menace coming from the Hauts de Meuse.

The 2nd Cavalry Division, and the mixed Brigade from Toul, watched the region to the south of St. Mihiel.

Hauts de Meuse:- The following information was received:

8 a.m. - Some patrols of the enemy are reported at Senzey, a platoon of Uhlans passed at Heudicourt, in march on Chaillon, followed by a regiment of Artillery accompanied by some Cavalry.

10 a.m. - This column consisting of 150 Uhlans and 30 cannon marched from Chaillon on St. Mihiel to bombard it.

12 a.m. - One regiment of Cavalry and one regiment of Artillery are between Senzey and La Croix sur Meuse, telegraph and telephone lines are cut. At St. Mihiel the bridges are blown up; the situation is critical, impossible to evacuate the people and treasure.

12:55 p.m. - The communications are cut with Vigneulles, St. Maurice, Buxiéres, La Croix sur Meuse, Troyon, Heudicourt and Chaillon.

1 p.m. - The Fort of Troyon is attacked by the Artillery.

1:10 p.m. - The Mayor of St. Mihiel notifies the inhabitants that without doubt a bombardment is going to commence.

9th of SEPTEMBER 1914.

8 a.m. - The 15th Corps recommenced the attack on Vassincourt, Mognéville.

9 a.m. - Verdun reports that the Fort of Génicourt is being bombarded, without doubt by the four pieces of Austrian heavy Artillery - 305 m/m.

11 a.m. - The Fort of Troyon has ceased fire.

9 p.m. - The left of the 3rd Army (15 corps) has progressed toward Lois Fontaines in communication with the right of the 4th Army.

Before the 5th Corps the positions are maintained, as well as before the 6th Corps, before which the enemy has shown two or three batteries of mortars of 210 m/m.

The Divisions of Reserves of the groupe Durrand have held well.

The 72nd Reserve Division has without ceasing attacked the line of communication of the enemy; it has lost half of its cadres.

Hauts de Meuse:- The following information has arrived:

The value of a division of the enemy into two parts is recognized, the one of seven or eight battalions to the north east of Deuxnouds-aux-Bois, the other of five battalions to the north east of Creue.

The batteries of the two Divisions of Cavalry are on the crests from Deuxnouds to Chaillon and Buxiéres.

One Brigade of Infantry with some Artillery

and some Cavalry is to the north of Mouilly.

The column of two kilometres of Artillery is between Combres and St. Rémy. One park of Aviation is to the west of St. Hilaire.

One wagon park is to the west of Avillers.

Some Artillery parks are toward Seuzey and toward Vaux les Palameik.

The menace is more and more precise on the middle Meuse.

The Fort of Troyon has already submitted to three assaults which have been repulsed.

10th of SEPTEMBER 1914.

3 p.m. - On the right, the 22nd Division of Reserves remains at Vadelincourt, faced to the south, reinforced by the troops from the section of the place. It has attacked several times the enemy's line of communication which passes by: Damvillers, Consenvoye, Montfaucon, Avocourt, Clermont, and which is guarded by fortified Infantry and Artillery.

7 p.m. - The 6th Corps, reinforced by the two Reserve Divisions, repulsed a violent attack of the 13th and 16th Corps, reinforced in their turn by the 6th Reserve Corps, while the 5th Reserve Corps come to replace the 6th Reserve Corps to the German left, to attack the 72nd Reserve Division to our extreme right.

The 16th Corps had progressed on Souilly, but the 6th Corps practically maintained its positions.

The Reserve Divisions showing some signs of lassitude.

The 6th German Corps was content to cannonade and to made a weak attack in the evening.

Our 5th Corps has had some local successes.

On the left: The 18th Reserve Corps has been

repulsed by the 15th Corps, which has progressed as far as the north edge of the woods of Trois Fontaine. We occupy Sermaize, Auderny, the crest west of Vassincourt. We have made a great number of prisoners.

Hauts de Meuse:- The Fort of Troyon has repulsed a 4th and 5th assault. It still holds.

The enemy has not crossed the Meuse.

11th of SEPTEMBER 1914.

8 a.m. -Impressive calm reigns on the front.

The 15th Corps continues to progress.

The 5th Corps commences a movement in advance.

6 p.m. - Before the 6th Corps and the two Reserve Divisions, no activity on the part of the enemy. Our patrols of Cavalry push as far as Souilly.

The 2nd Reserve Divisions reform near Neuville en Verdunois.

The 7th Cavalry Division is toward St. Mihiel.

The 5th Corps has retaken Villotte before Loupy and Laimont, supported by the Artillery of the 15th Corps in position on the crest of Vassincourt.

The 15th Corps has pushed some patrols on Revigny.

7:15 p.m. The movement in advance of the right of the 4th Army on Sermaize has facilitated the advance of the 15th Corps on the Canal between Contrisson and Neuville-sur-Orne, the 15th Corps has taken some cannon and caissons from the 18th German Reserve Corps.

The 6th Corps and Divisions of Reserve have submitted to a cannonade of heavy howitzers.

A column is reported in front of the 6th Corps marching toward the north.

9 p.m. - The situation is very satisfactory, the rations and ammunition have been replaced completely.

The 15th Corps occupies Alliancelles, Raucourt, Revigny and pushes on Brabant le Roi, it has taken 4 cannons, 5 machine guns, 15 caissons.

The 18th Reserve Corps is in retreat to the north west.

The 6th Corps is in retreat on Laheycourt and the woods of Belnoire.

Before the 6th Corps the enemy is entrenching, he has prepared a position to the south of Souilly.

Hauts de Meuse:-

10 a.m. - Nothing is seen from the Fort de Liouville still.

The Fort de Troyon continues to be bombarded.

One battalion of the 73rd Reserve Division from Verdun has been sent toward Bannoncourt, which has been cannonaded.

5.40 p.m. The 2nd Cavalry Division has reported to the 2nd Army that a column of 8000 German Infantry was marching from Thiaucourt on Beney, flanked on the left by a small detachment from Pannes on Lamarche en Woevre. (It is the 32nd Reserve Division from the Garrison of Metz reported the 10th marching from Pont á Mousson on Montauville).

7.15 p.m. - The 2nd German Cavalry Division (Bavarian) had come from Delme in the Woevre toward Flirey.

12th of SEPTEMBER 1914.

The enemy has established some entrenchments on the line Villers-aux-Vents, Louppy le Chateau, Rembercourt aux Pots.

Translation.

Chief Army Command, G.H.Q. Varennes 5-914.

5th Army, 80 Evening.

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ARMY ORDER for 6 - 9.

1) The enemy, whose advanced guard is established on the line Belval - Triaucourt - Evres - Beauzee, has its main troops on the heights of Anzecourt, Villotte, Devant, Louppy, Lisle en Barrois and eastwards.

2) The 4th Army has at the same time proceeded towards the Marne with XVIII Reserve Cavalry above St. Mard and Givry. They will support the attack of the 5th Army.

3) The attack begun to-day will be continued.
The 6th Army Corps from Charmontois and Triaucourt above Laheycourt and Villotte to take possession of the bridges Revigny and Neuville.
The XIII Army Corps from Triaucourt eastern half and Evres above Lisle en Barrois and Rembercourt to take possession of the bridges Mussey, Varney and Fains.
The XVI Army Corps will attack to the east of the XIII Army Corps and take Bar-le-Duc.
Army K.K.4 having proceeded successfully to-day above St. Mard-sur-le-Mont joins in the fight and extends its advance Cavalry before the front of the 4th and 5th Armies towards the line Dijon-Besançon-Belfort. Notice given also to the 4th Army, whose right wing will go forward over Vitry-le-François and Montier-en-Der.

4) It is specially ordered to free the attacking troops towards the middle Meuse, the following distribution of the troops of communication will hold good towards Verdun:
Landwehr division Francke of the 6th Reserve Corps from the Meuse down stream to Avocourt.
6th Reserve Corps from Avocourt to St. André.
6th Reserve Corps, in addition to its former tasks, takes over the pioneer bridge service of the bridges over the Meuse, Stenay, Sassey, Dun, Vilosnes, their maintenance being of special importance. (Special Army regulation).

5) Chief Army command remains at Varennes.

6) The Army Corps are not to quarter either troops or columns and trains in Boureuilles, Varennes, Neuvilly.
Morse and Pioneer regiments Field Air divisions will only march at 2 o'clock p.m. from their quarters.
The road Varennes - Neuvilly must be kept clear by I échelon of the XIII Army Corps up to 2 p.m. and by I échelon of the XVI Army Corps up to 4 p.m.

(Sd) Wilhelm

Crown Prince of the German Empire and Prussia.

troops is the following: Dompierre, Rainecourt, Lihous, Fresnoy-les-Roye, Champien, Fresniéres, Ribécourt.

26th September: The Divisions of the Territorials of General Bruqère came to support the left of the Army of Castelnau.

27th September: The Germans reached Marquion, their line passed by Combles and Feuillères. Attacked on this latter point they yielded some ground, and the French occupied the front Feuillères, Chaulnes, Ognolles, Avricourt, Fresnières, Ribécourt.

28th September: Some attacks were made on Lihous and Champien but repulsed, and these villages remain in the hands of the French.

29th September: The Germans renew their attack on the line Achiet-le-Petit, Authieule, Aveluy, Mametz, Maricourt.

30th September: The Army de Maud'huy entered in line in the region of Arras-Lens.

1st October: The 4th Army was not able to prevent the French from occupying the banks of the Scarpe and the heights around Arras. The 1st Division of the Guard found itself at Ervillers.

2nd October: The 10th Army Corps took Goyencourt, its left directed toward Saint Mard-les-Triot. The right of the 18th Reserve Division repulsed the French toward Dancourt, but its left was not able to progress from the Crapeaumesnil side.

3rd October: The Germans occupy Tournai. The Corps of the Guard progressed on Courcelles, Bois Logeart,

Achiet-le-Petit; it is supported by the 2nd Division of Cavalry from point to point from Lens.

The 1st Cavalry Corps supported to the north east by the 7th Division of Cavalry attacked without success at Rouvroy.

The 9th Division of Cavalry passed Montigny by Hénin-Liétard, the Division of the Guard is at Harnes, and the 4th Division of Cavalry is at Courrieres.

4th October: The French Cavalry coming from Arras marches toward Neuville, some engagements take place toward Carvin, Vendin-le-Vieil, Lens.

The Bavarian Cavalry and the 6th Division of Cavalry march to the north of Lille toward Armentières.

The 1st Cavalry Corps advances from Wingles and engage near Vermelles.

The 9th and 7th Cavalry Divisions are in contact with the French troops to the south of Aix-Noulette.

5th October: The Germans continue their march to the north of Tourcoing, then move toward Menin, Wervicq, Armentières, by Nouville-en-Terrain and towards Deulemont.

The 2nd Cavalry Corps engaged in a violent combat near Bouvigny.

The French occupy Vermelles and Hannin, their Cavalry at Hulluch.

The right of the 18th Division approaches Saint Aurin.

6th October: The 4th Cavalry Corps which has reached the region Mont-des-Cats, Bailleul, Steenwercke, received the

order to move from the north to the south on the heights of Bouvigny, thus enveloping the French left, while that of the 2nd Cavalry Corps seeks to pierce the line toward the west in the direction of Bouvigny, and the 1st Corps between Lens and La Bassée.

The Cavalry Division of the Guard tried in vain to advance.

7th October: The 1st Cavalry Corps was compelled to withdraw before the attacks coming from Béthune. The 2nd was unable to make any progress.

The French troops occupied Mazingarbe, Bully, Aix, Vermelles, Aire and Armentières.

8th October: The Germans fall back from around Arras, their retreat extends for 8 kilometres in rear of the region Beaumetz-les-Loges and Vimy. The French are at Armentières, Pont Rouge, Deulemont.

The 1st Cavalry Corps was only able to reach the region of Provin.

The 2nd Division attacked Carvin while the Division of the Guard moved to the north of that locality.

The 4th Cavalry Corps engaged in a battle to the south of Bailleul and repulsed the French Cavalry, it attacked the line Eecke, Hazebrouck.

9th October: The 4th Cavalry Corps pushed toward Ghent and Roulers, detachments which gained contact with the Belgians.

The main body of its force engaged in combat in the region near Hazebrouck, and to the north of Merville-Estaires. It sought to force the passage of the Lys. The 1st Cavalry Corps is obliged to halt in the region of Carvin.

The 2nd Cavalry Corps reached La Bassée and attacked Wavrin.

10th October: The 7th Division Cavalry is engaged at Armentières.

The 9th Division Cavalry is near d'Aubers.

The 4th Cavalry Corps has been driven from the points that it occupied on the Lys between Aire and Estaires and fell back to the region of Armentières.

The advance guards of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps are engaged on the front: Rouge, Croix, Lorgies, Salomé.

Between Arras and Oise: A Brigade of the 4th Army Corps attacked energetically in the region Monchy-aux-Bois, Hannes-camps, Fonquevillers, but was not able to occupy Bienvillers-aux-Bois.

11th October: The right of the 4th Army is engaged before Vermelles.

The 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps are between the Lys and the Canal de la Bassée.

The 4th Cavalry Corps moved to the north bank of the Lys. It occupies Merris and Estaires.

The 7th Cavalry Division is engaged in front of Béthune.

Between Arras and Oise: Attacks to the west of Thiepval and d'Hamel on the front Bienvillers, Fonquevillers are repulsed. The Guard and the 4th Division of the 2nd Bavarians suffered heavy losses before this locality.

12th October: The 2nd and 4th Cavalry Corps, which had operated to the north of the Lys withdrew as far as Bailleul and Estaires.

Between Arras and Oise: The French captured Fonquevillers and attacked Hannescamps, which they took.

14th October: The 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps received the order to take position on the line Estaires, west of La Bassée.

The 4th Cavalry Corps is at the northern outlet of the Station of Sailly.

The Division of Cavalry of the Guard is to the east of Givenchy.

15th October: The 6th Army occupies still the line Menin, Armentiéres, Givenchy.

The 12th Corps is on the front: Menin, Armentières, with some detachments in the direction of Gulleghem and Cuerne. Between La Bassée and Arras the Germans attack without success.

Combat very violent around Vermelles.

16th October: The Germans are at Thourout, Lichterwelde, Roulers, Gheluwe.

18th October: Formation of the Army d'Urbal.

19th October: The Germans evacuate the left bank of the Yser, abandoning Wervicq and Comines, and are organizing defensively on the right bank and on the front: Roncq, Linselles, Lambersart, Englos.

The 21st Corps supports the right to the road Foucoucourt, Estrées (west of Peronne).

The 4th Belgian Division reoccupied the positions on the right bank of the Yser at Mannekensvere and Keyem.

20th October: The Germans are between the sea and Thourout.

The 22nd Reserve Corps attacked Dixmude.

21st October: The 23rd Reserve Corps coming from Thielt arrived at Roulers and moved toward Bixschoote.

The 27th is to the north of the route of Menin.

22nd October: The 22nd Corps is before Dixmude.

The other Corps reach and engage the line, Ruyterhock, Houthuist, Schaapbaillie, Becelaere.

They take possession of T'ervaete on the left bank of the Yser.

23rd October: The Division of General Grossetti traversed Nieuport and arrived on the line Bamburg, Lombartzyde.

The 1st and 4th Belgian Divisions fall back and the Germans take possession of a second position on the left bank of the Yser between Schoorbacke and T'ervaete.

To the east of Deulemont the Allies occupy the woods of Ploegstaert.

The 4th Army engaged with its left near to Becelaere.

The 46th Reserve Division reached the region of Schoosten.

The 26th Reserve Corps is in the environs of Langemarck.

The 27th Corps of Reserves is in the environs of Westhocke, Kruiseik, and took possession of Vieux-Chien.

The 7th Cavalry Division and the Bavarian Cavalry Division are in contact with the Allied troops to the west of Houthem.

24th October: Seven Battalions of the 3rd Reserve Corps have crossed the Canal.

The 22nd Reserve Corps is not able to progress in front of Dixmude, and the 23rd Reserve Corps is repulsed on the line Kippe, Langewarde.

The 23rd and 27th Reserve Corps cover on the

line Zuyghem, Kocknit, Brooseinde, Routl, Oude, Kruiseik, the attack of the 3rd and 22nd Corps.

To the south east of Ypres a Brigade of heavy Artillery is established on the line Kortewilde, Terhaudtin in order to beat the positions occupied by the Allies.

To its right is the 2nd Division of Cavalry, to its left the 3rd.

The attack thus prepared on Kruiseik failed. The 3rd and 7th Divisions of Cavalry succeeded however to cross the ditch of Zaandvoorde.

Fourteen German attacks on Dixmude are repulsed by the Marine Infantry and Belgians.

25th October: Inundation of the Valley of the Yser.

29th October: Bitter combats to the east of Ypres in the presence of the Emperor.

10th November: The Germans are driven across the Yser.

11th November: Attack of the Prussian Guard on the Yser.

OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE OISE AND THE NORTH SEA.

(Resumé)

After withdrawing to the north of the Aisne and of the Vesle, between the Oise and Reims, the German Armies halted and prepared a defensive position on the heights which dominated the Valley of the Aisne, between the Forest of the L'aigle (eagle) and the plateau de Craonne.

The difficulties that were presented against a frontal attack on these positions so strongly organized, and furnished with heavy Artillery, decided the French General Staff to attempt a flank attack by moving up the Valley of the Oise toward Noyon.

The 4th French Army Corps, occupying the position on the left wing of the Army Maunoury, was not strong enough to execute this movement, the 13th Army Corps was brought from Lorraine, in the region of Clermont. It received the order to move on Noyon.

This attack, of which a part was executed on the east bank of the Oise, commencing at Bailly, gave no results. Our forces limiting themselves to holding the line from Matz to Ribécourt towards Roye.

From the beginning (15th September) the Germans had opposed to our forces only the 2nd Army Corps and fractions of the 9th and 4th Reserve Corps, supported by the Cavalry Corps, Von der Marwitz.

If we had the intention of overrunning the German right, from their side, they had never renounced their movement toward the west.

Beginning with September 20th, we brought between Somme and the Oise the 2nd French Army, transported from Lorraine, to the region of Roye-Amiens.

The Germans transported across Belgium a part of their

1st October, 4th Army Corps in front of Arras.

2nd October, 1st Bavarian Reserve to the north east of Arras.

8th October, 13th Division of the 7th Corps, and the 19th Army Corps in the region of Lens.

12th October, detachments of the Saxon Corps in the region of Lille and on the Lys.

16th October, some detachments of the 13th Army Corps to the north of Menin.

From the 19th October the German forces who had besieged Antwerp reached the Yser along the coast of the North Sea, and there appeared on the front of the Yser and the Canal four Reserve Army Corps of new formation, the 22nd, 23rd, 26th and 27th.

The great attempt on Calais was about the commence.

Furious attacks were directed against Ypres and Dunkerque.

The German masses were unable to progress, the actions terminated by an immobilization of the two sides on the front. A new attempt was made by some active elements in order to supply the shortage of the reserve elements, the result was the same, negative. everywhere the Allies maintained their front.

The end of November the German order of battle between the sea and the Oise was that indicated in the following table:

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE.

(End of November 1914)

4th Army, Duke of Wurtenberg: (From the North Sea to the north of the Lys)	Divisions of Marines.
	Guard (1st & 4th Brigades)
	8th Corps Active (29th & 31st Brigades)
	13th Corps Active (26th Division)
	4th Division d'Ersatz.

- 17 -

	3rd Reserve Corps
	5th Reserve Corps (9th Division)
	22nd Reserve Corps
	23rd Reserve Corps
	26th Reserve Corps
	27th Reserve Corps
	37th & 38th Brigade of Landwehr.
6th Army, Crown Prince of Bavaria:	2nd Active Corps (1st Division)
(From the north of the Lys to Arras)	4th Active Corps
	7th Active Corps
	14th Active Corps
	15th Active Corps (30th Division)
	19th Active Corps
	2nd Active Corps (Bavarian)
	18th Reserve Corps (25th Division)
	24th Reserve Corps (48th Division)
	1st Bavarian Reserve Corps
	6th Division Bavarian Reserve
	Brigade of Landwehr, Schulenburg.
2nd Army, Von Bulow:	18th Active Corps
(From Monchy to L'Aire)	21st Active Corps
	Guard (2nd and 3rd Brigade)
	1st Bavarian
	14th Reserve Corps
Part of the 1st Army, Von Kluck:	19th Reserve Corps
(From the Aire to the Oise)	Detachments of 9th Army Corps and of the 4th Reserve Corps (1st Division combined).

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

UP TO THE END OF OCTOBER 1914.

The 11th September while the French occupied, with some detachments belonging to the Territorial Army, the Valleys of

the Celle to the south of Amiens, the Germans had occupied Rozières, Roye, Villers-Bretonneux and Amiens.

The 14th September they evacuated this city and fell back on Pèronne and on St. Quentin.

The 18th September the right wing of the Army Von Kluck, consisting of the 9th Reserve Corps, occupied on the right bank of the Oise; Marquéglise, Vaudelicourt, Cambronne.

The 20th September the French extended their forces from Ressons s/Matz, Mareuil, Cambronne to Bettancourt, prolonging their line toward the north by Daucourt, Popincourt, Tilliloy, Beuvraignes, Crapeaumesnil.

They progressed, having especially in front of them the Cavalry Corps of Von der Marwitz.

The 24th September the French occupied Péronne, which they evacuated the following day.

On the 26th September, the German front extended from d'Herbécourt to Ribécourt, by Chaulnes, Omiécourt, Carrépuis, Roiglise, Lassigny.

Commencing from September 27th, the German forces acting to the north of the Somme, occupied the line Marquin, Combles, Feuilléres. On this front, of which a part was held at first by the Cavalry, was brought successively the 28th September the 2nd Bavarian to Maricourt and to the north, then the Guard the 30th September.

The 29th September, the French front was marked by: Maricourt, Mametz, Aveluy, Achiet le Petit, Authuile, Contal Maison, Ovillers la Boisselle, while the Cavalry pushed as far as Vis en Artois and Lécluse.

At the beginning of October the Germans made some progress to the south of Arras.

The Guard Occupied the three Courcelles, Bois-Logeart, Achiet-le-Petit.

The German Cavalry, 4th, 7th, 9th Divisions and Division

of the Guard, acted to the north of Arras and sought to gain Lens, in order to pronounce a movement on the left flank, and even ulteriorly, the rear of the French Army.

While awaiting the arrival of the English who were en route, General Foch, called to the command of the group of Armies of the north, occupied Aignies, Carvin, Aunay and Lens.

The German Cavalry, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Corps, extended its movement by Turcoing toward the north of the Lys.

The 3rd and 6th Divisions, with the Bavarian Division, brought the number of Cavalry Divisions operating in the north to eight.

While the French still held Lille with some detachments of Territorial troops.

The Germans acted to the north and to the south of that City.

On one side, the 4th Cavalry Corps (3 Divisions) attacked in the region Bailleul, Mont des Cats, Hazebrouck, the five other groups in two Corps operated in the region La Bassée, Lens, having as objective Béthune.

The entry in line of the 4th German Army Corps, marked the beginning of an action of forces against Arras, which was bombarded beginning with the 6th October, but without the enemy being able to make any serious progress.

The arrival of a part of the 7th Army Corps, and of the 14th Army Corps, permitted the Germans to push their attackon Béthune, overrunning the French advance from Arras; but this attack was confined to the heights of Aix Noulette, and in the region of La Bassée.

This situation continued without either party gaining any decided advantage, and more and more the French and German forces became immobilized.

The taking of Lille by the 21st German Corps the 12th October,&the arrival of the Saxons on the Lys, marked the

end of this period, which brought scarcely any continued prolongation of the front on one side or the other.

The period which opened the 19th October marked an attempt more serious.

In place of sending partial forces, of which the action was not able to give and could scarcely give a decisive result, the Germans caused to enter in line a new Army in a single block.

This latter consisted, aside from the forces which had besieged Antwerp, of the 3rd Reserve Corps, Division of Marines, Brigade of the Landwehr, 37th and 28th, four new Corps formed from volunteers, and of Landwehriens of the 2nd Battalion.

From the sea to the Lys they made a series of attacks, having for objective, Dunkerque and Calais; they were able to get a foothold, after some bloody battles, on the Yser, to the north of Dixmude. An occupation essentially precarious which they did not succeed in maintaining.

There also, the German offensive had totally failed.

The two sides nowcommenced a war of the trenches, as on the rest of the Front.

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[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Need not be returned.

Subject Distribution of Japanese Fleet.

From W. *No.* 65. *Date* September 1[illegible], 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. XXXXX *Date* XXXXXXXXX

The only information that has come out concerning the distribution of the Japanese Fleet was contained in a speech by the Minister of Marine made to the Budget Committee of the Lower House of the Diet on September 5.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
RECEIVED
OCT 16 1914

He stated that there was

One division	blockading Kiaochow Bay,
one division	convoying army transports,
one division	in the Yellow Sea,
one division	between Japan and Hawaii for the protection of commerce,
one division	north of Hongkong for the protection of commerce,
2 men-of-war	had been sent to the South Seas at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Squadron,
1 man-of-war	was between Hawaii and Vancouver for the protection of commerce.

Ships chartered as transports	35
Small ships, tugs, launches, etc chartered for use of naval stations &c	350

Here the Minister of Marine was interrupted by a member of the House who stated that he considered it imprudent for the Minister to speak thus openly on the movements and disposition of the navy.

Germany

Need not be returned 13/136 5.4 .11 (1)

E U R O P E A N W A R - 1914. SPIRIT OF THE GERMAN FORCES AND THE PEOPLE.

Z 328 September 11, 1914.

In the last two weeks I have been with the Navy in Wilhelmshaven, with the Army in Liege, Namur, Army and Navy in Brussels and have had other opportunities to get at the spirit that moves the services and the German people.

A spirit of deep patriotism is shown everywhere and a stern resolve to win at all costs. The Germans say "England has declared she will fight to the last penny, but we will fight not only to the last penny but to the last drop of blood."

At the outbreak of the war the hatred of of the country was directed toward the Russians, but since then there has grown up a bitter hatred for the English that is far beyond that held for the other enemies. It is believed here that England engineered the coalition against Germany, that England held the cables and circulated false news throughout the world and when England brought Japan into the fray, the last straw was added.

The German armies in Northern France want one thing above all others and talk and think of one thing :- that no part of the British Expeditionary Forces shall get back to England. In bloody fighting at St. Quentin and other places, they forced them back, but a full destruction of this force is the dearest wish. England they hold as the power which deceived them and tricked them, all the time pushing the other powers forward to bear the burden of the war. Of the French I heard very little enemity expressed. They consider them as victims, pulled into the war and as having a mistaken idea of revenge for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine.

The Russians they consider as barbarians who must be held in check but who are being exploited by the high officers and the Court circle of the Russian Empire.

At the mention of the unhappy situation of Kiauchau, the German rages at the yellow race being brought in by England and I believe so long as Germany is a power in the world she will cherish and seek to execute a revenge on Japan which will bring her to the dust.

The strength and virility of Germany is shown in the strong, well disciplined, singing soldiers who go to the front, in the cheerfulness with which the people leave their work and their homes and go to bear arms, in the work of of the women in all kinds of hospital and charity work, and the pride with which they send their men to the war.

Army officers tell me that the admitted great losses of their forces is due to the difficulty the officers have in keeping the men back on the field until artillery shall have cleared the field. The Navy people say " we knew we had good men, but never thought there were such splendid people as our men now show themselves to be, they

they want only to be led against the English fleet, no matter what the inequality " - . Certainly no German ship surrenders.

I doubt if it is possible to conquer a a people whose spirit is so great, backed as it is with careful preparation.

N.N.I.33.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.] *Need not be returned.*

Germany

13136 · 11 (7)

SUBJECT EUROPEAN WAR -1914. CONDUCT OF THE WAR ON LAND AND SEA.

From Z No. 239 Date September 11, 1914., 19

Replying to O. N. I. No. ---------- Date ----------, 19

The newspaper reports of German atrocities and brutalities so freely circulated in America are to be regarded with the greatest distrust. I have visited Liege, Louvain (Löwen), Namur, Brussels, and a great number of small towns and villages throughout Belgium and do not find that the war has been carried on by the German Army in other than a legitimate manner.

Plundering is not permitted, nor indulged in, the men are under strict discipline, the inhabitants are not wantonly abused. There is one rule enforced when un-uniformed men fire from a house on the army, the men are shot, or bayonetted and the house burned.

The German description of the Louvain (Löwen) incident is as follows:- After having peacefully occupied Louvain for perhaps a couple of days, an attck was made with rifles and machine guns from the windows of houses by the inhabitants. At the first fire, a general of division was wounded, several of his staff killed and wounded, etc. There followed two days of house to house street fighting necessary to conquer the the resistance which continued during that time.

I personally inspected Louvain (Löwen) and found that about 1/3 of it had been destroyed, mostly in the center of the city. The celebrated and picturesque "Rathaus" had been saved. In Namur and Liege (Lüttich) there had been a number of individual houses destroyed, because they fired on the troops, but the destruction was comparitively small.

In these cities the Belgian police were on duty and have their arms. They are under the general direction of the German military authorities and are said to be performing their duties well. The German authorities are endeavoring to have the people take up their work again.

The Canal traffic to Holland has been opened. Railroad traffic is fully taken up by military necessity and cannot for the present be used for transportation of civilians or freight. Three armies in the field are being supplied over the Belgian railroads. Brussels has not in any way been damaged and the Belgian flag is allowed to be flown and practically every house has one out, giving the city a gala appearance. The Belgian police are on duty. The German flag is seen over the Government headquarters and there are some pickets and patrols about the city. The Headquarters of Fieldmarshall von der Goltz is in the Ministry and the Kings Palace is a hospital. The German Army pays cash for all supplies taken.

In the small towns and outlying villages the conditions vary in accordance with the resistance offered. Many towns are totally undamaged, but the majority have suffered *more or less*

No destruction of crops was done and the farming population are working in the fields again.

I cannot state from personal observation what the conditions in the Eastern frontier are, but from all accounts they are not so satisfactory. Before the battle of Tannenberg, the Russian forces devastated East Prussia and penetrated to within sixteen miles of Königsberg coming from the South. They are reported to have burned everything, killing and outraging - whether they were resisted or not. There were a great number of refugees from that section who were distributed to Danzig, Stettin, Berlin, and other large cities, to be taken care of. Their pictures of conditions are most pitiful. Since Tannenberg and the clearing of the Russians out of East Prussia, the government is trying to induce the refugees to return and start life over again. Barbarities on one side always breed barbaities on the other, so it is probable that the war is conducted with ruthlessness on the Russian frontier. However all statements at the present time in regard to the conduct of the war must be carefully weighed and checked before being accepted.

On the sea it seems evident that little attention is paid to the rules of what has been called "International Law" by the English naval forces. In my report No. 223 was given some breaches of International Law, but since that time any number of cases have been added. For example, the sinking of the auxiliary cruiser "KAISER WILHELM DER GROSSE" in a Spanish colonial harbor by the English cruiser "HIGHFLYER"; the treatment of merchant ships bound between the neutral countries of the United States and Holland by both France and England; the attitude toward fishermen in the North Sea, etc.

In regard to what constitutes fortified and nonfortified cities there lies great cause for future recrimination. I note the German papers call attention to the fact that England has mounted anti-aircraft guns about various parts of the City of London.

Professor Wilson of Brown University and Lecturer on International Law at the Naval War College is on duty at the American Legation at The Hague and will undoubtedly collect valuable information on the various branches of former International Law. As all the material relating to legality of the various captures will be fully written up afterthe war and as it is not urgent at the present time, it is not proposed to go deeply into the matter in my reports except in case of individual cases important to the United States.

N.N.I.33.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Need not be returned.

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Germany

SUBJECT EUROPEAN WAR - 1914. GERMAN NAVAL BRIGADE AT THE FRONT IN BELGIUM.

From Z *No.* 333 *Date* September 13, 1914. *, 19*

Replying to O. N. I. No. ——— *Date* ——— *, 19*

CONFIDENTIAL.

On the evening of September 5th at Herbesthal, on the boundary between Germany and Belgium, I fell in with troop trains containing blue jackets of the Coast Artillery (Küsten Artillerie) und des Minenwesens) and also Marines, (Marine Infanterie). I was also with this force in Brussels, from where they marched out during the night of September 6th . The Marines in field uniform, but the Coast Artillery were in service blue jacket uniforms and equipped as in

The force was under the command of Rear Admiral Schrader. Inquiries about the use of this force brought replies that there being an excess of men for the Navy, they were being sent to assist as infantry in the siege of Antwerp.

This does not however cover the whole situation, I believe,

There does not seem to be much doubt that Germany expects to occupy a seaport on the English Channel and this force will be the part of its garrison to handle the sea coast guns, mines, et. There was a freight train with the outfit when seen at Herbesthal, some of the cars marked from Cuxhaven which is the site of the mine depot of the German Navy.

If Germany secures a base on the English Channel and gets some torpedo craft to it with the addition of the air fleet, things look as if they might be pretty lively in the English Channel for awhile.

N.N.I.33.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Germany

13136 .12 (2)

SUBJECT EUROPEAN WAR - 1914. GERMANY and the TURKISH NAVY.

From Z *No.* 232 *Date* September 13, 1914. *, 19*

Replying to O. N. I. No. ---------- *Date* ---------- *, 19*

C O N F I D E N T I A L.

There is a general report that the German battle cruiser "GOEBEN" and light cruiser "BRESLAU" have been sold to Turkey. This report I have not been able to confirm, but I do know that a number of German naval officers, some of the best in the service, have recently gone to Constantinople.

The relations between Germany and Turkey are very close and it is quite possible that in case Germany continues her victories on land, Turkey will declare for her. I think it probable that the Turkish fleet will be found to be Germanized.

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[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Subject Special War Budget.

From W. *No.* 64 *Date* September 12, 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. xxxxxxx *Date* xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
RECEIVED
OCT 16 1914

A special session of the Diet was called to meet on September 3 for the purpose of appropriating money to defray the expenses of the war with Germany up to December 31, 1914.

The estimate submitted was as follows :-

Navy	Yen	38,000,000 +
Army		12,000,000 +
Other departments		2,000,000

The explanation of the estimate subdivided the navy and army estimates as follows :-

Navy.

Temporary expenses	Yen	7,130,000 +
Maintenance		20,370,000 +
Construction of ten destroyers		10,578,000

Army.

Temporary expenses	3,040,000 +
Maintenance	8,890,000 +
Total for navy and army	50,008,000 +

To cover the above an appropriation of 51 million Yen was requested and passed for the navy and army and 2 million Yen for other departments.

What is designated "temporary expenses" is for material, arms, ammunition, etc., and "maintenance" is for carrying on hostilities.

Besides the above, Yen 13,462,552 were expended prior to the meeting of the Diet as "urgent expenses", without being

approved by the Diet, for mobilization and preparation for hostilities.

Thus the entire extraordinary expense for the war up to December 31, 1914, is estimated to be

Navy and army appropriation	Yen 51,00[illegible],000
Other departments	2,000,000
Urgent expenses authorized by the cabinet	13,462,552
	Yen 66,462,552

But during the war it is estimated that the following sums from the regular appropriation will not be used :-

Navy	Yen 8,800,000
Army	1,300,000
Total	10,100,000

Therefore the actual war expense for navy and army up to December 31, 1914, will be Yen 54,362,552 and for other departments Yen 2,000,000, if expectations are realized.

The foregoing may give some idea of the extremely complicated method by which the Japanese Government conducts financial affairs and frames budgets.

Attention is particularly invited to the item under "navy" appropriating Yen 10,578,000 for the construction of ten destroyers. This item was subject to some hostile criticism in the Diet but was forced through as a war necessity, though the next regular budget will be presented in about four months. It looks as though advantage had been taken of the state of war to force through an addition to the navy building program, and illustrates that the Satsuma (navy) element is still a very powerful one in politics despite the fall of the Yamamoto cabinet and the navy scandals.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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OCT 21 1914

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Office of Naval Intelligence, Copy

October 19, 1914. N.H.L.

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American Embassy,

London, England.

14 September 1914.

From: Lieutenant J.V.Babcock, U.S.N.
To: The Naval Attache.

ORDNANCE AND ORDNANCE GEAR

No reliable information of value.

TORPEDOES

12 torpedoes were fired in Heligoland action, and three hits reported, but due to mist and confusion hits were not verified. Admiralty expressed disapproval of waste of torpedoes owing to nature of the action, class of ships fired at, and fact that they were already accounted for by gunfire.

Believed, but unconfirmed, that the Pathfinder was sunk by torpedo from submarine.

My previous reports covering British service torpedoes, characteristics and construction - particularly long range (water heater) types - further confirmed. Serious trouble continues due to high speeds attempted, accompanying high sustained heats, and engine lubrication problem involved. Wrecked engines frequent occurance on proving ranges; also burned bearings and valves. Whiteheads now manufacture similar construction, but have less trouble as they do not attempt Admiralty speeds. Typical performance below. Whitehead's present output 40 per month, working night and day and Sundays

Main Whitehead Works at Fiume, Hungary, confiscated by Austrians, and English Director imprisoned.

Admiralty has ordered from Whitehead two torpedoes

RECEIVED

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

October 10, 1918.

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Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Whiting,
U.S.N.,
Director Naval Militia.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that the Secretary of the Navy has approved the recommendation of the Board appointed by the Department's letter of September 19, 1918, to examine into the qualifications of applicants for commissions in the Naval Militia, and has directed that the following officers be appointed in the Naval Militia:

To be Ensigns from the 19th day of September, 1918:

Harold Bruce Hoffman,
Yale Unit, Connecticut Naval Militia.

Edward Hall Bierstadt,
Yale Unit, Connecticut Naval Militia.

Very respectfully,

R. E. Coontz,
Captain, U.S.N.,
Chief of Naval Intelligence.

fitted with Davis Gun.

Uhlan Depth Gear abandoned by Admiralty due to deep initial dive and shoal firing waters - North Sea. Using Double Hydrostatic Valve as previously reported.

Typical Whitehead proving performances at present:

11000 yards - 25.85 knots Deviation plus 30
Water 52 liters
Fuel 7.9 "
Engine Oil 55 oz.
Reducer Oil 8 oz.

7000 yards 30.6 knots
Water 49 litres
Fuel 6.8 "
Engine Oil 50 oz.
Red. Oil 8 oz.

3500 yards 37.73 knots
Water 42 liters
Fuel 4.3 "
Engine Oil 18 oz.
Reducer Oil 7 oz.

2000 yards 40.05 knots
Water 43 liters
Fuel 4 "
Engine Oil 22 oz.
Reducer Oil 7 oz.

Admiralty speeds 21" 22" torpedoes

29 knots at 10000 yards
42 to 45 knots at 4000 yards.

MINES

British have no floating mines, i.e., a floating mine designed as such. The Vickers type can be used as a floater by using light anchor.

British have laid no mines so far.

Unconfirmed report that there are but 2000 mines in British service.

Majority of German mines in North Sea located by Sweepers have been towed into sufficiently shoal water to bring them to surface, and then destroyed by gun fire.

Some have been taken and are of the Carbonit type concerning which I have previously made complete and detailed reports Sprengstoff A.C. Carbonit, Hamburg.

Fitted with Davis Gin.

Ladies Depot Gent's Waiting Room

Initial Give Bus Depot Fifth Street - North Bed. Light

Double Pedestal Wash in Private Entrance.

Typical Bedroom Private Bathroom Entrance if one is used:

Bath Room 23.23 Front Elevation Both 28 and 29 Sq. Ft.

Water 23 Inches
Rod 6.7 "
Engine Oil 14 Qts.
Regular Oil 2 Qts.

Stock 23.73 Sq. Ft.

Water 23 Inches
Rod 8.3 "
Engine Oil 23 Qts.
Reg. Oil 3 Qts.

Stock 23.73 Sq. Ft.

Water 23 Inches
Rod 8.4 "
Engine Oil 17 Qts.
Regular Oil 7 Qts.

Stock 20.20 Sq. Ft.

Water 13 Inches
Rod 4 "
Engine Oil 25 Qts.
Regular Oil 7 Qts.

Stock 20.20 Sq. Ft.

Water 13 Inches
Rod 4.2 "
Engine Oil 17 Qts.
Regular Oil 7 Qts.

Stock 23.73 Sq. Ft.

Water 23 Inches
Rod 6.7 "
Engine Oil 14 Qts.
Regular Oil 2 Qts.

Stock 23.73 Sq. Ft.

Water 23 Inches
Rod 8.3 "
Engine Oil 23 Qts.
Reg. Oil 3 Qts.

Stock 23.73 Sq. Ft.

Water 23 Inches
Rod 8.4 "
Engine Oil 17 Qts.
Regular Oil 7 Qts.

Stock 20.20 Sq. Ft.

Water 13 Inches
Rod 4 "
Engine Oil 25 Qts.
Regular Oil 7 Qts.

Stock 20.20 Sq. Ft.

Water 13 Inches
Rod 4.2 "
Engine Oil 17 Qts.
Regular Oil 7 Qts.

They are apparently being laid in pairs with bridle between.

Although unconfirmed, it is reported that Amphion's magazines or war heads detonated sympathetically with the exterior mine detonation. Commanding Officer Amphion reported that flame surrounded fo8castle and burned crew as well as fo8castle deck fittings. As similar reports are on record in the past it would seem to be warranted to undertake serious experiments with a view to verifying and preventing such sympathetic detonations.

SWEEPING

Extensive sweeping operations are constantly underway on grounds frequented by Fleet, merchant service, and in neighbourhood of all principal harbours. With exception of Amphion and one trawler Admiralty states that mines would not have been fouled if their instructions had been followed. Sweeping is carried out principally by trawlers, old torpedo craft, and harbor vessels. Fleet sweeper class apparently being held in reserve with Main Fleet.

Considerable trouble is reported by sweepers in dragging mines after caught by sweeps and with sweep lines riding up mooring lines and clearing mines. This report confirms my previous reports that Germans were preparing for British sweeping methods (which seemed to be known to them) by use of extraordinarily heavy mooring lines, double anchors, and extra heavy anchors.

Approaches to all naval harbors are swept daily commencing about three a/m.

GENERAL NOTES

Fearless received 27 hull holes, one about 3' by 7' reached Sheerness under own steam, and had but 5 wounded.

British destroyers were within 3000 yards of Heligoland and reported that a large German force was getting underway at one stage of the operation.

Reported that British Marines were landed at Ostend in compliance with request of City for protection.

N. N. I. 33.

Need not be returned

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

13,36

Germany

SUBJECT EUROPEAN WAR - 1914. LESSONS FROM THE BELGIAN FORTS ABOUT LIEGE AND NAMUR AND THE FRENCH FORTS ABOUT MAUBEUGE.

From Z No. 335 Date September 14, 1914., 19

Replying to O. N. I. No. ---------- Date ----------, 19

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE RECEIVED OCT 28 1914

As there seems to be a general impression in American that the fortresses of Lüttich (Liege), Namur, and Maubeuge were able to check for a considerable period the right wing of the German Army, I forward this report to show how utterly they failed to do so and how necessary it is to have a mobile force to support such strongholds. This has a particular application in the United States where a false sense of security is given by the fortifications of the terminals of the Panama Canal and by coast batteries covering water approach to our great cities. Such batteries and forts will surely fall before intelligent attack, unless they are defended by a mobile force:- First, the Navy which holds command of the sea and prevents an enemy's army from landing; second, if the enemy gains the command of the sea a sufficient army to prevent the hostile force erecting its mortar batteries in such positions as it may select.

The forts surrounding Lüttich and Namur are practically the same. They were constructed beween 1888 and 1891, under the direction of General Brialmont and for a complete study of their plans and arrangements reference should be made to books on fortifications some of which published their plans.

In general the features are a heavy concrete mass from which rise in some forts five, in others six small cupola turrets. The barbettes are sunk about 1 1/2 metres into the concrete, and the top turns by hand gear. Where the turret meets the barbette a light iron watershed keeps rain from running down between the turret and barbette. This proved to be one of the many fatal weaknesses of these forts.

Where six turrets were installed there were two turrets each with one 21 c/m rifled mortars, range 8000 yards, two each with 15 c/m rifles, range 10,000 yards, and two turrets each with two 12 c/m rifles, range about 8000 yards. In each case the muzzle of the gun did not project beyond the turret. The high elevation was about 35°.

In addition to the turrets there was at the highest point of the concrete part a steel tower as an observation tower (B) and with a search-light. This tower lowered into the concrete. Some small ventilating shafts came up through the concrete. Below the concrete the turrets opened into a gallery from which led the magazines and the fire control room.

There was also a commanding officers order room, boiler and dynamo's room and a pumping room from the well. There were telephones and fire control outfits in poor order.

The whole was surrounded by a dry moat, about thirty feet deep and some rapid fire guns were in position in small turrets to cover the ground beyond the moat.

These forts can therefore be somewhat likened to a stationary battleship. Both Lüttich (Liege) and Namur were surrounded by a ring of these forts occupying salient positions from 8 to 12 kilometres from the centre of the city and separated from each other from three to five kilometres . Their garrisons were about four hundred men all told of whom half were artillery and halfinfantry. At Liege there were few if any troops to hold the lines between the forts. At Namur there were perhaps 300 men along the lines between forts with a few field guns of inferior type and the ground was mined.

The plan of attack was to reduce the (?) forts with siege artillery, taking them by storm when they were reduced to helplessness, then moving into the city and finishing the other forts by gun fire from the centre of the city, after the main body had passed on to continue the campaign elsewhere.

The guns used in the attack on Liege were 42 c/m Krupp mortars, length 7 1/2 metres, weight of shell 800 kilogrammes, bursting charge 180 k.g., ranges used 8300 to 15,000 metres, depending on circumstances. They were transported on large motor tractors. Also 21.c/m Krupp siege guns and some smaller.

At Namur the largest guns used were the Austrian 30.5 Skoda siege mortars, also German 21 c/m and smaller. The Austrian Siege trains were used in Germany in this campaign as Russia does not depend on fortified places and there is no employment for Austrian siege trains. The fatal defects of the forts showed up at once They were:-

1. Forts and turrets in full view so that spotting and correction of ranges by the attack was easy.

2. Only one observation position, which, soon buried in debris, was not usable.
   Note:- German forts have four or five inside spotting positions.

3. No positions belonging to the fort for spotters outside the forts.
   Note:- German forts do all their spotting and observing from concealed position outside the fort and some distance from it as long as possible.

4. Turret watersheds torn off by fragments of shell and concrete. The concrete and splinters fell in between turret and barbette and put the mechanism out of order. Many turrets fired not more than two rounds.

5. Barbettes were not deep enough, the plunging fire striking outside,the barbette,went under it , and exploded in the base of the turret and in the galleries, killing the crew of the turret and the fumes rushing through the galleries rendered all in them useless for further work.

6. In once case (Fort Louvain), a shell followed the course of the magazine ventilation trunk and the whole magazine blew up, leaving a crater 50 feet deep and in it a confused tangle of overturned turrets, masses of masonry , etc. Practically the entire garrison perished in this fort.

7. The concrete top in which the turrets are set was not thick enough to withstand the attack of the new 42 c/m guns whose fuses are timed to explode after the shell has buried itself. In this material these shell would go down over 5 metres before exploding, thus opening up the upper galleries and rendering the whole fort untenable.

There were no hits on armor by the 42 c/m, so no opportunity to see what would have happened. War being declared on the 2d of August and the first of the Lüttich forts was taken on the sixth and the town occupied on the 7th, which is about as fast as the force could get there with its guns.

The forts of Namur fared no better when they were attacked later in the month in the course of the advance of the Army. They did not serve to delay matters.

It cannot be claimed that Liege and Namur were modern strongholds, but Maubeuge with its concealed forts and garrison of 40,000 men can justly be claimed as modern and properly garrisoned.


Here the attack on the forts by gun fire was spotted from captive balloons necessary to see the French gun positions which were in pits.

The siege train and a sufficient force were left at Maubeuge which finally fell on the 6th of September. The wing of the German Army which this fortress was to hold in check was well down toward Paris at that time.

The forts at Lüttich and Namur are now being put by the Germans into condition for further usefulness in case their army has to fall back. The forts are to be protected points for infantry and their guns, where reparable, are not expected to do much. The Germans would only hold such a place as Namure or Liege as part of the lines of a large army.

An idea of the appearance and damage done is best shown by some photographs which will be forwarded.

The great fortresses along the French - German border, such as Toul, Verdun, etc. are all supported by effective armies in the field.



A A. Cupola turrets
B Observation and search light turret
C Protecting Towers

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(3)

American Embassy,

LONDON.

Need not be returned.

Sept. 14th, 1914.

From: Major Thomas C. Treadwell, U.S.

To:

Subject: Report on Conditions in Ostend, Belgium and Vicinity from Sept. 3 - 9th, 1914.

The undersigned was at Ostend from Sept. 3-9th and the following report is from personal observations, and conversation with officers and officials. While at Ostend motor trips were made through Northern Belgium as far as Dunkirk in France, to Knocke on border of Holland, and inland as far as Ghent.

British Expeditionary Force at Ostend.

A British Expeditionary Force consisting of a brigade of Royal Marines (3,000 men) with a battary of artillery, under the command of Brig. Gen. Sir George Gray Aston, was landed at Ostend Aug. 22nd. This Force was conveyed by 4 battleships, several cruisers and a flottila of destroyers. There was a very rough sea at the time, but the expedition was landed quickly, and without confusion at quay in harbour, and the criticism on military appearance and efficiency of the men was most favorable. This force was camped between Ostend and Middlekirke, and between Ostend and St. Coy sur Mer, and constructed intrenchments, and barbed wire entanglements. A Naval Aviation section offour hydroplanes was established here on following day. This force remained at Ostend until Sept. 1st, when transports and convoy were sent in to get them and entire force was withdrawn.

During their stay the greatest secrecy was maintained with regard to them, and nothing about them appeared in the local papers, other than articles welcoming them, commenting on their fine appearance, and these, several days after their arrival.

General Military Conditions in Ostend and Vicinity.

After the withdrawal of the British Force there were no troops at Ostend other than a battalion of Belgian Civil Guards. The place was, however, well patrolled English destroyers and other vessels appearing off the port every day, English and French aeroplanes frequently flying over, and a number of French and Belgian armoured motor-cars mounting Maxim guns patrolling the country in search for German air-craft. All lights in Ostend were extinguished at 9 p.m. every night. The mail steamer to Folkstone left at 10.40 a.m. each day except on the 8th, when it was not permitted to go, probably on account of danger from mines. The mail boat made trip from Ostend to Folkstone on the 9th leaving at 8 a.m., instead of the usual time. She ran close to the shore and was stopped off Nieuport for about half an hour when vessel came out and told him it was all right to proceed designated course

There were rumors of a pro-jectedland ing of Russians troops at Ostend, Zu Brugge and Nieuport, but the evidence of such intention other than the presence of a Russian captain at Ostend, who left there on the 4th.

On Sept. 3rd, we motored through Northern Belgium and as far as Dunkirk in France. It seemed harder to get out of Ostend than to get through at other points along the road. The Civil Guard seemed to be nervous, suspicious of German spies, and not well up in their duties, and some of these would bring their pieces up to firing position to halt you. There were no Belgian troops from Ostend to the border. On crossing into France, we found many French troops - apparently there was an army corps in vicinity of Dunkirk. We were halted many times, but allowed to proceed without delay on examining passports. The French troops were entrenching at various places, standing and kneeling trenches constructed of earth and sand bags in several lines evidently to fall back from one to another. The roads were obstructed with felled trees, barbed wire, and barricades at many points. Not so as to obstruct all traffic, but in such a way that they could be quickly blocked. On arriving at Dunkirk we were given pass to return to Ostend. In the same building they were taking in last reserves and conscriptsmen of all ages from 18 - 48, and a great crowd was assembled. The officers said they had just taken an auto with 3 German spies. Officers and men seemed polite, cheerful and confident, and said "we are not through with Germany yet, our turn will come soon."

On Sept. 5th, we motored to Knocke on the border of Holland, where were met the Consul General from Brussels, and transferred to him funds for relief of Americans in Brussels. He said that there were about 70 Americans in Brussels, and that American Minister there had been trying for 10 days to get train to send them to Ostend, but that Germans would not permit. Military Governor of Belgium was there, and everything was run quietly and strictly in the city. There were no Belgian soldiers between Ostend and Knocke except at part of Zu Brugge, where there was a battalion of infantry and battery of artillery. We talked with Belgian officers there. The Major in command said that he was at Namur with some of his men, that they were in trenches under fire without food for 3 days, and without water for 2, and some of the men died from hunger. He said that Namur could have been held much longer, through Belgian force there was too small, and German heavy siege guns did great damage to forts. These huge 11-in. Krupp siege mortars weigh with recoil cylinders and carriage 15½ tons. They are drawn over the roads by traction engines or by at least 28 horses. They fire from field carriage or may be mounted in concrete emplacements requiring less than two days to construct. The shell weighs 600-lbs. and has very high explosive, and the range is over 6 miles with about 42 degrees elevation.

Sept. 7th, on approaching Ghent firing was heard and some thousands of refugees appeared on the road fleeing from the threatened city. The firing had ceased and everything was quiet on our arrival in Ghent. A German force had attacked the Belgians at Melles, about 4 miles south of Ghent, had been checked and withdrew a few miles. The German commander threatened to bombard the city but after a conference with the Burgomaster and others, agreed to withdraw if furnished with provisions, fodder, etc., appeared to be reinforced brigade, and a large number of Civil Guards. The Germans had lost about 100 men killed and 2 field guns demolished

in

in the attack, the Belgians not so many. German artillery fire had demolished and set on fire a number of houses in Melles. The German Army in Belgium, Sept. 9th, were apparently on line Malines, Termonde, with forces at Brussels, near Ghent and Antwerp.

Belgian Refugees.

Belgian refugees have been pouring into Ostend for over two weeks. On some days as many as 5,000 in a day. To assist these refugees an International Organization known as the "Double Croix Blanche" has been formed, with Mr. Aurel Batonyi, an American, as Secretary. The Burgomaster has given 500 bathing vans to be used for their accomodation which have been installed in the public gardens behind the Royal Palace and Galerie Leopold is used for mess rooms for these and many other destitutes quartered in schools, etc. The organization is now endeavouring to arrange accomodations in hotels. The hotels, kursaal, etc., could accomodate at least 300,000, if authority could be obtained to use them, or if they were turned over for this purpose by their managers. The situation at Ostend is now becoming serious owing to these refugees and a shortage of food is at hand. Money and food supplies are urgently needed to relieve the situation. About 1,500 refugees are transported each day by mail steamer to England where they are being looked out for, but the number in Ostend is constantly increasing.

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(4)

American Embassy,

LONDON.

Sept. 14th, 1914.

Need not be returned

From: Major Thomas K. Treadwell, U.S.M.C.

To:

Subject: Report on Conditions at Harwich and Vicinity Sept. 11th, 1914.

Harwich was before the war made a Naval base and the permanent headquarters of the Admiral of Patrols, and of the Torpedo Destroyer Flottilas operating in the North Sea, with a range of action extending from Dover to the Firth of Forth. The Naval station is at Shotley across the river from Harwich, and here is moored a floating dock for repairing destroyers, large enough to contain two at a time. Harwich Harbour is also the headquarters of the Submarine Flotillas. Two large hangars for storing hydro-aeroplanes have been erected near the Shotley Pier.

There is a large training school for bluejackets at Shotley. These bluejackets are quartered in the large Shotley Barracks, which are capable of accomodating about 5,000 men/

Harwich is supposed to be strongly fortified. On the Suffolk side at the entrance of the Harbour and commanding the Channel is Landguard Fort. South of the town on Beacon Hill close to the stone breakwater, is a fort called the "Redoubt". These works are garrisoned by a force consisting of 3 Cos. R.G.A., (1 Regular, 2 Territorial) and 2 Cos. R.E., (1 Regular, 1 Territorial

Parkeston Quay has been turned over to the Navy. This is point from which steamers ordinarily leave for the Hook of Holland and Antwerp, Denmark and Hamburg, but service is now suspended. Off the quay was a flotilla of 12 destroyers moored close together in double column. They did not have steam up and crews were ashore on liberty. These destroyers were of 965 and 750 ton classes - the Sennet, Archer, Duad, Dido, etc. There was also in harbour the Woolwich depot ship for destroyers; Maidstone depot ship for submarines; Pembroke; and a flotilla of submarines. Destroyer and Submarine Flotillas come into Harwich from time to time to refill and refit and rest their crews.

The seaward waterfront of Harwich extending round to Dovercourt Bay had all been taken for military purposes. This embraces a shore line of about a mile and a half, and includes an area containing parks, and an old Martillo Tower, the permanent fortification known as the "Redoubt", R.G.A. Barracks, some town buildings and one hotel. It appears that two 9.5-inch guns and a number of smaller guns had recently been mounted near the Redoubt, that barbed wire entanglements had been constructed near them

them and that at least one building had been demolished.

There appeared to be four battalions of the Essex Regt. (Territorials) and one battalion at least of the Bedford Regt. (territorials) in addition to the 3 Cos. of R.G.A., and 2 Cos. Engineers above referred to, in Harwich and vicinity. All positions that were reserved for military purposes were marked "closed" and strongly guarded. There was also a strong guard round the Parkeston Quay reservation. The troops were mostly quartered in buildings but guard detachments, etc. were in tents, and all kinds of old white canvas in use as tentage. There was a large hospital at Shotley. The large Great Eastern Hotel facing Harwich Pier had also been converted into a hospital. The troops at Harwich were not busy (Saturday afternoon) and many were on liberty in Harwich and Dovercourt, and playing football and other games. There appeared to be nearly 5,000 recruits in Harwich and Dovercourt, and they were all in civilian clothes.

Colchester.

During the week recruits from all parts of England have been arriving at Colchester for training, preparatory for service. On Thursday afternoon between one and two thousand men who had been recruited in London for which is to be known as "Lord Robert"s Regiment" detrained at Colchester, and marched to a camp that had been provided for them near Reed Hall. At the Abbey Field the recruits may be seen drilling at all times of the day. When drilling the majority wear khaki breeches and grey shirts, but many have not yet been supplied with uniform and have to drill in civilian clothes.

In the open fields near the railroad east of the town a battalion was observed drilling in attack formation. The military authorities are trying to arrange with the owners of motor-cars to convey wounded soldiers that may arrive in the town to the military hospitals. The Essex Regt. is forming a new battalion which will make nine battalions for that Regiment. It is understood that there will be 13 battalions of Kitchener's Army to train at Colchester and Shorncliffe. When ready for active service this division will probably be under the command of Major General Mackenzie, lately appointed to command the Colchester training centre.



[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.] Need not be returned.

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(5)

Japan -

Subject Destroyers authorized in War Budget.

From W. *No.* 66. *Date* September 14, 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. xxxxxx *Date* xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
RECEIVED
OCT 16 1914

The special session of the Diet, Sept. 3 - 10, appropriated Yen 10,578,000 for the construction of ten destroyers. Work on these destroyers is to be begun as soon as possible. They are to be of the Sakura class improved.

Name to be assigned.	Where built.
Kaba	Yokosuka Naval Station
Katsura	Kure Naval Station
Kakaki	Sasebo Naval Station
Kayede	Maizuru Naval Station
Ume	Kawasaki Dockyard, Kobe.
Kusunoki	do
Kashiwa	Mitsu Bishi Dockyard, Nagasaki
Katsu	do
Kiri	Uraga Dock Co., Uraga
Sugi	Osaka Iron Works, Osaka.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

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14

(5)

Subject Conversation with German naval attache, Tokyo, re German naval war plans.

From W. *No.* 68. *Date* September 15, 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. xxxxxxxxx *Date* xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
RECEIVED
OCT 16 1914

A few days after war had been declared between Germany and England I had a conversation with the German naval attache at Tokyo in which he made some statements of interest regarding the naval war plans of Germany. Of course, these statements were not authoritative, but were probably true, as this officer has been on duty at the German Naval Staff College and with the Naval General Staff.

News had just been received of the sinking of the German M.L. Koenigen Louise on Aug. 5 while laying mines off the English coast. The German naval attache said in effect:-

This same vessel, at approximately the same place, and on the day after the declaration of war with England has in chart maneuvers laid mines dozens and dozens of times. Sometimes she has been sunk and sometimes she has laid her mines and escaped, but always she has done in chart maneuvers exactly what she has done now in actual war. He cited this as an example of the thoroughness of German war preparation. He then said it is the plan of the General Staff in the early part of a war with England to attack the English fleet with submarines, destroyers, mines and airships, but not to expose their fleet unless and until the English fleet had been reduced to practical parity with the German fleet. This war, he said, is not to be a test of our navy because we are not ready for such a test with England. Germany can destroy France and cripple Russia on land in this war and then England will readily make peace. This war is to be directed against France and Russia on land, and the next war is to be against England on the sea. We will be ready for the English fleet then.

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American Embassy,

London, England

15 September 1914

Need not be returned

From: Lieut-Commander W.F.Bricker, U.S.N.
To: The Naval Attache

STRATEGY and TACTICS.DISPOSITION OF FORCES.

This seems to contemplate:- (a) containing the German Fleet within the North Sea; (b) containing the Austrian Fleet within the Adriatic; (c) driving German and Austrian trade from the sea; (d) keeping their own trade routes open; (e) capturing or driving from the high sea the German cruisers which are engaged in commerce destroying.

TACTICS and DISPOSITION

To accomplish the above the following dispositions probably are made -

(a) There is a double patrol line extending from the Continent probably from near Ostend to the English Coast somewhere near Harwich, thence northward off the coast to some point off the north-east coast of Scotland, probably north of Aberdeen, thence to the coast of Norway opposite. This guards the coast of England and Scotland and also the exits from the North Sea. Cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and small craft form this patrol. In the Channel is stationed the Second Fleet based at Portland; this gives a strong force to close the Straits of Dover (Lt. Babcock has seen it there). On the north-east coast of Scotland, at either Cromarty or Rosyth (probably the former) is stationed the Third Fleet; this gives a strong force to guard the exit from the North Sea to the northward. At some point along the east coast of England or

Scotland, probably near the Humber, the First Fleet is located, ready to proceed in any direction should the German Fleet come out. In addition to this there are patrols of cruiser and destroyer divisions which cruise out into the North Sea as far as Heligoland to keep watch and report any activities of the German Fleet (This is my opinion).

Naval Constructor McBride is of the opinion that the First Fleet is to the northward, probably at Cromarty, and that both the Second and Third Fleets are to the southward of the southern patrol line.

Units of both the First and the Second Fleets were in the Heligoland Bight fight (First Fleet - First Battle-cruiser Squadron and Destroyer flotillas; Second Fleet - Submarines; the latter two are based on Harwich: I saw them there).

French cruisers and destroyers are also in the Channel, and it is reported that French Submarines are with the First Fleet.

(b) French Mediterranean Fleet and English Second Battle-cruiser Squadron, First Cruiser Squadron and Fifth Destroyer Flotilla are used for this purpose, and to keep Mediterranean trade routes open.

(c), (d), (e). These three are closely related and many cruisers and auxiliary cruisers are searching out the German cruisers on the high sea.

AUXILIARIES (British)

200 fuel ships, coal and oil (Captain Osborne)
27 auxiliary cruisers (Navy List)
10 Hospital ships " "
3 " carriers " "
156 small vessels, tugs, etc. (Navy List)
107 trawlers " "
34 "mercantile fleet auxiliaries" (Navy List)
In addition 95 small torpedo boats have been placed in commission.

ACTIONS

Heligoland Bight, August 28, 1914, has been the only important action in which a number of vessels were engaged on both sides.

Apparently the British destroyers and submarines went in behind Heligoland and lured the German destroyers and cruisers out. It was misty and the Germans did not see the English supporting cruisers until well out. There was a "go as you please" fight for several hours, in which the British seem to have had the best of it, the result being made certain by the timely arrival of the First Battle-cruiser Squadron. The losses were - two German cruisers, Mainz Class, sunk and one set on fire and badly damaged; at least two German destroyers sunk; several British light cruisers and destroyers damaged by gun fire.

No vessels damaged by torpedoes.

E-4 picks up Defender's whaleboat crew and takes them home 250 miles.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
RECEIVED
OCT 28 1914

American Embassy,

LONDON,

Sept. 16th, 1914.

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13085

From: Major Thomas C. Treadwell, U.S.M.C.

To:

Subject: Report on Conditions at Aldershot, Sept. 15th.

Aldershot is the headquarters of one of the eight military commands of the United Kingdom, and the largest military post therein. The troops in the command include the 1st and 2nd Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Brigade, Signal Co. Bridge Train and Royal Flying Corps (Militar Wing) Other troops in the command are the 15th Hussars, 2 Cos., and a Signal Squadron of Royal Engineers, and the Headqqarters of the Military Mounted and Military Foot Police. There is also a Training Depot for Royal Engineers and following schools of instruction: Gymnasia, Army Signal School, Royal Army Medical Corps Training Establishment, School of Army Sanitation and Army Veterinary School. These troops are all regulars, and most of them now on Expeditionary Service in France, with exception of those left to train recruits and look out for the post.

The large recruiting results following the recent appeals are shown in the enormous increase in the number of men now under training at Alderhot. There are at present over 100,000 troops of all kinds there, while every day brings in further detachments. On the 15th all trains coming in seemed to have a large number of recruits. It is estimated that there will soonebe 150000 troops in and around Aldershot, and that this number is likely to be maintained throughout the war, allowing for the despatch from time to time of trained men to the theatre of war.

These recruits are being organized into battalions of the regiments ordinarily stationed at Aldershot, or into battalions for new regiments.

More than half of the recruits were not in uniform of any kind, and of those that were in uniform the greater number were not provided with military caps. The recruits appeared to be generally of good quality, though many were small and some did not seem to be up to age requirements.

Theywere quartered in the barracks and buildings at Aldershot, and in tents around these, and in camps in vicinity on Laffan's Plain, Farnborough Common, North Camp, etc.

On the afternoon of the 15th they were drilling everywhere. At least 30,000 men must have been drilling at one time. On Queen's Parade, the drill ground in the town, more than 5,000 men were drilling in detachments. Drills were seen in extended order, company drill, manual of arms, school of the recruit, entrenching, signals, etc., but very few of the recruits were drilling with arms. There seemed to be shortage of non-commissioned officers to conduct these drills, for many of the drill masters appeared to have larger detachments than they could well handle, while others did not seem to be competent.

OCT 23 1914
RECEIVED

A considerable amount of field transportation in the shape of motor trucks, and horse vehicles was seen at Aldershot, but few horses. A numberrof traction engines were there.

It is understood that the aircraft works at Farnborough is busily engaged in making aeroplanes and dirigibles and that the Royal Flying Corps is training aviators. This plant was not visited, but several aeroplanes were making flights in vicinity.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Would not be returned 13136

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SUBJECT The Foreign (other than French) Armies.

Translation from La Tablette des Deux Charrettes, Sept. 17, 14.

From Y *No.* 130 *Date* Sept. 21, 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ..... *Date* .....

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE RECEIVED OCT 28 1914

It has appeared interesting to us to give the following information which we have obtained from official sources as to the military organization and armament of the fighting nations' armies.

These data give only the regular fighting force, not comprising the engineers, the train of supply forces, etc.

I. ARMIES OF OUR ALLIES.

Russia.

The Russian army is divided into the army of Europe and the army of Asia. The European army comprises 25 army corps, the imperial guard, the grenadier corps, and the three army corps of the Caucasus. The Asiatic army comprises two corps from Turkestan and 5 corps from Siberia/. To these armies must be added the Cossacks.

An army corps in time of war contains 40,000 men. The active army, on a peace footing, contains 1,385,000 men; in time of war, without reckoning the Cossacks, there are six million men as an effective force.

The infantry is armed with the so-called "three lines" rifle, calibre 7.6 mm., model 91, 5 cartridge magazine; each regiment of infantry contains a section of Maxim machine guns.

The cavalry has the "three lines" rifle shortened, the first ranks of all the cavalry and Cossack regiments (except those of the Caucasus) have the lance, each division of cavalry and of Cossacks has a section of eight Maxim machine guns.

The field artillery is armed with 76 mm. guns, model 1900-1908. The heavy artillery has guns of 6 inches and 10.67 inches, model 1910: horse and mortar batteries are of 6 guns each, Cossack batteries of 4 guns, and all others of 8 guns.

England.

The English army is divided into eight superior commands. The infantry comprises 2 guard regiments, 2 grenadier regiments and 74 battalions of line infantry, of which 23 belong to the colonies; and 52 batallions in India, making a total of 69 regiments of infantry, with a reserve of 101 batallions. The cavalry comprises 3 guard and 14 line regiments, and 5 regiments in Africa and 9 in India. The artillery comprises 29 horse batteries and 147 field batteries. The total English force may be evaluated at 480,000 men.

The infantry is armed with the Lee-Metford 1889-1891, and Enfield, model 1893, rifles, calibre 7.696 mm., with demountable 8 cartridge magazine. Each battallion of infantry has a section of machine guns. The cavalry is armed with carbines or with rifles. The field artillery is equipped with an 89mm gun and the horse artillery with a 76 mm gun, each battery has 6 guns.

Belgium.

The Belgian army is divided between a field army and a fortress army. The field army comprises 4 divisions each of 4 regiments of infantry and 2 regiments of artillery (each of 6 batteries); and 2 cavalry divisions each of 4 regiments and a group of 2 horse artillery batteries. The fortress army comprises an effective complement of 80,000 men.

The infantry is armed with the Mauser 188ç rifle, 7.65 mm, fixed 5 cartridge magazine. The cavalry has a model 1889 carbine. The field artillery guns are Krupp cast steel (?) 75 mm.

Servia.

The active Servian army comprises 20 regiments of infantry, 4 regiments of cavalry each of 4 sqyadrons, and 7 regiments of artillery, of which 1 is field and 1 siege guns. The total effective mobilized force is close to 400,000 men.

The infantry is armed with 7 mm Mauser rifles, 1889 . There is one section of machine guns with each regiment. The

field artillery is Schnieder 1907 70 mm guns, 4 to a battery; the heavy artillery of Schnieder-Canet 120 mm siege guns and 150mm mortars, model 1897. In addition they have Schnieder rapid fire 75 mm guns taken from the Bulgarians, and 249 guns (140 rapid fire) Krupp 75 mm, taken from the Turks.

II. ARMIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES.

Germany.

There are 25 active army corps pf which 3 are Bavarian. Each corps consists of 2 divisions each of 2 brigades of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and a brigade of field artillery. Each brigade comprises 2 regiments. The total infantry force is 217 regiments with 18 batallions of chasseurs and 235 companies of mitrailleuses; the cavalry 110 regiments of 5 squadrons each ; the field artillery 100 regiments, the foot artillery not part of the field army, is 23 regiments. To these must be added the landwehr and the landsturn, which bring the effective total to more than four million men who have received military instruction.

The infantry is armed with modified 1898 Mauser, 7.9 mm, 5 cartridge magazine, weight 9 pounds. The cavalry has a carbine similar but shorter, and a ten foot lance. The field artillery with 77mm rapid fire guns, 6 to a battery; the siege artillery has 9 and 12 cm steel and bronze (?) guns; 15 cm short steel guns, and 21 cm guns, also revolving rapid fire guns of 3 and 5 cm. (Note by translator, also campaign shows they have 24 cm. siege guns and 42 cm mortars.)

Austria.

There are 16 army corps, each consisting of 2 divisions of infantry of two brigades each, 1 brigade of cavalry of 2 or 3 regiments, and 1 brigade of artillery of 1 heavy gun regiment and 3 field gun regiments. The total infantry force is 106 regiments and 3è batallions of chasseurs; cavalry, 15 dragoon regiments, 16 hussars, and 11 uhlans, each of 6 squadrons; artillery (other than fortress) 14 regiments of heavy guns and 48 field, siege artillery 10 regiments. To this add the landwehr which brings the total effective to more than 1,300,000 men.

The Infantry is armed with the Mannlicher 1895 8 mm. rifle, fixed 5 cartridge magazine; 4 battalions to a regiment; each regiment has 3 sections of Schwartzlose machine guns. The Cavalry is armed with repeating carbines and each regiment has a section of machine guns. The heavy field guns, 10 cm. forged bronze, eccentric breech closure; the mountain guns same model but with modifications.

WAR COLLEGE,
RECEIVED
OCT 28 1914

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American Embassy,

LONDON.

Sept. 21st, 1914.

13085

From: Major Thomas C. Treadwell, U.S.M.C.

To:

Subject: Report on conditions at Southampton, Sept. 17-19th, 1914.

Southampton was soon after the outbreak of war taken over by the Military Authorities, and becams a closed port for commerce; and a great part of the British Expeditionary Force was embarked here. For this purpose it is the best port on the coast being a spacious and well defended harbor, 83 miles from Cherbourg, 112 from Havre, and 130 miles from Boulogne. It has five docks or basins at which the largest ships can lie, only a short distance from the railroad terminus, so that troops and supplies may be loaded direct from rail to ship, and is only 15 miles from the Naval base at Portsmouth from which Naval escort is furnished the transports.

On Sept. 12th, the re-opening of the port to commerce was announced, owing to temporary lull in transportation of troops but the numerous steamship companies using the port, of which the Royal Mail, White Star, Union Castle, and Cunard are the largest hesitate to accept the Admiralty's obviously tentative communication as a basis for working their steamers as it is believed that there will be a removal of military transport activities at the Docks early in October, and Southampton is a prohibited port for aliens, whereas normally it is more especially a passenger port. One result of this interference with business is noticed in the vicinity of the Docks, where hundreds of dock hands are marking time looking for a job. The South-Western Co. cross channel boats from Havre, however, continue to run each day.

Though there has been a lull in military transport activities since the despatch of the Expeditionary Force, a considerable number of troops arrive and depart each day. At the docks on the 19th there were moored 9 large transports. On the 18th transports arrived with wounded and 900 German prisoners, some of whom were selling their helmets for tobacco. Forces from Malta, Gibraltar, Africa and Canada have arrived or are on the way. German prisoners have, heretofore, been sent to the prison camps near Aldershot, but accomodation for them is now being provided at Shirley, 3 miles from Southampton in skating rink, and a prison camp on the golf links. There is a large military hospital at

Netley

DUPLICATE
DO NOT DESTROY

Netley that was visited by the King and Queen on Tuesday last. The lafge building occupied by the Ordnance Department, Survey at Southampton has been working night and day supplying French maps. The large South Western and other hotels were closed to public and used by officers of the transportation force. All railroads, military reservations etc., in vicinity of Southampton and Portsmouth were strongly guarded.

On the large common at Southampton is a rest camp and on the 19th there were 6 battalions camped here on a splendid camp site, also a remount depot with about 700 horses.

There are camps at Lyndhurst, Winchester, Havant and Cosham. These camps are for regulars soon to leave on Expeditionary Service, and are distant respectively 9, 12, 17 and 15 miles from Southampton. The camp at Lyndhurst is for two divisions, that at Winchester for a division, and the other two are smaller. There is a remount depot at Havant, and a Rifle depot at Winchester. + Supply Depot On Salisbury Plain, distant only 25 miles, there are a number of camps for recruits.

The large camp in the New Forest near Lyndhurst was on an ideal site, well laid out and everything done for comfort of men, except that in this and other camps there were no cots or boards for men to sleep on, which did not seem favorable to health of commands, owing to cool damp weather of late and thefact that many of the troops had come from warm climates. In the Lyndhurst camp were 8 battalions of troops recently arrived from Malta, where they had been replaced by Territorials. On Sept. 19th, troops arrived from Africa in transports and were marched through the city to camp at Lyndhurst. The battalions of the Queen's (R.W. Surrey Regt) and the Bedford Regiment were seen marching to camp. They wore khaki covered helmets, and made an excellent appearance.

W. Trudeau

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

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Must not be (3)

Subject Official reports of operations by Japanese Flag Officers. German-Japanese war.

From W. *No.* 69. *Date* September 21, 1914

Replying to O. N. I. No. xxxxx *Date* xxxxxxxxxx

NAVAL WAR COLL. RECEIVED SEP 16 1914

(1) Telegram of Vice Admiral K. Kato, Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Squadron, addressed to Vice Admiral Shimamura, Chief of General Staff, despatched on the 27th, Aug. 1914, at 11:25 a.m. and received at 3:50 p.m. same day, is as follows :-

Arrived outside of Kiaochow Bay on the morning of the 26th, and sent a message by wireless requesting that our military messenger be received as one would be sent. When we arrived about 9 miles south of Takung Island, the Governor answered by wireless asking us to communicate our wishes by wireless, adding that he would transmit our desires to the American Consul and the Commander of the Austrian man-of-war. So the despatch of a messenger was stopped and the proclamation of blockade was made by wireless. When the message was finished and understood by him, it was 9 a.m. of our central standard time.

(2) Report of Vice Admiral T. Kato, Commander-in-Chief of the First Squadron.

The 1st Torpedo Division while on duty at its post of patrol, on the 24th at about 2 p.m., met a storm. Not being able to take shelter on account of raging waves and blinding rain, the vessels of the Division, avoiding the centre of the storm, steamed towards southwest following the direction of the wind and waves. They were drifted amid the raging waves for nearly one day and night, and all the flotillas were scattered. From about noon of the 25th, the wind and

waves began to abate, and Rear Admiral Fujimoto, Commander of the Torpedo Division, searched for the vessels of the various flotillas, and they were all collected by the night of the 26th. As they were drifted on the raging sea for a long time, some of them lost boats, others hatches and other articles, etc., and everyone of them received more or less damages, but as the result of the great efforts of all the crew, none of them have been disabled either for fightingor for navigation. However I regret very much to report that Chukyu Goto (of Ono village, Nasu Gun, Tochigi Prefecture), 2nd class stoker of the Umikaze and Yonekichi Koguchi (of Oishi Village, Kita Atachi Gun, Saitama Prefecture), 3rd class stoker of the Yamakaze, while defending in-rushing water, and Ju Sugawara (of Nataki village, Nishi Iwai Gun, Iwate Prefecture), 1st class Petty Officer, Shinnosuke Watanabe (of Nomura village, Iwaki Gun, Fukushima Prefecture), 3rd class Petty Officer, and Isaburo Iwata (of Shimo Naguri village, Nashima Gun, Gifu Prefecture), 3rd class Petty Officer, all of the destroyer Nokura, while securing a boat amid great dangers, were washed away by waves. (Given out by the Navy Department on the 28th)

(3) According to report of Rear Adm. Kanimura, Division Commander of the 2nd Squadron, dated the 2nd 8:30 a.m., the division together with a force despatched from the Ryojun Secondary Naval Station arrived at the landing place to-day the 2nd at 6 a.m. The landing party of the squadron is now disembarking being covered by part of the squadron. It seems there is no enemy on land, and no foreign men-of-war in the adjacent waters. Many of our army transports have

7 Mar 1913

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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REPORT

OF A

SUB-COMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

ON THE

INSURANCE OF BRITISH SHIPPING IN TIME OF WAR.

CONTENTS.

	Page
TERMS OF REFERENCE	1

REPORT.

PART I.—GENERAL PRINCIPLES	1
PART II.—THE INSURANCE OF HULLS	2
The Mutual Insurance Associations	2
The Insurance of Hulls on Voyages current at the Outbreak of War ..	3
Shipowners' Contributions	5
The possible Liability of the State for Losses on Voyages current at the Outbreak of War	5
The Insurance of Hulls on Voyages commenced after the Outbreak of Hostilities	6
The possible Liability of the State for Losses on Voyages commenced after the Outbreak of War	7
The Settlement of Claims	8
Valuation	9
Concluding Remarks on Hull Insurance	9
PART III.—THE INSURANCE OF CARGOES	9
The Market for War Risks	9
The Insurance of Cargoes on Voyages current at the Outbreak of War ..	10
The Insurance of Cargoes on Voyages commenced after the Outbreak of Hostilities	12
The Extent of the Liability of the State for Losses on Cargoes ..	16
PART IV.—SUMMARY	16
Concluding Remarks	18

Insurance of British Shipping in Time of War.

TERMS OF REFERENCE.

THE Prime Minister desires that a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence composed as follows :—

The Right Hon. F. Huth Jackson (*in the Chair*),
Lord Inchcape,
Sir A. Norman Hill, Secretary, The Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Asssociation,
Sir Raymond Beck, Deputy-Chairman of Lloyd's,
Mr. Arthur Lindley,

Captain M. P. A. Hankey (*Secretary*),

should meet to consider, without prejudice to the question of policy, whether an administratively practicable scheme can be devised for submission to His Majesty's Government, which will secure that, in case of war, British steamships shall not be generally laid up, and that oversea commerce shall not be interrupted by reason of inability to cover the war risks of ships and cargoes by insurance, and which will also secure that the insurance rates shall not be so high as to cause an excessive rise of prices.

Any scheme prepared must be on the basis of reasonable contributions being paid by the owners of ships and cargoes towards the cost of insurance.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*,
May 7, 1913.

REPORT.

Part I.—General Principles.

1. In seeking to devise a scheme which will ensure that, in case of war, British steamships shall not be generally laid up, and that oversea commerce shall not be interrupted by reason of inability to cover war risks of ships and cargoes by insurance, and which will also secure that the insurance rates shall not be so high as to cause an excessive rise in prices, we have kept the following principles in view :—

(1.) As laid down in the terms of reference the scheme must be on the basis of reasonable contributions being paid by the owners of ships and cargoes towards the cost of insurance.

(2.) The main object of the State is to keep the trade of the country going and not to make a profit.

(3.) Nevertheless, it is necessary to safeguard the State against incalculable financial liabilities, and more particularly against fraud.

(4.) If the scheme is to have any prospect of success it is essential to avoid the hostility of any of the interests concerned. It is therefore necessary to avoid any step prejudicial to the legitimate business of shipowners, insurance brokers, underwriters, merchants, or bankers.

(5.) The scheme should avoid the appearance of a gratuitous gift from the State to a particular trade, at a time when all branches of trade will be very much hampered and every class of the population will be subject to unforeseen and incalculable risks of loss.

(6.) It should, on the other hand, avoid disclosing to the enemy the real conditions prevailing at any moment, by the quotation of official rates of insurance corresponding to the actual risks as known to the Admiralty.

(7.) It should avoid or minimise, as far as possible, the administrative difficulties which will fall upon the State, *e.g.*, of valuation, avoidance of fraud, congestion of business, &c.

2. The details of our scheme are set forth below.

Part II.—THE INSURANCE OF HULLS.

The Mutual Insurance Associations.

3. With regard to the insurance of hulls, our attention was drawn to the fact that during recent years the insurance of shipping against war risks had passed from the Underwriters into the hands of Mutual Insurance Associations or Clubs, of which the principal are the following:—

The North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association, comprising in its war risk class steamers of a value of about 30,000,000*l.*

The London group of War Risks Associations, comprising steamers of a value of about 27,000,000*l.*

The London and Liverpool War Risks Insurance Association (Limited), comprising steamers of a value of about 30,000,000*l.*

The two last-named Associations have only been formed during the last two years.

4. The total values insured in these three Associations amount to about 87,000,000*l.*, while the total steamer tonnage of the United Kingdom engaged in foreign trade was valued in 1911 at 127,000,000*l.* So far as we can learn, the majority of vessels not entered in one or other of the Associations are not at the present time insured against war risks.

5. The risks covered by these Associations differ somewhat in detail, but the main principles embodied in their insurance are the same. They cover fully the risks incident to war so long as this country is neutral, but the risks covered incident to a war in which this country is a party are strictly limited.

6. The losses and claims, to meet which these Insurance Clubs were formed, are those which are excluded from the ordinary marine insurance policy by the following or similar clause: "Warranted free from capture, seizure and detention, and the consequences thereof, or any attempt thereat, barratry, piracy, riots and civil commotions excepted, and also from all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations, whether before or after declaration of war." This cover applies both in the case of war between two foreign nations, and also when Great Britain is one of the belligerents; but when Great Britain is at war the cover is limited, in the case of vessels actually at sea, or in an enemy port, on the declaration of war or the outbreak of hostilities, until the time of first arrival at a British or neutral port which is a safe port for the ship to lie in. The period of cover while in such safe port varies. In one Club it is limited to ten days, in another to thirty days, while in a third it extends to the date of expiry of the policy. Vessels which are not at sea on the outbreak of hostilities, but are in a safe port, are held insured while they remain there for a similar period. Every vessel is deemed to be insured against all perils covered by an ordinary marine insurance policy, and must continuously sail under the British flag. There are a number of other conditions which are important, but which it is not necessary to mention in detail here. Only a nominal initial premium amounting to a few pence per cent. on the values entered is charged to cover the expenses of management, but the members share all losses on the basis of the insured values. The Club insurances are effected on the 20th February in each year, and run until the same date in the following year, when, under ordinary circumstances, the policies are automatically renewed for another year.

7. It must be recognised that these Associations have been organised with a view to restrain, as far as possible, the vessels they insure from running risks in a war in which this country is engaged, and it is therefore evident that soon after the outbreak of such a war all vessels insured in the Mutual War Risk Insurance Associations (that is to say, nearly 70 per cent. of the total British steamships engaged in the foreign

trade) will be found in a safe British or neutral port, and will remain there until they are able to secure fresh insurance against the risks of war.

8. There are some lines of steamers which continue to run their own war risk insurance, notably the P. and O. and the Alfred Holt Line of steamers. These vessels would probably act in the same way as the vessels insured in the Clubs, at any rate as far as voyages to and from Great Britain are concerned. It might, therefore, happen that within a very short period after the outbreak of a war in which we were one of the belligerents, the movements of practically the whole of the shipping under the British flag would be arrested, except, perhaps, in such areas (if any) as were outside the possibility of interference by the enemy.

9. We understand that the chief reason which has induced so many of the shipowners of this country to combine for the mutual insurance of their vessels against war risks has been the difficulty, if not impossibility, of securing continuous cover for these risks in the open market. The extent of this mutual cover was naturally limited to the first arrival at a safe port of the vessels at sea on the outbreak of war, and could not have been extended on the same terms to voyages commencing after the outbreak of war, as the risks of these fresh voyages would vary considerably.

10. This is a new and important development since the report of Mr. Austen Chamberlain's Committee in 1908, and we have endeavoured to point out its consequences. In any case the action of shipowners in forming these mutual Clubs has resulted in the creation of an effective machinery for the control of values and the settlement of claims; and it must be emphasised that this is not a machinery which has to be improvised when this country becomes a belligerent, but is in daily use at the present moment. And it is obvious that it would be in the interests of the State to make use, if possible, of this machinery for the working of any scheme of war risk insurance of hulls after the outbreak of war.

The Insurance of Hulls on Voyages current at the Outbreak of War.

11. The first thing to try and provide for was the completion of voyages current at the outbreak of war which would be automatically interrupted under the existing mutual insurance arrangements. Under these arrangements, which are described above in paragraph 6, the Associations, and through them the shipowners, are liable for a considerable amount of King's enemy risks on the outbreak of war, although the extent of these risks is carefully safeguarded by the rules of the Associations, and more particularly by the provision that ships are only covered until they arrive at a British or neutral port which is a safe port for the ship to lie in. We have not found it possible to estimate what proportion of the risks to be run in completing voyages current on the outbreak of war would be the precise equivalent of the risks already covered. Sir Norman Hill, who is the Secretary of the Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance Association, suggested, however, that the Associations might be induced to run a maximum of 20 per cent. of the total King's enemy risks on current voyages, on condition that the State undertook the remaining 80 per cent. of these risks. But he was quite convinced that shipowners would not be prepared to pay any premium to cover these additional risks. They would for the most part be running at peace freights, and would be under no obligation to run these additional risks. Under the conditions of many bills of lading, they can, on the outbreak of war, discharge their cargo at a safe port, and start on a new voyage, at war rates of freight, as soon as they have been able to arrange their insurance. Failing this, it would probably suit them better to lay up their ships for six or twelve months—a policy that some have adopted in recent years, when they have been unable to obtain remunerative freights. Indeed, we are informed that managers of shipping companies might consider themselves under an obligation to their shareholders not to send ships to sea without war risk insurance, and that every mortgage deed or debenture bond has a stipulation of some kind that the vessel shall be amply insured.

12. Sir Norman Hill further told us that the Committee of his Association could not accept these additional risks without the consent of its members; and it was evident that this would mean a certain amount of publicity during time of peace, the extent of which it was impossible to gauge.

13. We thought it desirable to consider whether any scheme was possible which would avoid publicity before the outbreak of war. The only plan that suggested itself to us was that the State should, immediately on the outbreak of war, make a public announcement that it was willing to accept 80 per cent. of the King's enemy risks for the completion of all current voyages from the time when the cover provided by the

Club policies ceased. But in that case an arrangement for the Associations to take the remaining 20 per cent. of these risks would be impracticable. In the first place, the members of the various Associations would have to be called together to approve of the arrangement. Seven days' notice of the first meeting would have to be given, and a subsequent confirmatory meeting would have to be held. This would take at least three weeks, during which time the current voyages of the ships in question would all be suspended. Secondly, it would be very difficult to get the whole of the shipowners to share these risks equally. The country or countries with which we were at war would be known, and the zones which would be particularly dangerous to shipping could be easily diagnosed. Those shipowners whose vessels were not going to pass through the danger zones would very naturally refuse to share these risks on equal terms with those owners whose vessels were bound to pass through the danger zones.

14. The only alternative would have been to suggest that, in order to avoid publicity in times of peace, the State should, on the outbreak of war, undertake the whole of the King's enemy risks for the completion of current voyages without premium. But this we could not recommend, as it was not in accordance with our terms of reference, which require that there shall be reasonable contributions from the owners of ships towards the cost of insurance. Besides, such a proposal would not have secured for the State the advantages of the active and interested co-operation of the Mutual Associations, which we consider of the highest importance.

15. We had therefore to face the fact that any scheme that would secure for the State the co-operation of the Mutual Associations in time of war would necessarily involve a certain amount of publicity in times of peace, and we came to the conclusion that, if there was to be any publicity at all, this publicity had better be complete.

16. We considered a form of policy for the Mutual Associations to issue, to cover the additional risks involved, and a form of policy for the State to issue, to reinsure its share of the same risks. These policies were "voyage" policies, and it was evident that the preparation of separate policies to cover these risks on every voyage would involve a vast amount of clerical labour, and would probably entail the creation of a Government office in time of peace, whose duty it would be to keep a record of all the contracts entered into by the State under this arrangement.

17. We therefore decided to go a step further, and to propose that the present standard form of policy of the Associations should be altered so as to include the additional risks involved. This new form of policy would run from year to year, just as the present policy does, and a list of the policies issued by each Club would be given to the State every year. The State would enter into a general agreement with each Association, accepting responsibility for 80 per cent. of the King's enemy losses incurred under these policies in the case of a war in which we were one of the belligerents The insurance would remain in force for ten clear days following the arrival of the ship at her port of destination. The war risks, other than King's enemy risks, would be covered under the same Club policy, but the Club would alone be responsible for these.

18. The rules of the existing policies of all the Clubs contain provisions in varying terms for the control by the Committee or Directors of the Association of the movements of the ships insured at times when war has broken out, or is considered by the Committee to be imminent. The most comprehensive provisions are perhaps the following : "When, in the opinion of the Directors, special circumstances exist in "regard to the probability of war breaking out, or otherwise, Members or Owners "shall, on the request of the Manager, furnish full information as to the position "and contemplated voyages of all their steamships entered in this class of the "Association. When steamships are making, or about to make, a voyage in or through "seas or waters in which belligerent action or hostilities are taking place, or expected "to take place, Members shall forthwith report every voyage in progress or contem-"plated which is likely to bring any steamship entered into such seas or waters." (Rules of the North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association, 1913–14, Class III, Rules, No. 21.)

19. Or again, "Provided that immediately upon the declaration of war or outbreak of hostilities, or as soon as the same can be notified to her, the ship insured shall without delay proceed to such British or neutral port and in such manner as the Committee by regulations made or specific directions given by them may direct. . . ." (Rules of the London and Liverpool War Risks Association. Form of Policy, Clause 4 (*c*).)

20. It was however, felt—not only by us, but also by the Managers of those

Mutual Associations who appeared before us—that as the State, under the arrangements suggested, would be taking such a large proportion of the risks after the outbreak of a war in which we were a belligerent, the movements of all ships thus insured should be subject to the control of the Admiralty. It was therefore agreed that words should be introduced into the new policies providing a warranty that after the outbreak of war every ship shall, so far as possible, carry out any orders that the Admiralty may give in regard to their routes, ports of call, and stoppages. If, however, they fail to carry out these orders, they will not lose the benefit of insurance, provided the assured can satisfy the Committee of the Club that the breach of orders happened without the fault or privity of the assured and of the owners and of the managers of the ship. But, even then, we think the shipowner should be liable to some penalty, and we suggest that the State should require that the rules of every approved Club contain provision for an appropriate penalty. This might take the form of the levy of an extra premium payable by the Member to the Club on the insured value of the ship in which the breach has taken place, or it might take the form of a deduction in the settlement of a claim of an amount to be fixed, within reasonable limits, by the Committee of the Club, or, in extreme cases, the Committee might have the power of expelling a Member from the Club.

It would not be possible for the Club to impose penalties upon the Master of the ship who deliberately disobeys the orders of the Admiralty, but we are of opinion that this might be made an offence with an appropriate penalty, under the Act sanctioning the scheme.

Shipowners' Contributions.

21. We have already mentioned the reasons given us why shipowners cannot pay a premium to cover the risks incident to the completion of voyages current when war breaks out. Nor do we see how the collection of such a premium would be possible, if our suggestion is adopted that the standard form of annual policy issued by the Clubs should be extended to cover the additional risks involved. It would, of course, be possible to deduct such premiums from the amount paid in settlement of a loss; but it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to collect the premiums in the case of those vessels (and we hope that they would form a very large proportion of the total) which arrived safely at their destination.

22. It may then be asked how we reconcile this absence of premium with the conditions laid down in our terms of reference: "that any scheme prepared must be on "the basis of reasonable contributions being paid by the owners of ships . . . . "towards the cost of insurance." Our answer is in the first place that we are only now dealing with one portion of the scheme, viz., that relating to ships afloat at the time of the outbreak of war. In the case of voyages begun after the outbreak of war we recommend the charge of premiums (see below, paragraph 29). In the second place we consider that the fact that the Clubs, and through them the shipowners, retain 20 per cent. of the risks involved, and will pay the whole cost of administration, may be looked upon as a "reasonable contribution towards the cost of insurance." It may be added that the managers of the Clubs whom we consulted assured us that this arrangement for the completion of current voyages without payment of premium would probably be necessary as an inducement to the members of the Clubs to accept our proposals for covering the insurance of vessels starting after the outbreak of war.

An offer, made whilst the area which will be affected by our next war is a matter of pure conjecture, to cover the King's enemy risks incident to the completion of all current voyages, is apparently the only inducement that can be offered to get all the members of the Club to agree to share the risks of those members whose voyages will be specially affected by the war.

The possible Liability of the State for Losses on Voyages current at the Outbreak of War.

23. It may be pertinent here to try and form some rough estimate of what the losses on current voyages may be. Sir Henry Hozier submitted to Mr. Austen Chamberlain's Committee a statement showing the net registered tonnage and position of all ocean-going British steamers on the 26th March, 1903. Taking this statement as a basis, and applying it to the number and net registered tonnage of British steamers employed in foreign trade in voyages to and from ports in the United

Kingdom in 1911, a rough estimate of the values of the vessels employed is as under :—

	£
Homeward bound	13,000,000
Outward bound	16,000,000
In port and coasting in foreign waters	29,000,000
In port and coasting United Kingdom	17,000,000
On voyages between Continents intermediate	5,000,000
Total	80,000,000

24. We have, of course, no means of judging what the percentage of losses may be, as we have no experience in recent years which can be of any practical use to us. But we do not think it necessary to assume that the losses will be very great. It must be remembered that the Admiralty will have the right to forbid any dangerous voyages, or to order a ship to proceed to a port other than that for which she was originally bound, and that the shipowners themselves will have no inducement to expose themselves recklessly to risk of capture, as they will, by so doing, either forfeit their insurance, or in any event, have to contribute themselves *pro ratâ* to the loss of their own vessels.

25. Without committing ourselves to any estimate, we would point out that, on the basis of the above statement, a 5 per cent. loss on the vessels employed in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom, homeward and outward bound, at the outbreak of a war with a first-class Power would represent 1,450,000*l.*, of which the State would bear 80 per cent.—say, 1,160,000*l.* If it is assumed that of the remainder of the vessels employed in the same trade two-thirds were on voyages or in the enemies' ports, a 5 per cent. loss would represent a further 1,700,000*l.*, of which the State's share would be 1,360,000*l.*

26. The value of British vessels employed in 1911 abroad, but in trades other than the foreign trade of the United Kingdom, may be taken roughly at a further 47,000,000*l.* No particulars are available showing the positions of these vessels, but it is probable that a number of them would be outside of the range of a war with a Continental Power. If it be assumed that one-half of these vessels would be on voyages current on the outbreak of war or in ports of the enemy a 5 per cent. loss would represent a further sum of 1,175,000*l.*, of which, to maintain the continuance of current voyages in the general oversea trade, the State would have to bear, without receiving any premium, losses amounting to 940,000*l.*

27. If, therefore, the losses of vessels engaged on voyages in the foreign trade on the outbreak of war amounted even to 5 per cent. of the total number of vessels then at sea or in enemies' ports, the State would have only to bear, without receiving any premium, losses amounting to 3,460,000*l.* in order to maintain our oversea trade, and in particular to facilitate the completion of voyages to and from the United Kingdom.

28. It may be argued that, even if our suggestions are adopted, they will not compel any ship to complete its voyage after the outbreak of war. It will still be optional for the shipowner to give directions that his ship is to go to a safe port and remain there until the war is over. We admit that if this policy were generally adopted our scheme would fail in its main object; but we think that few, if any, shipowners are likely to adopt this policy. In the first place, the vessels on voyages current at the outbreak of war will only be earning peace freights, and it will be a strong inducement to the owner to get his present voyage completed, so that he may be able to take advantage of the higher freights for new voyages which would presumably be offered after the outbreak of war. And, further, the shipowner would realise that, even if he laid up his own ship, he would not thereby escape his liability to contribute *pro ratâ* to the loss of other ships insured in his Club which had run the risks he was afraid of.

The Insurance of Hulls on Voyages commenced after the Outbreak of Hostilities.

29. With regard to new voyages commencing after the outbreak of hostilities, we propose that these should be similarly insured by the Associations and reinsured by the State to the extent of 80 per cent. of such risks. But there will necessarily be many points of difference between these arrangements and those suggested for the completion of voyages current at the outbreak of war. In the first place, each voyage will have to be separately insured, and a separate reinsurance policy issued by the State—though, perhaps, such reinsurance policies may be dispensed with, if the State is content to receive statements from time to time from the Associations showing the vessels on risk.

Secondly, premiums will be charged for these insurances. These premiums will be collected by the Associations when issuing their policies, and 80 per cent. of them will be accounted for to the State in consideration of its taking 80 per cent. of the risks insured under the Club policies. Thirdly, a warranty will have to be inserted that ships will not sail when ordered by His Majesty's Government not to do so.

30. We propose that the rates of premium for new voyages commencing after the outbreak of war shall be fixed by the State, which shall have power to vary them from time to time. It will in our opinion be necessary to have different rates of premium for different zones, and it may also be found advisable during the course of the war to change the rates for certain of these zones. But we are strongly of opinion that the different rates should be as few as possible, and also that the changes in these rates should be as infrequent as possible. It is admitted that the State is not undertaking this business with a view to making a profit out of it, but solely with the object of preventing the interruption of our oversea commerce in time of war owing to inability to insure against war risks through the usual channels. The rates charged by the State must not, therefore, be so low as to compete with the rates that the insurance market may be willing to quote, nor must they be so high as to be prohibitive, or materially to affect the cost of the food or other merchandise being brought to or carried from these shores. At the same time it would be obviously unfair to the State's partners in this business—the individual shipowners in the Clubs—that they should be called upon either to pay premiums out of all proportion to the risks of the voyages undertaken, or to bear their share of losses in respect of voyages insured at much too low a premium. It is for this reason that we recommend that the premiums charged should to some extent depend on the risks involved. But we should like to suggest that the maximum rate for any voyage should be 5 per cent., and the minimum rate 1 per cent., and that any rate accepted for a particular voyage shall hold good, provided that the ship starts within fourteen days after acceptance of the risk.

31. It is in our view impossible to lay down beforehand what would be the proper premiums to charge for any particular voyages, as these will vary with the enemy we are at war with. It is obvious, for example, that if we were at war with an Eastern Power the risks of many voyages would be very different to what they would be if we were at war with a European Power.

32. We suggest that the State should appoint a Board of Experts to advise on the question of rates and variations of premiums, and we are assured that the members of Lloyd's and other institutions would willingly place their services at the disposal of the State for this purpose. The State would no doubt have one or two representatives of their own on this Board.

33. We recommend that any shipowner who has insured his vessel under this scheme for a certain voyage should have the right to cancel the policy and receive back the premium paid, if the voyage in question is prohibited by the Admiralty before his vessel has started. Such a proposition as this would not of course be acceptable or possible in the case of the insurance market, whose members are engaged in the business for the purpose of profit. But, as we have already said, the State is not expecting to make a profit out of this business, and it should therefore be quite willing to refund the premium, provided it is relieved of the liability. Besides, such action on the part of the State might very conceivably be furthering the main object it has in view—namely, to prevent the laying up of shipping during war time. For instance, a particular voyage is prohibited by the Admiralty, and a shipowner who has fixed his vessel for this voyage is able to cancel his contract and enter into another for a voyage which is not prohibited. It must surely be in the interests of the community at large that he should be able to do this.

The possible Liability of the State for Losses on Voyages commenced after the Outbreak of War.

34. We found it impossible to give any estimate of what the State's losses would be in regard to vessels on voyages current at the outbreak of war. We find it equally impossible to give any estimate in regard to voyages commencing after the outbreak of war. For the purposes of illustration, we assumed (paragraphs 25 to 27) a loss of 5 per cent. on all British vessels at sea or in ports of the enemy at the outbreak of war, and showed that the value of the vessels so lost would be 4,325,000*l*. The

value of the British steamer tonnage employed in foreign trade was, in 1911, about 127,000,000*l.*, and if from this value is deducted the assumed loss on the outbreak of war 4,325,000*l.*, there would remain steamer tonnage of a value of 122,675,000*l.* available for the oversea trade of the country. A loss of a further 5 per cent. of this tonnage would represent 6,133,750*l.*, of which the State would bear 80 per cent., say 4,907,000*l.*

The Settlement of Claims.

35. We make provision for the State to be represented on the Committee of each Club or Association. Claims will be dealt with and settled by the Committee of the Club. But if the State's representative on the Committee should protest against a proposed settlement, the liability of the State will have to be settled (failing agreement to refer to arbitration) by the Courts of Law.

36. The question of when and how payment of claims shall be made gave rise to considerable discussion. The general principle underlying the proposed arrangements between the State and the Clubs is that the Clubs take the whole of the risks, and re-insure 80 per cent. of them with the State. A Club would therefore be primarily liable for the settlement of the whole of an admitted claim, but would only call on its members for 20 per cent. of the amount involved. We were told that the present practice of the Club was to pay an admitted claim within a very short time. But would they be able to collect funds from their members so promptly when we are at war? And would it be reasonable that the State should discharge its 80 per cent. liability to the Clubs before the Clubs had collected the remaining 20 per cent. from their members?

37. We came to the conclusion that the State had no concern with the internal arrangements of the Clubs with regard to the collection of the contributions from their members to an ascertained loss. Even if a Club were unable to collect from its members the whole amount required, this would not affect the State's liability to pay over its 80 per cent. of an agreed claim to the Club.

38. We then had to consider when the payments by the State should be made. It was obviously not fair that, if a vessel were captured by the enemy, the owner should be able to give immediate notice of abandonment and claim payment of a total loss. This point is dealt with in the existing rules of all the Clubs, which provide that if a ship is captured, seized, or detained, the owner shall have no claim for total loss unless the capture, seizure, or detention shall have continued for a certain period. This period varies in the different Clubs from one month to six months. We propose that, under the arrangement with the State, the Clubs shall not be bound to pay a total loss, if the ship be recaptured, released, or restored to the owner within six months of the date of capture. But if the vessel is so restored, the Club shall pay the cost of repair or damages to and expenses incurred by the ship by reason of such capture, together with a sum equal to 10 per cent. per annum on the insured value from the date of capture. Also, in the event of loss by destruction, we propose that no payment shall be made within a period of six months of the loss. It follows, therefore, that the earliest time of payment by the State for a total loss or a capture will be six months after the event.

39. We have decided to recommend that the liability of the State shall be discharged in three equal instalments: at six, nine, and twelve months from the date of loss or capture, with interest at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum.

40. It may be argued that this system of deferred payments will be a hardship to the owner of the vessel, who will naturally wish to replace her as soon as possible, so as to be able to take advantage of the higher freights which will presumably be ruling during time of war. Our answer is that there is no reason why the Club should not arrange to pay the owner at an earlier date if it can do so; and that if, as we assume, some certificate of acknowledgment of the liability in question is given by the State, the Club, or the owner of the lost vessel, should be able to obtain temporary advances from a banker to provide for his necessities. If, therefore, the money is to be used to construct a new vessel, or to purchase a vessel under a foreign flag, no inconvenience should result.

41. One of our principal objects in suggesting these deferred payments is to relieve the State as far as possible from immediate and, perhaps, heavy calls on its resources to meet these losses, at a time when its resources are sure to be strained to the utmost to meet the expense of carrying on the war.

Valuation.

42. What is to be the basis of value of shipping for the purpose of this insurance? We find that the practice of the various Associations differs in this respect. One takes as the value the first cost less depreciation at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, with a minimum value of 2*l.* per ton gross. Others agree the value of each ship with the owner every time the insurance is renewed. We suggest that, for the purposes of this arrangement, the basis of values should be the first cost of the vessel, without allowance for the cost of alterations or additions, less depreciation at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum, but without any minimum limit per ton. This is the basis accepted for income-tax purposes, and we consider it a reasonable one; but we think the committee of each Club should have the right at its discretion to refuse to accept a vessel for insurance on this basis, if they are of opinion that the value thus arrived at is excessive. The agreement for valuation on this basis will be provided for in the articles of association or rules of the Clubs which will, in accordance with the practice of the Clubs, be incorporated in the policies.

Concluding Remarks on Hull Insurance.

43. Mr. Austen Chamberlain's Committee on National Guarantee for the War Risks of Shipping drew attention in their report to the "immense difficulties attendant on the determination of values and on the settlement of claims." We are satisfied that by making use, in the manner outlined above, of the co-operation and mutual responsibility of the Insurance Associations now in existence, the interests of the State will be well safeguarded, both in the matter of claims and of values, so far as vessels are concerned. These Clubs will have as great an interest as the State has in preventing any overvaluations of shipping, and will in their own interest satisfy themselves that every claim is fully substantiated.

44. It will be necessary, if these proposals are adopted by His Majesty's Government, for the Clubs to adopt identical rules for all matters concerning King's enemy risks. In all matters apart from this class of risk State interference will be unnecessary, and the Clubs can be left to make their own rules.

45. It will be observed that we have in this report assumed that the State would confine itself to arrangements with approved Mutual Insurance Associations or Clubs We think it would be more satisfactory if it could do this, but we do not wish to say that the State should not be prepared to make arrangements with other bodies who were able to provide satisfactory machinery for the protection of the State in the matter of values and of claims, and who represented a sufficiently important amount of tonnage.

46. We have now, we think, dealt sufficiently with the proposals we are putting forward for the insurance of war risks on vessels by the State.

Part III.—THE INSURANCE OF CARGOES.

The Market for War Risks.

47. We have already explained (see paragraph 9) the reasons which have induced so many shipowners to combine for mutual insurance of their vessels against war risks. No similar combination for purposes of insurance seems practicable among cargo-owners. They are not, like shipowners, a distinct body with constant and clearly defined interests and limitations. Every merchant, trader, and manufacturer—in fact, broadly speaking, every consumer—is a potential cargo-owner, but the nature and extent of the interests of the individual cargo-owner vary from voyage to voyage and from season to season. Cargo-owners, therefore, only insure against war risks in the open market; and we considered it necessary to find out what the present attitude of the insurance market was towards this class of risk, and also how far cargo-owners were in the habit of availing themselves of this insurance.

48. Mr. Austin Chamberlain's Committee reported on the question of insurance rates (paragraph 215) that "it does not appear that there was ever real difficulty in "securing a quotation in the past, and though it seems to be supposed in some quarters "that rates have often been fixed too high, and that underwriters have been accustomed

" to make unduly large profits out of them, the evidence we have collected does not " bear out this view. Nor has it been proved that in future wars the market would be " so restricted or the rates so prohibitive as to necessitate interference by the State. It " is impossible to give any estimate of what the rates are likely to be in any future war " in which we may be engaged, or to state with any approach to exactness what the " extent of the facilities would be. They will vary with the circumstances and the " episodes of the particular struggle. That the rates will be sometimes high enough to " handicap seriously particular trades must, we think, be admitted as probable." While expressing great hesitation in offering an opinion of their own, they were (paragraph 56) " inclined to believe that, though the market for war risks might be seriously restricted " just before and after the outbreak of a great naval struggle, and though rates might " be subject to violent fluctuations at such a time, yet that if our Navy did not sustain " any serious reverse the market would expand and become steadier as the situation " developed, and that there is not sufficient evidence to justify the belief that private " enterprise would be insufficient to bear the financial strain that is likely to be put " upon it."

49. From the evidence submitted to us, we gather that the attitude of the insurance market towards the insurance of war risks has in recent years changed considerably. Not many years ago the war risk was included in the marine insurance policy without extra premium; and a careful perusal of the evidence given by insurance representatives before Mr. Austen Chamberlain's Committee gives the impression that at that time underwriters as a body looked favourably on those risks, and did not wish to part with the business. Now, some of the marine companies refuse to cover war risk, except for special customers; and many underwriters at Lloyd's have adopted the same policy. Others, as one of the witnesses put it, " hop in and out " of the market. One of the reasons given us for this change of view is that many underwriters believe that, if they had to realise their securities in time of war to meet their losses on war risks, the severe depreciation in values would not in any way be compensated by the higher premiums they were receiving.

50. At the same time, we were told that there is still, in times of peace and in the absence of war rumours, a sufficiently large market to deal with all the war risks offering. The premium charged is a nominal one compared with the usual normal premiums for marine insurance. When there are rumours of war the market contracts, but all war risk insurances offered can still be placed. The rates of premium rise, owing partly to the contraction of the market, and partly to the increased demand for war risk insurance; but the rise is not very great as long as there is not much likelihood of this country being involved in war. If war was regarded as imminent, and this country was likely to be a belligerent, there would be little or no market; and the same conditions would prevail on the actual outbreak of a war in which this country was involved.

51. At present very little cargo is insured against war risk. The estimates of the amount vary considerably: some say not more than 10 per cent. of the total, while one witness estimates it at something like 50 per cent. Nitrate of soda and specie are always insured against war risk, but practically no grain, or wool, or cotton. The increased demand for war risk insurance in times of rumours is stated to be mainly due to the requirements of bankers.

The Insurance of Cargoes on Voyages current at the Outbreak of War.

52. We have now to consider whether we are to recommend that the State should provide facilities for the insurance of King's enemy risks on cargoes afloat at the time of the outbreak of a war in which we are a belligerent. It is evident that if such a war broke out suddenly, a great deal of cargo then afloat would not, under present conditions, be insured against war risk; and it may be argued that if the State is providing for the insurance of war risks on ships afloat at that time, it ought in equity to provide similar protection for cargoes. Otherwise the owners of uninsured cargo on ships, which will continue their voyages under protection of the Club policies extended as recommended in Part II, paragraph 17, may find themselves compelled to run uncommercial risks which may prove uninsurable except at prohibitive rates. We felt the force of this contention, and gave therefore the fullest consideration to a number of proposals that were put before us.

53. It was suggested that the State should undertake to make good to cargo-owners, without premium, 80 per cent. of the invoiced value, leaving the remaining 20 per cent., together with the estimated profit, shipping charges, &c., to be covered in

the open market. Another suggestion was to offer cargo-owners insurance, at a premium, from the first port of call of a vessel after the outbreak of war; or, alternatively, to offer such cover to those cargo-owners who had and exercised an option to order their cargoes to a British port from a port of call. These suggestions, if acted on, would in our opinion afford an inducement to cargo-owners to discontinue all war risk insurance in the open market in future. The main inducement to a cargo-owner to insure these risks at present (apart from the insistence of bankers in certain trades) is the fear that, if war becomes imminent or breaks out, he may not be able to effect his insurance at all. If you give him the certainty of being able to cover this insurance, he may consider it unnecessary to continue to insure in the market. He will be saving premiums on a very large number of transactions, and will not much mind what premium he has to pay on the few shipments or cargoes he may have afloat when war breaks out, as long as he knows for certain that, at a price, he can cover these risks. There is also the possibility that, in respect of cargo actually insured in the market, the underwriters would, if the State insurance were established before the outbreak of war, reinsure these risks with the State when war broke out, and to that extent the State facilities would not benefit cargo-owners but only relieve underwriters.

54. We also considered a suggestion that the State should limit its protection to insured cargoes by undertaking to reimburse underwriters for 80 per cent. of the actual losses they were called upon to pay in respect of insured cargo afloat on the outbreak of war. But it was pointed out that, if insurance were thus made a condition of obtaining State protection, this meant handing over cargo-owners, bound hand and foot, to the insurance market, while there would not be any means of controlling the rates of premium charged by underwriters to cover these risks. Even if the State confined its offer to such cases where the premium charged was limited to a certain rate, it would not be possible to compel underwriters to work at that rate. If they did not consider it sufficiently remunerative they would simply decline the risks altogether.

55. It was also suggested that the State should be prepared to open an insurance office for war risks, when the insurance market, before the actual outbreak of war, was demoralised owing to the serious nature of the outlook. But if this were done, the opening of the State office might not unreasonably be construed by the British public—and possibly by the potential enemy as well—as an admission on the part of the Government that war was inevitable. Besides, it might quite conceivably happen that the State would find that it had insured enemy goods against war risk at such a time. Suppose, for instance, a British steamer to be sailing from Hamburg to Chile with goods consigned to a German house there, and the war risk on these goods is offered to the State office at a time of extreme tension between this country and Germany. If the principle we recommend later on is accepted, that the State insurance of war risk on cargo should be extended to all cargo (other than enemy cargo) in British bottoms, irrespective of the nationality of the owner of such cargo, the State office could not on that account refuse to accept this insurance before the outbreak of war. It is true that a similar situation might conceivably arise after the actual outbreak of war; but at that time the transaction would have to be carried out in the name of a British or neutral firm, who would have to face the risk of exposure and its consequences. Many of these schemes had the further objection that they postulated the establishment of a Government office in times of peace to deal with any business that was offered to it. An essential condition of any scheme of State insurance of cargo is, in our opinion, that it should not compete with the insurance market as long as that market is prepared to transact the business offering and to charge reasonable rates. It should only intervene when the ordinary channels for insurance are no longer available, or available only at prohibitive rates. It might therefore happen that the State office would be in existence at considerable annual cost, for a great number of years, without transacting any business.

56. Besides, we were informed that unless State action is confined to the period after the outbreak of war, or is limited to a time of panic, the insurance market would not view such action with favour. This is a very important consideration, as it is, in our opinion, essential to the success of the proposals set forth later in this Report for State insurance of cargo starting after the outbreak of war, that the scheme should have the hearty support and co-operation of the insurance market.

57. For all these reasons we are unable to recommend any scheme for the insurance against war risks by the State of cargo afloat at the outbreak of war. We fully realise, as we have already pointed out, that this may be regarded as unfair treatment of cargo, in view of the proposals we have made for the protection of hulls

under similar circumstances. But we think there is no real justification for this view. In the first place, it must be remembered that shipowners have already combined together for the mutual insurance of war risk on voyages current at the outbreak of war. It is true that the premium paid in the absence of losses is very small, but the liability to make good these losses in full exists at the present moment, and our proposals in the case of hulls are confined to extending the existing cover so as to secure the completion of the current voyages. Then, again, it must be borne in mind that the reason which has induced shipowners to combine for the mutual insurance of these risks is that they have found it impossible to secure continuous cover at reasonable rates in the open market. This continuous cover is essential in many cases, as many steamers have freight agreements extending over long periods. Cargo-owners, on the other hand, can, as we have pointed out, in normal times cover these risks in the open market at a nominal premium ; and even when there are rumours of trouble, they will still be able to cover these risks at a reasonable though somewhat higher rate of premium. This state of affairs will probably continue right up to the actual outbreak of war, or at any rate until a few days before the outbreak. If the State office for insurance of cargoes is opened immediately after the outbreak of war—as we suggest it should be—cargo-owners would only be prejudiced by a few days' delay in securing war risk insurance for their cargoes ; and this delay at such a time may not be to the disadvantage either of shipowners, cargo-owners, or of the State, in so far as it leads to the avoidance of unduly hazardous risks. It is quite possible, too, that if our proposals are accepted and made known, they may have the effect of keeping the insurance market open longer and at reasonable rates.

58. Further, it must be remembered that most steamers will, on the outbreak of war, be running at peace freights, and will not be getting higher freights until they start on voyages after the outbreak of war ; whereas cargo-owners may reasonably look forward to a substantial profit on the sale of cargoes afloat at the outbreak of war, if and when these cargoes safely reach their port of destination.

59. Quite apart, however, from these considerations, we were influenced in our decision not to propose any scheme for State insurance of cargo afloat at the outbreak of war by the feeling that this would be outside the terms of our reference. We are asked to prepare a scheme which will " secure that, in case of war, British steamships " shall not be generally laid up, and that oversea commerce shall not be interrupted by " reason of inability to cover the war risks of ships or cargoes by insurance." We have put forward certain recommendations which will, in our opinion, secure the continuance of the current voyages of steamers afloat at the outbreak of war. And, if these steamers continue their voyages, it is obvious that the cargoes on them will come along too. This would certainly apply to all liners, which bring in 40 per cent. of our total imports, and to all other ships in which the cargo belongs to so large a number of owners that they will not have time to get together and put concerted pressure on the shipowner to stop the voyage. The only exceptions will be those cases where the cargo is the property of a single owner or of a very small number of owners, who are able to communicate with the owner of a vessel, and offer him sufficiently attractive terms to suspend the voyage. Besides, we are satisfied that cargo-owners can now, and will continue to be able to, secure war risk insurance in the open market at reasonable rates up to the time immediately preceding the actual outbreak of war ; and we see no particular reason why they should receive special consideration, if they choose not to avail themselves of these facilities of insurance.

60. We would also point out that we are (as will be seen later on) offering cargo-owners substantially better conditions after the outbreak of war than we are offering shipowners ; and this is a point which must be borne in mind in considering the whole question.

The Insurance of Cargoes on Voyages commenced after the Outbreak of Hostilities.

61. We now come to our recommendations for State insurance against King's enemy risks of cargo starting on a voyage after the outbreak of war.

62. We recommend that arrangements should be made for the State to cover these risks when the insurance market is no longer prepared to accept them at reasonable rates. For this purpose we propose that a State insurance office should be set up immediately after the outbreak of war ; and we are assured that the insurance market can be relied upon to give every assistance to the State, both in regard to the necessary machinery for working the State office and in regard to technical advice on all questions of administration or policy that may arise.

63. We suggest that there shall only be one State office, and that in London. A proposal was made to us that offices should also be opened in Liverpool and Glasgow, and possibly Cardiff as well; but on the whole we came to the conclusion that the administrative difficulties of establishing and conducting so many separate offices at such a time would not be compensated for by any corresponding advantages.

64. Every cargo-owner will be able to obtain provisional cover for war risks on his cargo at this office, pending the production of details of shipment. The value given must be the outside limit of his requirements on a particular shipment. If subsequently he produces evidence to show that this provisional value was excessive, the premium paid on such excess value will be refunded to him; but he will not be permitted to increase his provisional insurance for that particular shipment.

65. Payment of premiums must be made to the State office in cash when the provisional insurance is effected. An insurance slip will be handed over to the State office. Stamps to the amount of the premium required will be impressed on a counterpart of this insurance slip, and this counterpart will be handed to the assured, and will be conclusive evidence that the insurance has been accepted by the State.

66. In order to fix values the assured must subsequently produce to the State office his marine insurance policy or policies covering the same goods, and the values in these marine insurance policies will be accepted by the State as the final values for war risk insurance.

67. Marine insurance policies will only be accepted by the State if issued by members of Lloyd's, British insurance companies, and other approved insurance companies and underwriters.

68. The final State policy will then be issued for the same values, and for the same voyage as covered by the marine policies, and these documents will be attached to each other, so as to form a complete insurance for the risks of the voyage in question.

69. In requiring the issue by the State of a policy guaranteeing a specified value in the case of each shipment, we are adopting the conclusions of Mr. Austen Chamberlain's Committee (see paragraph 210), as such a policy will be required by bankers, bill brokers, and others when financing the movement of produce in time of war.

70. It will be seen that we recommend the adoption for State insurance of war risks of the values agreed in the marine insurance policies covering the goods on the same voyage. We considered many other suggestions for arriving at values for State insurance, as we were anxious to secure for the State the fullest possible protection against fraud. The most attractive of these suggestions was to take the invoiced value of cargo at port of shipment, plus cost of insurance and shipping charges; but we do not consider that this would afford any better protection to the State than taking the values in the marine policies, while it would certainly make the administrative machinery much more cumbrous and lengthy. Nor would it facilitate the requirements of bankers and others who are financing the shipment of the goods, as the values in the State policy would differ from those in the marine policies, and there would not be the same certainty that the two insurances covered the same shipment.

71. We believe, too, that the interests of the State will be best protected by accepting for war risk insurance the values agreed in the marine policies. These are now accepted by the insurance market for payment of losses, subject to challenge in the case of suspected fraud or mutual mistake; and we were told by representatives of the insurance market that instances of fraudulent values are rare. It is true that these values in marine policies habitually include an estimated profit on the venture of up to 10 per cent. or 15 per cent.; but if there is any doubt as to the correctness of the values given, it is always possible to control them, in the case of all current articles, by the daily published quotations of prices; and, besides, the original invoices and other documents can be called for if required to prove the correctness of the insured values.

72. All claims will be settled by the Board of Advisers, but in the event of there being any dispute with the assured as to the proposed settlement the liability of the State will have to be settled (failing agreement to refer to arbitration) by the Courts of Law.

73. Payment of claims, when admitted, will be made at once in cash. In this respect cargo-owners, it will be noticed, will be treated better than shipowners, who will not be paid their first instalment until six months after loss.

74. On what principle is the rate of premium for State insurance on cargo to be fixed? It will be seen that in the case of hulls we have good reasons for recommending varying rates (paragraph 30), more or less proportionate to the risks of the respective voyages, with a maximum rate of 5 per cent. and a minimum rate of 1 per cent. In the

case of cargoes we recommend the adoption of a flat rate for all voyages, irrespective of the risks involved. But we recommend that this flat rate should be subject to variation, up or down, within a maximum of 5 per cent. and a minimum of 1 per cent. In order to facilitate business, the State office must be authorised to accept risks for provisional insurance at the current fixed rate for a certain period—say, fourteen days—before actual shipment takes place. If on any day following an acceptance and before the commencement of the risk the State should alter its fixed rate up or down, the risk accepted will be binding on both parties at the original rate.

75. We admit that it can be argued that a flat rate will in some cases involve a hardship, and appear unfair to particular voyages, but, on balance, we think that it will work out fairly for all shippers. It must be remembered that if the war risk on a particular voyage is very slight, the open market will probably be willing to take it at a lower premium than that charged by the State; or, alternatively, the owner of the cargo may in that case elect to run the risk of capture himself.

76. Nor do we believe that the charging of lower rates for less hazardous voyages would be found in practice to benefit the consumer. Assume, for instance, two cargoes of grain coming to this country from Odessa and Philadelphia respectively. If the Odessa cargo were charged a premium of 4 per cent. and the Philadelphia cargo only 2 per cent., we are of opinion that the price to the consumer in this country (provided that the Odessa cargo is essential to maintain our food supply) would be based on the higher premium, and the advantage of the lower rate go to the importer.

77. Apart from these considerations, the administrative difficulties connected with the issue of policies would be immeasurably greater if the rate for each risk had to be separately considered, and many of them referred to the Advisory Board for adjudication.

78. It is possible that under this arrangement the State will get all the bad risks and the market all the good ones, when once the market is again working. This is quite true, but then we recognise that the main object of the State will be not to compete with the insurance market, but only to secure the continuance of voyages after the outbreak of war, which might be arrested owing to inability to cover insurance against King's enemies. It will not mind, therefore, if it does little business in war risks so long as these risks are being covered elsewhere.

79. We propose that the State insurance of cargo shall be confined to vessels insured by the State. The State will thus have the power under the hull insurance policies to stop voyages, if it considers them unduly hazardous, and in this way will be able to avoid losses in respect of cargoes the prompt arrival of which is not essential to the community.

80. We understand that practically all insurance is effected through brokers, who receive a brokerage of 5 per cent. on the premiums. For this purpose the premiums quoted are in guineas, the broker receiving the shillings as his remuneration. We suggest that the same practice shall be adopted by the State office, the premiums being treated as net premiums, and therefore not subject to discount.

81. With regard to the ownership of cargo, this question was gone into thoroughly by Mr. Austen Chamberlain's Committee, who came to the conclusion that it was impossible to impose any effective restrictions as to the nationality of the owner. It is, to begin with, very difficult to say who is, at a given moment, the actual owner of any cargo afloat. Such cargo may change hands twenty times during the course of the voyage. Again, if an attempt were made to distinguish between British and foreign-owned goods in British bottoms, it would soon be found that all goods shipped in such vessels were British goods. We do not, therefore, propose to suggest any restriction for State insurance on the ownership of goods in British vessels, except, of course, that we exclude enemy goods. Nor do we propose to suggest any discrimination between different classes of goods or between different voyages. It may be argued that shipments of American hosiery from New York to Buenos Ayres in a British vessel cannot have any practical interest for us in time of war. But this vessel, when she arrives at Buenos Ayres, is available to carry foodstuffs back to this country; and if, for want of facilities for insurance of war risks, that voyage was not undertaken, a link in the chain of communication with this country would be disturbed, if not broken. It is, in our opinion, just as essential for us that these cross voyages should be maintained, as far as possible, in time of war as it is that the movement of shipping direct to and from this country should not be interrupted.

82. This brings us to the consideration of an important point in administration. At the present time many marine insurance policies are issued, on behalf of British underwriters, at the port of shipment of the goods abroad. One of the reasons for this

is doubtless the requirement of bankers at the foreign or colonial ports that, before negotiating the drafts drawn against a shipment, they must have documentary proof that the marine insurance on the goods has been properly covered. We have already indicated that the State office must require the production of the marine insurance policy on the goods as evidence of values, and although there will be no necessity to produce this document when the State insurance for war risk is originally arranged, it will probably follow that, as a matter of convenience, most marine policies will, during time of war, be issued in London. How will it then be possible to satisfy the banker at the port of shipment abroad that either the marine insurance or the war insurance has been properly covered? We admit that this is an administrative difficulty which will in the beginning be the cause of some friction and delay; but we refuse to believe that a satisfactory way out of the difficulty will not be found by the parties concerned. It cannot be expected that everything will run as smoothly immediately after the outbreak of war as it does in times of peace.

83. We may add that, for the protection of bankers and others who may be holders for value of shipping documents, we have inserted in the State policy a provision that a breach of the warranty regarding the movements of the vessel carrying the goods shall only become operative as against the cargo-owner, provided that such breach has happened with the connivance or assent of the holder for the time being of the State policy, or of the persons seeking to enforce the policy.

84. Mr. Austen Chamberlain's Committee were much impressed with the administrative difficulties of working the State insurance of cargoes through a single Government office, and quoted in their report the statement of an underwriter that in peace time from 50,000 to 100,000 policies were issued every day in London alone. We believe these figures are very much exaggerated. There are in London some thirty companies transacting marine insurance business of importance; and we were told that the average number of policies issued by each of them would be from fifty to a hundred a day. If we assume much larger figures for Lloyd's underwriters, it is difficult to believe that the number of policies issued daily in London can exceed 10,000, and it is probable that a large number of these policies refer to the same shipment, since the larger risks are usually spread through the market. The State war risk policy will cover the whole shipment, and therefore the number of policies which the State office might have to issue would probably be substantially less than 10,000, even if the trade of the country suffers no diminution in consequence of the war. Nevertheless, the number of policies is likely to be a formidable one to contemplate being issued from one office daily. We do not indeed wish to minimise the difficulties of establishing and administering the State office. We realise that they will be very great; but we are assured that, with the cordial co-operation of the insurance market, they will not prove insuperable.

85. We have already indicated that a Board of Advisers will have to be established to assist the Government both with the administrative work of the State office and with the settlement of claims. We are inclined to think that one board should be sufficient to deal with these matters; but it may be found necessary to have two separate boards with separate functions. In any case, there should be representative underwriters and average adjusters on these boards, together with one or two representatives of the Government.

86. We recommend that one of these boards should be appointed at once with a permanent secretary. Its first function will be to fill in all the details of the organisation of the State office, so that it may come into being at once when required. These details will require constant revision, as the personnel from which the staff of the State office will be selected will be constantly changing. The details of insurance business will also change in course of time, and many improvements in organisation may suggest themselves, which it would be wise to adopt.

87. Another important function of this board will be the following: We understand that there are special standard clauses in marine policies covering certain articles such as meat, timber, wheat, and nitrate of soda, which have been settled after years of experience and negotiation between assurers and assured. These clauses define clearly the risks of the voyage which the underwriter insures against, and those other risks which have nothing to do with the perils of the sea or of war, and which therefore remain at the risk of the cargo-owner. But these and other clauses and conditions in marine policies are constantly being altered; and it is essential, in our view, that a committee of experts should revise these clauses periodically in the interests of the State, and settle from time to time what the standard clauses are which the State will assume to be included in marine policies when it is called upon to cover the war risks

on cargo. It would not, we think, be necessary for the board to meet for this purpose more than twice a year. It is essential to protect the State against the insertion in marine policies of special clauses which might involve it in much more extended liabilities than are usually understood by the sea risk clause. There would, of course, be no possible objection to the adoption of such special clauses for ordinary purposes; but the State is entitled to fix the standard clauses which it will require in marine policies when it assumes the King's enemy risks excluded from these policies, and cargo-owners, too, are entitled to know the requirements of the State in this respect.

88. There is one other point on which we wish to make a few remarks. We have shown that the State will be able, by forbidding the movement of vessels, to avoid the loss of these vessels and of their cargoes. It is quite right that the State should, in the interests of the community and in its own protection, have this right and exercise it; but we submit that the right must be exercised with great discretion. It must not, for instance, be possible for shipowners or cargo-owners to say that the State has taken their premiums to cover a certain risk and has then exercised such precaution as to avoid running all the risks it has undertaken. We have already suggested that, in the case of ships, the State should, when requested to do so, refund the premium it has received to cover a particular voyage if this voyage is prohibited; and we are of opinion that this privilege should be extended to the cargo-owner.

89. We have now completed the general outline of our proposals for State insurance of cargoes after the outbreak of war.

The Extent of the Liability of the State for Losses on Cargoes.

90. We are, of course, unable to give any indication of what the losses in respect of cargoes will be in time of war. But the assumption we have made, by way of illustration, that 5 per cent. of the vessels engaged after the outbreak of war in the foreign trade would be lost in six months represents a loss of about 200 ships. The values of the cargoes carried under normal trade conditions vary greatly on vessels and on voyages, but each ship in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom carries, on the average, 40,000*l.* worth of cargo per voyage. If this average be adopted for the purposes of illustration, then the value of the cargo lost on the 200 ships would be 8,000,000*l.*

Part IV.—SUMMARY.

91. We recommend—

(*A.*) In the case of *Hulls*—

(1.) That arrangements should be made with the existing Clubs, or Mutual War Risks Associations, that they shall extend their existing standard forms of policy to cover the King's enemy risks up to the arrival of the vessels at the final port on the voyage which they are making when war breaks out or hostilities have begun, and for ten clear days after such arrival.

(2.) That arrangements should be made with these Clubs for the issue of policies covering the King's enemy risks on vessels starting on voyages after this country is at war.

(3.) That the State shall reinsure 80 per cent. of all these risks.

(4.) That no premium shall be charged by the State in respect of voyages current at the outbreak of war.

(5.) That, for voyages begun after the outbreak of war, the State shall fix the insurance premium to be charged on a voyage basis and shall receive 80 per cent. of such premium.

(6.) That the State shall have the right to fix and vary the premiums from time to time as may be considered necessary within a suggested maximum of 5 per cent. and a minimum of 1 per cent.; but a rate agreed for a specific voyage shall hold good if the vessel sails on that voyage within 14 days of the completion of the insurance. On the other hand, if the starting of a voyage is delayed under the orders of the Admiralty, the assured shall have the option of cancelling the policy and receiving back the premium paid.

(7.) That the Clubs shall run the remaining 20 per cent. of these risks, both before

and after the outbreak of war, receiving for voyages commencing after the outbreak of war 20 per cent. of the premiums fixed by the State.

(8.) That all expenses of administration shall be borne by the Clubs.

(9.) That the Club policy shall contain the following warranties:—

(*a.*) That no ship insured by the State shall start on a voyage if ordered by the Admiralty not to do so, and that under both the policy relating to a new voyage and the policy relating to the completion of the voyage any orders that the Admiralty may give as to routes, ports of call, and stoppages shall be obeyed. Provided that, in case of breach, the above warranty shall not operate if the assured can satisfy the Committee of the Club that such breach happened without the fault or privity of the assured and of the owners and of the managers of the ship.

(*b.*) That the ship insured shall be deemed to be at all times fully insured against all perils covered by an ordinary Lloyd's policy (with collision clause attached) and containing an F. C. and S. Clause, and no claim whatever against which the ship is deemed to be otherwise insured as aforesaid, or against which she is in fact insured by any other insurance policy, shall be recovered under the Club policy.

(10.) That ships so insured undertake, as far as possible, to carry out the orders of the State in regard to their routes, ports of call, and stoppages. Failure to carry out such orders will involve an appropriate penalty, but such failure shall not be treated as a breach of warranty.

(11.) That each Club and its constitution shall be approved by the State.

(12.) That the State shall be represented on the Committee of each Club.

(13.) That the basis of values for the purposes of State insurance shall be the value accepted for income tax purposes, that is to say, the first cost of the vessel, without allowance for the cost of alterations or additions, less depreciation at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum, but without any minimum limit per ton.

(14.) That the Club shall not be bound to pay a loss if the ship be recaptured, or released, or restored to the assured within six months after the date of capture, but in that event the Club to pay the assured—

(i.) The cost of repair or damage received by the ship by reason of such capture, &c.

(ii.) The expenses incurred in respect of the ship by reason of such capture, &c.

(iii.) A sum equal to 10 per cent. per annum on the insured value from the date of capture until release.

(15.) That claims shall be dealt with and settled by the Committee of the Club. If a claim be settled with the approval of the State's representatives on the Club Committee, the State to pay on the agreed figures. If the State's representatives protest against a proposed settlement, the liability of the State under its policy of reinsurance to be settled (failing agreement to refer to arbitration) by the Courts of Law.

(16.) That in the event of loss by destruction or capture, the first payment by the State shall be made at the end of six months after the event.

(17.) That the liability of the State shall be discharged in three equal instalments —at six, nine, and twelve months from the date of loss or capture, with interest at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum.

(18.) That a Board of Experts shall be appointed to advise the State on the question of rates and variations of premiums, and that the State shall have one or two representatives on this board.

(19.) That this arrangement shall only extend to vessels which are in the Clubs and which are under the British flag and registered in the British Isles.

(20.) That the State should be prepared, if necessary, to make similar arrangements with other bodies than the existing Clubs, provided such other bodies represent a sufficiently important amount of tonnage and can provide satisfactory machinery for the protection of the State in the matter of values and of claims.

92. (*B.*) In the case of *Cargoes*—

(1.) That no arrangement shall be made for the insurance by the State of cargoes afloat at the time of the outbreak of a war in which we are a belligerent.

(2.) That immediately after the outbreak of such a war a State insurance office be opened in London for the insurance by the State against King's enemy risks of cargo starting on a voyage after the outbreak of war.

(3.) That the rate of premium charged by the State for covering these risks be a flat one, irrespective of the voyage or the character of the cargo insured.

(4.) That the State shall have the right to fix and vary such rates of premiums, within a maximum of 5 per cent. and a minimum of 1 per cent. But a rate agreed for a specific voyage shall hold good, provided the cargo starts on such voyage within 14 days. If, however, the voyage is delayed under the orders of the Admiralty, the assured shall have the option of cancelling the policy and receiving back the premium paid.

(5.) That the values of cargo for State insurance shall be the values agreed in the marine insurance policies covering the same cargo.

(6.) That these marine insurance policies must be produced at the State office, when the State insurance of war risks is finally arranged.

(7.) That the premium for insurance must be paid in cash to the State office when the provisional insurance is effected.

(8.) That if, when the marine insurance policies are produced, the values in those policies shall be less than the amount provisionally insured in the State office, the premium on the excess value will be refunded, but no increased value on a shipment will then be accepted.

(9.) That marine insurance policies will only be accepted by the State if issued by members of Lloyd's, British Insurance Companies and other approved Insurance Companies and Underwriters.

(10.) That claims under the State insurance policy shall be settled on the basis of the marine insurance policy, but such marine insurance policy shall be deemed to contain such standard clauses (if any) as may be approved by the State in regard to the particular class of cargo insured.

(11.) That the State insurance of cargo shall be confined to cargo on vessels insured by the State.

(12.) That the State shall be prepared to insure all cargo on such vessels, irrespective of the nationality of the owner of such cargo, except, of course, enemy cargo.

(13.) That a Board or Boards of Advisers shall be established to assist the Government both with the administrative work of the State office and with the settlement of claims.

(14.) That one of these Boards should be appointed at once with a permanent secretary. Its duties will be :—

(*a.*) To fill in all the details of the organisation of the State office and to revise them from time to time.

(*b.*) To fix and revise from time to time the standard clauses which the State will deem to be in marine insurance policies when it assumes the King's enemy risks excluded from those policies.

(15.) That all claims shall be settled by the Board of Advisers, but in the event of any dispute with the assured as to the proposed settlement, the liability of the State will have to be settled (failing agreement to refer to arbitration) by the Courts of Law.

(16.) That payment of all agreed claims be made at once in cash.

Concluding Remarks.

93. We further recommend that, if our proposals are approved of, they shall be made public as soon as possible. This is, in our opinion, essential, not only in order that the necessary changes in the present arrangements for mutual insurance of hulls should be made by the Clubs, but also in order that the details of our proposals for insuring cargoes may be carefully prepared and periodically revised by the Board of Advisers which we recommend should be appointed for the purpose.

94. We have already pointed out that, in the absence of experience of the effect of naval warfare on our oversea trade as it now exists, it is impossible to form any reliable estimate of the liabilities which the State would incur if these proposals are adopted. We have shown, however, in paragraphs 23–27, 34 and 90, that on the assumption that 5 per cent. of all British steamships which on the outbreak of war are at sea or in ports of the enemy are captured, and that during the six months following the outbreak of war

a further 5 per cent. of all British steamships remaining available for foreign trade are captured, the cost to the State would be as follows :—

—	Total Estimated Loss.	State's Share.
	£	£
1. 5 per cent. loss of British steamers, homeward and outward bound, employed at the outbreak of war in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom	1,450,000	1,160,000
2. 5 per cent. loss of the British steamers employed in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom which are neither homeward nor outward bound, but which may at the outbreak of war be at sea or in ports of the enemy	1,700,000	1,360,000
3. 5 per cent. loss of the British steamers employed abroad and not in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom and which may, at the outbreak of war, be at sea or in ports of the enemy	1,175,000	940,000
Total Hull losses incurred by the State without premium ..	4,325,000 ..	3,460,000
4. 5 per cent. loss during the six months following the outbreak of war of all British steamers remaining available for foreign trade, after deduction of the above losses	6,133,750	
Total Hull losses incurred by the State against premium ..	..	4,907,000
5. Value of the cargo, carried on the steamers assumed to be lost during the six months following the outbreak of war, but excluding the cargoes carried on the vessels at sea or in enemies' ports on the outbreak of war .. .. (The basis of this valuation is the average value of the cargoes carried under normal conditions in the foreign trade of the United Kingdom.)	8,000,000	
Total cargo losses incurred by the State against premium ..	..	8,000,000
Grand total (gross) of State's share of estimated losses on hulls and cargo in six months (*without taking into account any premiums received*)	..	16,367,000

On these assumptions the total losses on hulls insured against premiums would be 6,133,750*l*., and the State's share of those losses would be 4,907,000*l*. We estimate the value of the steamship tonnage remaining available for foreign trade during the six months following the outbreak ot war at 122,675,000*l*. Under normal conditions each vessel in that part of our foreign trade which is with the United Kingdom makes, on the average, ten voyages each year, counting each outward and inward voyage as a separate voyage. If that average can be taken as generally applicable, and if the number of voyages be maintained after the outbreak of war, premiums at the average rate of 1 per cent. per voyage on the new voyages would in six months be sufficient to cover the whole of the losses on hulls insured against premiums.

It is more difficult to estimate the total values of the cargoes that will be carried in British steamships in our foreign trade during the six months following the outbreak of war, but if that trade were maintained such values would, on the same basis as that upon which we have estimated losses, amount to 800,000,000*l*. If the whole of those cargoes were insured with the State Office the assumed loss would be covered by premiums at the rate of 1 per cent. per voyage.

It is, we think, probable, that at average premiums of 1 per cent. per voyage the greater part of the hulls would, through the Clubs, be insured with the State, but the amount of cargo so insured, and therefore the amount of cargo at the risk of the State, would depend largely on the facilities offered by the insurance market.

We admit that we are making many assumptions, both in regard to the extent of our losses and in regard to the volume and value of our trade ; but when every allowance is made it will be seen that, even on an assumed loss of nearly 10 per cent. of all British steamers employed in our foreign trade, which on the outbreak of war and for six months thereafter are at risk, the claim on the State in respect of hulls and cargo would be but a very small percentage on the total volume of our trade.

95. We recognise that there may be other reasons which might tend towards the laying up of ships. For example, in the evidence given before Mr. Austen Chamberlain's Committee, some stress was laid on the possibility that, "if the danger of capture, imprisonment, and loss of life were very serious, neither shipowners nor seamen would care to tempt their fate, even if there was a chance of securing insurance." We are of opinion that the danger of ships being laid up for this reason would be reduced if the rules laid down in the "Convention (The Hague, 1907) relative to certain Restrictions on the Exercise of the Rights of Capture in Maritime War" (see "Command Paper 1175," p. 96) were more generally known. These rules are as follows :—

"CHAPTER III.—*Regulations regarding the Crews of Enemy Merchant-ships captured by a Belligerent.*

"Article 5.

"When an enemy merchant-ship is captured by a belligerent, such of its crew as are subjects or citizens of a neutral State are not made prisoners of war.

"The same principle applies in the case of the captain and officers, likewise subjects or citizens of a neutral State, if they give a formal undertaking in writing not to serve on an enemy ship while the war lasts.

"Article 6.

"The captain, officers, and members of the crew, if subjects or citizens of the enemy State, are not made prisoners of war, provided that they undertake, on the faith of a written promise, not to engage, while hostilities last, in any service connected with the operations of the war.

"Article 7.

"The names of the persons retaining their liberty under the conditions laid down in Article 5, in the second paragraph, and in Article 6, are notified by the belligerent captor to the other belligerent. The latter is forbidden knowingly to employ the said persons.

"Article 8.

"The provisions of the three preceding articles do not apply to ships taking part in hostilities."

We recommend that arrangements should be made by His Majesty's Government to make these rules known in shipping circles in time of peace, and to draw attention to them in the event of an outbreak of war, in order to allay the misapprehensions which, we believe, are current as to the extent of the personal danger to be incurred in time of war by the officers and crews of merchant-ships.

96. In accordance with the Terms of Reference we have avoided any expression of opinion on the question of policy, and we now submit the above as an administratively practicable scheme. We believe that it will secure that, in case of war, British steamships will not be generally laid up, and that oversea commerce will not be interrupted by reason of the inability to cover the war risks of ships and cargoes by insurance. Even if the maximum premium of 5 per cent. on ships and of 5 per cent. on cargoes is charged for all voyages, and the whole of this premium is borne by cargoes, the total increased cost of such cargoes, on account of war risk insurance, will not be excessive, and will not, in our opinion, approach the extreme fluctuations in prices of many articles, especially of articles of food, in recent years.

FRED HUTH JACKSON (*Chairman*).
INCHCAPE.
NORMAN HILL.
RAYMOND BECK.
ARTHUR LINDLEY.

M. P. A. HANKEY (*Secretary*).

2, *Whitehall Gardens, S.W.*,
April 30, 1914.

[*Note.—Pro formâ* drafts of the various documents, necessary to carry out the recommendations in the Report, have been prepared, but are not reproduced.]

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22 Sep, 1914

59

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April 2, 1915. N.H.L.

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Russian Naval Prize Rules, Issued in connection with the Naval War Regulations of September 22,1914.

Translated by Miss N.D.Fomine.

Revised by Captain N.A.McCully.

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580 9 137 APR 8 1915 1-1 Naval War College

Regulation

regarding naval prizes and Instruction on the manner of stopping, searching and seizing ships, and on the transfer and disposition of seized ships and cargo.

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Annex to 353 of the Naval Statute (book X of the Code of Naval Regulation).

Regulation regarding Naval Prizes.

General Considerations.

1. These rules must be applied in all prize cases where no special rules have been established by convention or agreement between Russia and other States.

(Note. As concerns the seizure of the enemy's property on shore and by action of shore forces, special rules must be observed.)

2. On the exact basis of the Paris Declaration of the 4/16 April, 1856, in applying this Regulation the following Rules will be observed:

(a) Privateering certificates (lettres de marque) will not be delivered to private persons;

(b) A neutral flag covers the enemy's cargo except military contraband;

(c) Neutral goods, except military contraband, are

1-1

not subject to confiscation when under the enemy's flag; and

(d) A blockade, to be considered as binding, must be effective, viz. it must be maintained by sufficient military forces as to constitute a real impediment to an approach of the enemy's shore.

3. For the capture of a prize, open force, or admissible military stratagems can be used; but treacherous proceedings are absolutely prohibited.

4. In prescribing these rules, which limit the right of stopping, visiting, seizing and confiscating ships of an enemy, or of a neutral Power and its subjects, the Imperial Government reserves the right to allow digressions from these rules in regard to an enemy, or a neutral Power, from which the observance of said rules is not to be expected, and will correlate his actions in such cases with the peculiar circumstances of every incident of this kind.

5. The following are considered as prizes:

(a) Seized enemy's ships and cargo, as well as ships and cargo of neutral nationality;

(b) Russian and neutral ships and cargo, as well as ships and cargo of an allied Power when retaken by force from the enemy (reprises), if the capture has been made in accordance with these Regulations.

Section I.

On the stopping, search and seizure of ships and cargo and their confiscation as prizes.

Chapter I.

Ships and cargoes subject to arrest, search, seizure and confiscation.

6. In war at sea, merchant ships which comprise all vessels not forming part of the war fleet, are subject to be stopped and searched in order to verify their nationality and

their observance of neutrality. Merchant ships under military escort of an allied or neutral State, are not submitted to search, if the escort commander officer makes a statement as to their number, their nationality, the destination of their cargo and certifies that there is no military contraband on board. The stopping and searching of such ships is allowed only in the following cases:

(a) If the escort commander refuses to deliver the above mentioned certificate;

(b) If he declares that any ship does not belong to the convoy under his charge; and

(c) If it becomes evident that the escorted ship is preparing to execute an act, which constitutes a breach of neutrality.

7. The nationality of a ship is determined according to the laws of the State whose flag she bears, or of the navy to which she claims to belong. Merchant ships acquired from an enemy State, or from subjects of such State, by persons of a neutral nationality, will be considered as enemy ships, if it cannot be shown that the transaction had been concluded in accordance with law before the acquirers have been informed of the declaration of war, or that such ships have been acquired even after the receipt of such information, but in bona fide, and not with the intention to cover enemy's property.

8. A breach of neutrality is considered established in the presence of evidence as noted in Par.11 and 12 of these Regulations.

9. Such ships and cargo which are liable by these Regulations to confiscation as prizes, are subject to capture.

10. Subject to confiscation as prizes are all war and merchant ships of the enemy with whatever articles may be on board of them, except:

(a) Personal effects of the crew or passengers, and

(b) Articles belonging to the Government of a neutral State or to its subjects and not constituting military contraband. Independent of this, the Imperial Government may permit as a measure of reciprocity, exemption from confiscation of all or certain kinds of enemy's ships and cargo, except cases when such ships and cargo are subject to confiscation in virtue of rules (indicated in Par.11 and 12 of these Regulations)regarding neutral ships.

(Note: All property whatever, on board of an enemy's ship will be considered as enemy property, if the contrary should not be proved.)

11. Merchant ships of neutral nationality are subject to confiscation as prizes in the following cases:

1. When such ships have been seized in the act of transporting to the enemy, or to an enemy's port;

(a) Accessories of or munitions for fire-arms as well as explosives or any of their accessories, independently of their number;

(b) Other articles of military contraband, in a quantity exceeding in weight or volume the half of the whole cargo;

(c) Parts of the enemies war forces ; if in all such cases it should not be proved that the declaration of war was unknown to the respective ship's captain;

2. When ships are seized in the act of breaking blockade and it should not be proved that the establishment of the blockade was unknown to the ship's captain;

3. When ships have offered resistance by force to visit and search;

4. When ships have taken part in hostile operations by the enemy.

12. The cargo of merchant ships of neutral nationality is subject to confiscation as prize;

(a) When this cargo constitutes military contraband transported to the enemy, or to an enemy's port, and it should not be proved that the declaration of war was unknown to the ship's captain; and

(b) When the cargo is on a ship subject to confiscation in virtue of p.2-4 of P.11 of these Regulations and it should not be proved that it belongs to Russian owners or to neutrals, who are not involved in proceedings making them liable to confiscation.

13. A special declaration will be issued, bringing to public knowledge what goods will be considered as military contraband. Such articles, although included in this list, which form the personal, war or provision supply of neutral national ships, shall not be subject to confiscation.

14. If confiscation applies only to war contraband and not to the ship carrying it (Par.11, p.1 and 12), the ship will be held only until delivery of the contraband cargo. The delivery may take place, at discretion of the captor, either on the very spot of capture, or on the arrival of the seized ship in a port.

Chapter II.

On conditions and consequences of the stopping, searching and seizing of ships and cargo.

15. The right of stopping, searching and seizing enemy's or suspicious, ships and cargoes, belongs to ships of the Imperial Navy. Merchant ships are given these rights only in case:

(a) If they be attacked by enemy or suspicious ships,

(b) If they have to assist Russian or allies' ships attacked by the enemy. Ships and cargo, seized under such conditions by merchant ships, must be delivered by them to authorities - as indicated in PP 23 and 24 of these Regulations,

and they are entitled to a remuneration in case the ships and cargo seized be confiscated as prizes.

(Note: The limitations, indicated in this Par. for merchant ships, do not extend to cases, for which special rules will be established in conformity with Par.4 of these Regulations.)

16. The stopping, searching and seizing of enemy or suspicious ships or cargo, is allowed anywhere at sea, or in waters, except those which belong to a neutral State, or are excluded from military operations in virtue of special international agreements.

17. On declaration of war, hostilities at sea will begin at the time fixed by the Imperial Government. In case of an armistice, hostilities will be limited, according to conditions of the same, and at the conclusion of peace will cease, from the moment when the ships of the Navy will receive due information of the beginning of the armistice, or of the conclusion, of peace, respectively.

18. Having seized a trading ship, or a cargo, the Commander of the ship making the seizure, must draw a statement stating the reasons and circumstances of the seizure, and must take the necessary measures for the security of the ship, or cargo, seized. Moreover, together with seizure of ship herself;

(a) Will be arrested provisorily, independently of their being later on recognised as military prisoners, or not, the ship captain, the supercargo, and such persons of the crew whose statements, in the opinion of the Commander of the ship making seizure, may be necessary for clearing up any matter, when the case is brought up for adjudication, in accordance with the Prize Rules; and

(b) The ships papers found on board, must be inventoriated and sealed up.

19. The captain of the ship seized, as well as the owners of ship or cargo, or their representatives, if on board, have the right to be present during the proceedings mentioned in first part of Par.18, and as regards (2) of this same section, to make such notes or statements as they may desire, and to place their seals also on any articles sealed up.

20. In case of seizure of a man of war, the commander of the ship making seizure must proceed in conformity with the requirements of Par.351, of the Naval Regulations (book X of Code of Naval Regulations).

21. In extraordinary cases, when it may be impossible to keep a ship seized by reason of her bad condition, or extreme low value, or the possible danger of her being retaken by the enemy, or because a port too far away, or because the ports are blockaded, or because some danger be threatening the ship making seizure, or the operations in which she is engaged, the officer in command may, on his own personal responsibility, burn or sink the ship seized, having previously taken off the crew and, if possible, the cargo on board, as well as taking measures for the safeguarding of the ships papers and of any other evidence which may be necessary for clearing up any question when the case is brought up for adjudication in accordance with the Prize Rules. In regard to the circumstances which impelled the naval commander to destroy the ship seized, he will make a statement in conformity with the requirements of Par.353 of the Naval Statute (book X, Code of Naval Regulations).

22. Ships and cargo seized will be directed by the ship making seizure, to some Russian port, and if there be no such port nearby, to a port of an allied Power or to the Russian Active Fleet. In case of bad weather or any other extreme necessity, the ship making seizure can take refuge, with the

ship seized, in a port of a neutral Power. In regard to the term and conditions of the stay in such port, the commander of the ship making seizure is bound to submit to rules, established for such cases by the local Government.

23. On the arrival of a seized ship, or a cargo, in a Russian port, or on their joining the active fleet at sea, all matters seized must be delivered to the proper naval authorities, accompanied by all documents, as required by PP 18 and 21 of these Regulations. Naval authorities on breaking the seals receive inventories and take measures for the safekeeping of the property delivered, and if necessary holds public sale of such goods, which by their character, or condition, cannot be stored. The commander of the seized ship, or his representative and persons named in Par.19 of these Regulations, are allowed to be present at these proceedings and to make any observations, or suggestions.

24. The rights and duties of naval authorities, as indicated in Par.23, in case of their absence,will be assumed:

(1) In Russian ports, by local port, custom or police officials; and

(2) In ports of an allied Power, after agreement of the Minister of the Navy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs,with the competent foreign authorities, to the local Russian Naval agency, or Russian Consulate, or some other institution, or as otherwise designated.

25. On the arrival of a seized ship, or cargo, in a port, the proper authorities (PP23 and 24) will immediately inform thereof the nearest prize tribunal and, after taking the measures indicated above, will forward into the custody of said tribunal the respective ship's captain, supercargo and other persons arrested, as well as papers and documents until all the circumstances of the seizure may be finally established.

25. (a) The Naval,port or police authorities, or whoever may have received the prize (Par.23 and 24), must inform

thereof the nearest custom-house immediately the inventory is completed.

26. Detailed rules on the order of stopping, seizing, searching, forwarding and delivery of ships and cargo seized are laid down by instructions, approved by the Admiralty-Council. Instructions for the manner of stopping, searching, seizing, forwarding and delivery of ships and cargo seized, is annexed to these Regulations.

Chapter III.

On conditions and consequences of confiscation of ships and cargo seized.

27. The confiscation of seized warships and cargo takes place on an order of proper Naval authorities. The confiscation of other ships and cargo seized can take effect only by verdict of a Prize Court.

28. The property seized can be confiscated only if included in the list of articles, declared to be subject to confiscation as prizes (Par.10-12 of these Regulations), and if seized under conditions laid down in PP 2,3,15 and 17 of these Regulations. If not, the property seized will be returned to its owner.

29. If some property, which should be returned to its owner, shall have been sold, or hypothecated, the owner will receive the full amount of the sale, or hypothecation. If the property, subject to be returned, shall have been destroyed by order of naval authorities, or lost by fault or negligence of officials, whose duty it was to keep it safe, the owner will receive its value according to an appraisal, made in accordance with the information at hand.

30. Independent of the restitution of property seized, or of the payment of its equivalent amount, the owner of such property can be entitled by a Prize Court verdict to a compensation for injury caused by the seizure of his property, if

it be admitted that the latter had been seized without sufficient reasons, or contrary to provisions in PP 16 and 17 of these Regulations. In case the property be returned in damaged condition, the owner will be entitled to compensation for loss caused him, if it be proved that the damage was caused by fault or negligence of the officials whose duty it was to keep it safe.

31. The original owner of property seized within the limits of waters belonging to a neutral power, or excluded from the sphere of military operations in virtue of special international agreements, will be entitled to restitution of the property and to damages only if the neutral Power, or a Power having taken part in the mentioned agreement, shall claim such restitution or compensation within the course of one year from the day of the seizure. Otherwise the property seized will be confiscated.

32. The amounts, in restitution to be paid in virtue of PP 29 - 31 of these Regulations for compensation for the value of property destroyed, or for the injury caused by its seizure or damage, will be paid by the Treasury; this expense will be, in such cases, be sued for in legal proceedings against the persons causing the damage.

33. All goods confiscated as prizes are State property. They will be appraised and those, which the Naval Department may not find necessary to retain, shall be sold by public auction.

(Note: The appraisal and sale of goods seized will be made according to rules, published by the Minister of the Navy in agreement with the Minister of Finance. They are annexed to these Regulations.)

34. In regard to Russian and foreign ships and cargo retaken from the enemy, as well as to their conveyance and delivery in a port, general rules in regard to these matters

will be followed with additions of the following special rules:

(a) A property retaken from the enemy by force, though being already confiscated by the enemy as prize, will be returned to the original owner by verdict of Prize Court, after payment by him of such expenses as may have been caused by the proceedings (reprise); in case any property belonging to the enemy be found on board of such retaken ships, this property will be considered as prize and confiscated on general basis;

(b) Russian Government ships and goods retaken by force from the enemy, will be returned to the State without intervention by a Court, on an order of the proper naval authorities; and

(c) the property of a foreign owner, retaken by force from the enemy, will be returned to the owner without any claim for the expenses, of recapture if it be proved that such property could not have been considered by the enemy as lawful prize, but must have been released.

Section II.

On the participation in prizes.

Chapter I.

On the right of participation in prizes.

PP.35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 are annulled.

Chapter II.

On the amount of prize money allowed and its distribution.

42. This Par. is annulled.

43. For the capture of enemy ships and goods, made by merchant ships (Par.15), as well of such which have been condemned as prizes, and subsequent have been released by a verdict of a Prize Court, consequent on annullment of annulled

(Par.84), or of such as may have been returned to owners in virtue of conditions of peace, or armistice, the allowance of prize money will be fixed in proportion to the value of the prize, after deduction of the sums retained in accordance with (Par.46).

Pars. 44 and 45 annulled.

46. The value of property seized will be determined by the amount for which it is sold or if not sold, by the amount calculated according to the evaluation of such property, after deduction of:

(a) The custom duty on merchant ships and cargo according to the Custom Regulations; and

(b) The cost of conveying, discharging, storing, estimating and keeping, as well as the expenses of the sale, if the sale took place. From the amount thus established, 10% will be retained for the benefit of the Invalids Fund.

(Note: When any property retaken from the enemy by force (reprise) is returned to its original owners, or the amount produced by its sale is to be paid to the latter, Treasury goods excepted, they must pay the expenses mentioned above Par.46,(2) Par.47, annulled.

48. In case of seizures made by merchants ships, the owners of such ships will be entitled to 1/4 to 1/2 of the prize value, depending on the damage suffered by their ships in making the seizure. The part of each owner will be determined in proportion to his ownership in the ship making the seizure. The remainder of the prize money will be divided among the crew of the ship making the seizure according to their rated standing and to the part respectively taken by each in the seizure and to wounds, or other injury to health they may have received during this action. In case of death of a person entitled to a part of prize money, the amount will pass to the party's heirs in the usual legal manner.

Par.49 annulled.

Section III.

On the constitution of Prize Courts and on proceedings in Prize cases. (affairs re/ prizes).

Chapter I.

On the constitution of Prize Courts.

50. The trial of prize cases is entrusted to:

(a) Port and Naval Prize Courts, and

(b) The Admiralty,-Council as highest Prize Tribunal.

51. Port Prize Courts are organized by the Minister of the Navy in Russian Ports and, in case of necessity, in ports of an allied Power with the consent of that Government. Naval (or Fleet) prize Courts are formed by authorization of flag officers, on detailed service.

52. A port Prize Court consists of a president and five members. The president is appointed by Imperial order from the staff of officials of the Naval Justice Department, with rank at least that of Colonel. Two members will be appointed by the Minister of the Navy from the staff of Naval Justice officials; two members, by the Minister of Justice from officers of the Department of Justice who have practical knowledge of the maritime laws and proceedings; and one member will be appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs from officials of that Department. In case of absence of the president, the senior member in rank appointed by the Navy Department, shall act in his stead. The staff of a Prize Court comprises: a prosecutor, a secretary (who is also treasurer) and an interpreter, with such clerks and other assistants as may be needed. The prosecutor will be appointed by the Minister of the Navy from graduates of a standard Law School, or having proved in service their knowledge of legal matters and having had practical legal experience. The appointment of the

secretary is made by the Minister of the Navy; and the appointment of the interpreter, the clerks and subaltern servants) assistants, are made by the president of the Prize Court. The interpreter, if he be not an official in the Government service, must be sworn before assuming duties with the Court.

53. The president, members, prosecutor and secretary of a port Prize Court will receive no special salary for their service in the Court, if they already receive for their other service salaries equal (or higher) to those, which are appropriated to corresponding situations in the Department of Naval Justice. If they occupy posts with smaller salary rates, or if they receive no salary at all, they will in the first case receive additional pay up to the amount as mentioned above, in the second case, the full salary of corresponding officials of the Department of Naval Justice.

54. Sittings of a Port Prize Court are valid if they are held by the president(or acting president), the prosecutor, the secretary and:

(a) In decisions on cases indicated in Par.1-3 of P.58 of these Regulations at least three members, in this number one from each of the Ministries of the Navy, Justice and Foreign Affairs; and

(b) In decisions on all other affairs subject to Prize Courts, at least two members, one of them from the Ministry of Justice.

55. Prize Courts, established in ports of an allied Power will be composed, in accordance with these rules by an agreement of the Ministers of the Navy and of Foreign Affairs with the proper local foreign authorities.

56. A Naval or Fleet Prize Court will be organized by the Admiral flag officer, the president being one of the senior commanders of some vessel of the squadron's or detachment's

of: four staff officers of the Naval service, the senior auditor doing prosecutor's duties, and other officers from the squadron (or detachment) acting as secretary and interpreter. Sittings of a Naval or Fleet Prize Court will be valid, if they be held by the president, at least three members in addition to the acting prosecutor and secretary.

57. The Supreme Prize Court is formed by the additional appointment, by His Majesty, to the Admiralty Council of two senators of the Justice or Civil Cassation Committees of the Senate and one official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The legal adviser of the Ministry of the Navy will act as prosecutor and one of his assistants will act as secretary. The sittings of the Supreme Prize Court will be valid, if there are present: the (acting) prosecutor, secretary and at least three members of the Admiralty Council and one senator; and in cases mentioned in Par.1-3, of P.58 of these Regulations, besides the above named persons, also the member from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Chapter II.

On the proceeding in

Prize Cases.

Part I.

Considerations.

58. Prize Courts have jurisdiction, according to Par. 59-93 of these Regulations over the following matters:-

(1) Confiscation and release of seized merchant ships and cargo, or of the amounts of money realized by the sale of such ships and cargo, or money deposited as security for their release;

(2) On compensation for losses caused by seizure, destruction, wrecking or damage of such ships and cargo;

(3) On restitution to original owners of merchant ships and cargo, retaken from the enemy by force(reprise),. and the

fixing of the expenses to be paid by such owners; and

(4) On the fixing of the prize money for seizure of the enemy's cargo and ships by merchant ships, and of its distribution.

(Note: The order of proceeding for Prize Courts established in ports of an allied Power, will be fixed, in accordance with these Regulations, by agreement of the Ministers of the Navy and of Foreign Affairs with the proper local foreign authorities.)

59. Cases, which may cause some difficulty in the order of proceeding in the Prize Courts, will be decided according to rules established by these Regulations combined with the general statutes governing Civil and Criminal proceedings.

Part II.

Proceeding in regard to confiscation, and release of seized ships and cargo or of money realized by the sale of seized ships and cargo, or deposited as security for ships and cargo liberated.

60. In proceedings of confiscation and release of seized ships and cargoes, or of money realized by the sale of such seized ships and cargoes, or deposited as security for their release, the prosecutor will be considered as the representative of the Treasury interests, and the original owners of the property seized, or their representatives, as the opposite party; if owners and representatives be absent, the captain of the seized ship will act in their stead. In all points, on which may depend the decision on the regularity of the seizure of ship and cargo, or of their destruction (par.21), the captain of the ship having made the seizure, or his representative, will enjoy the rights of an interested party.

61. The parties to the trial are entitled:

(a) To be present at all proceedings of the Prize Courts and to submit explanatory statements on any matter;

(b) To produce proofs in confirmation of their statements and to address, with the permission of the president of the Court, questions to persons being interrogated;

(c) To make written or verbal declarations and requests relating to the case; and

(d) To examine the original records of the case and to receive copies and extracts of documents and papers from such records.

62. The time and place of the sittings of the Prize Court will be fixed by the president in accordance with PP.64 and 73 of these Regulations. The prosecutor and persons interested in the case, having given their addresses to the Court, will receive notice of the time and place of meeting.

63. Statements of persons, interrogated by the Prize Court, but not understanding the Russian language, can be made in writing such statements and all documents in a foreign language, shall be translated into Russian.

64. Having been informed of the arrival ofany seized property, the Brize Court, in its sitting, fixed for the earliest possible date, will interrogate such persons from the crew of the ship seized and from the ship making the seizure, as well as such who have willingly come at the invitation of the parties (Par.60), the statements of which the Court may decide to take under consideration. In case the property seized has been conveyed into some port distant from the usual place of meeting, the Court shall, for the examination, go as a body to such port, or will delegate one of its members to do so. If this be impossible before the day fixed for the departure of the ships, the Court will delegate the local Naval or other authorities, to execute this formality.

65. Independent of interrogation (proce's verbal) the Court will, if necessary, at the request of interested parties, or on its own motion, make an examination of the property

seized and an appraisal of it by experts, either as a body, or by one or more delegated members.

66. The Prize Court is authorized to liberate the property seized before the decision of the suit, in case a sum equal to the value of the property be deposited as security. This value will be determined by an evaluation, made under control of a member of the Court, by sworn appraisers, or, in their absence, by other experts, at least two in number.

67. A property seized can be sold by public auction, before the examination of the case by the Court, on the request of the interested parties, or if the Court finds it necessary, when such property by its character, or bad conditions, does not allow storage, or when its value, according to the conclusions of experts, cannot cover the expenses of storage. The Court may also execute a sale of seized property before the case has been decided if a further storing appears unnecessary to the Decision, and if the interested parties agree to the sale.

68. In case the seized property be conveyed to a port of an allied Power in which there is no Prize Court, the proceedings mentioned above (Par.64 and 65) shall be entrusted, on an agreement between the Ministers of the Navy and of Foreign Affairs and the proper foreign authorities, to the local Russian Naval Attaché or Consul, or to a specially appointed person, in the presence of at least two witnesses, who should be, if possible, Russian subjects residing in the locality. On execution of the prescribed formalities, the case of the seizure, with all Documents relating to it, will be referred to the nearest Prize Court. At the same time, the Naval Attaché, Consul, or specially appointed person, will take the necessary measures in regard to the property seized, as prescribed by Par.66 and 67 (P.1) of these Regulations, when it appears inconvenient to await such action by the Prize Court.

69. On the completion of all formalities, as prescribed by Par.64 and 65 of these Regulations, the Prize Court will proceed to the trial of the case and, first of all, will declare, without delay, liberation of such part of the property seized, the further storing of which, under the circumstances appears to be inadvisable.

70. When it may be necessary for a better explanation of the matter, the Prize Court will issue order for gathering supplementary proofs, and will allow an exchange of documents between the parties, fixing a term for such exchange and for the production of supplementary proofs. The interrogation of witnesses, summoned by the parties, will be made by the Court, or, on an order of the latter, by Naval authorities not having participated in the seizure of the property, under adjudication, or by one of the persons, mentioned in Par.68, of these Regulations.

71. In cases relating to merchant ships of neutral nationality, or of a nationality appearing dubious, or the cargo of such ships, if part of the cargo be not included under the heading, military contraband, the port Prize Court, in case of absence of the original owners of the property seized, will summon these owners by means of advertisements. A Naval or Fleet Prize Court will send, without delay, all such cases off to the nearest Port Prize Court, for further legal proceedings, retaining, however, the right in regard of such property, if not liberated by Naval or Fleet Court according to Par.69 of this Regulation, to take such measures, as foreseen by PP.66 and 67 (P.1), when it may not be convenient to wait action of the Port Prize Court.

72. The notices mentioned in Par.71, will summon the original owners of the seized property, or their representatives, to appear in the Port Prize Court and produce whatever proofs they may have, within the term fixed by the advertisement.

This term will be fixed by the Court with due regard to the place of the Court's sittings and to other circumstances, but cannot be less than one month, nor more than four months from the day of the last advertisement. The advertisements will be made three times, in three following NN°° of the"State Messenger" and in two newspapers published in Russia in foreign languages, at the choice of the Minister of the Navy. In case of necessity, the text of the advertisements can be given to the newspapers by wire. The cost of the advertisements summons will be paid out of the amount produced by the sale of the prize; if the latter has not been sold, this expense will be paid out of the Treasury, in which case this amount will be deducted from the value of the prize (Par.46), or must be reimbursed by the original owner (Note to Par.46), or will remain as the Treasury's outlay(Par.82).

73. The session of the Court for deciding a case, for which advertisements have summoned up the original owners of seized property, will not be fixed before the latter, or their representatives, have appeared, or before the expiration of the term fixed in the summons.

74. The trial in the Prize Court will begin by the report of one of the Court's members, stating the circumstances of the case; after he has explained the matter, the Court will hear the arguments ofthe prosecutor and the statements of the persons taking active part in the seizure, who may be present at the sitting. Having arrived at their conclusions according to their own convictions, in regard to the meaning and relative importance of the evidence produced, the Court's members pronounce their verdict on the whole case, or a decision on the separate questions, arising out of the circumstances. The decision, declaring that the property seized could have been liberated, or that it was subject to confiscation, will be declared by the Court also in the event of the property having already been destroyed by an order of the naval

officer in command. If the property were seized in the waters of a neutral Power, or in waters excluded from the sphere of military actions by special international agreements, the Court will decide a confiscation of the goods under the reserve that if during a year's time from the date of seizure, no claim of releasing said property be entered (Par.31), this decision will be executed.

75. The decisions of Prize Courts are taken by majority of votes, In case of equality the president's opinion is casting.

76. The Court's decision on a case will be announced by the president during the session in which it was taken. In declaring the decision the president of the Court will, at the same time, fix a day, when the parties can come for reading the decision after being put in writing and will explain to the parties the order for lodging a complaint in appeal, stating the term, settled for such action. The decision and the Court's conclusions must be put in writing not later than two weeks after the day judgement is pronounced and must contain the statement of the motives on which they were based; The decision and conclusion are considered to have been declared on the day fixed for the reading.

77. The parties to the trial, including in that number also, the captain of the ship making the seizure, or his representative, have the right to lodge a complaint in appeal on the decision of the Court. Such a complaint, with a number of copies of the same equal to the number of persons participating in the case, must be lodged with the Court, which has judged the case, within a month's term after the day on which verdict was pronounced. (Par.76). In case the term for lodging appeal be passed, the Court (which tried the case) can, for reasons meriting special considerations, allow a prolongation of the appeal term. Petitions of prolongation of the term of appeal must be presented in the course of a fortnight

from the time when the decision of the Court, declaring the expiration of the term of appeal had been announced. On a refusal of the Court to grant prolongation for appeal, private complaints can be lodged in a fortnight's term from the day on which this decision of the Court was declared.

78. Having accepted the appeal, the Prize Court sends copies of the same to the prosecutor and to all parties interested in the case, if they reside in the vicinity where sessions of the Court are held; if not, the copies of the appeal petition destined for them, will remain in the hands of the Court. The original appeal will be sent, with all documents relating to the case, to the Supreme Prize Court; private complaints on the refusal of the first Court to grant prolongation of appeal term (mentioned in Par.77), are also sent to this Supreme Court. Explanations which persons interested in the case can give on the petition of appeal, must be lodged with the Supreme Prize Court before the day fixed for the deliberation on the case in said Court.

79. The decision to execute confiscation of a property seized will be executed immediately on expiration of the fixed term for appeal, if the appeal petition has not been lodged within that term; if such petition has duly been submitted, the execution of confiscation will be suspended until deliberation on the appeal.

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
Dept's letter of Apr. 17. 1915.

80) The decision to liberate seized property, if in conformance with the conclusion of the prosecutor and with the evidence of the captain of the ship having made the seizure, or his authorized representative, will be put into effect immediately on declaration; if such decision is not in conformance with said conclusion and evidence, it cannot be put into effect before the expiration of the term fixed for submitting appeal. In case such appeal being made, the property seized will be appraised in accordance with P. 66 of these Regulations. The Court may permit the liberation of such property before decision on the appeal under condition of a cash deposit equivalent to the appraised value of the property, or even without this condition. If contests arise as to the owners rights in such property to be liberated, the restitution of such property to its original owner will be suspended until such questions are legally decided or until one of the contesting parties shall deposit as security a sum of money, equal to the value of the property.

81) From the moment that the person, or institution, having in charge the property seized, has received notice that the property is liberated without deposit of security, the subsequent cost of its storing must be paid by its original owners.

82) Property seized and then liberated, but not claimed and removed within six months after the decision to liberate has gained legal force, may be sold by public auction. If in the course of ten years after the date on which the decision has become legal, no one yet claims it after submitting evidence of right to the same - this property or the amount represented by its sale, will be turned over to the benefit of the Treasury, the latter paying the cost of storing.

83) As concerns the manner of consideration by the Supreme Prize Court of the appeals from decisions of lower Prize Courts, and the manner of publishing the decisions of the



Supreme Prize Court, the Rules established for Prize Courts proceeding, given in PP 62 and 74 to 76 of these Regulations will be complied with.

84) The Supreme Prize Court will examine only such parts of the Decision of the lower Court, which have been designated by the interested parties, in the appeal. The revocation of a decision to liberate property seized and its return to the original owner without demand for security, although under appeal (Par.80), will entail the assignment - according to (Par.43 & 93) - of prize money corresponding to the value of that part of the property seized, which, by the decision of the Supreme Prize Court, is considered subject to confiscation as prize.

85) The Decisions of the High Prize Court admit no further appeal and, as soon as pronounced, are transmitted to the proper naval authority for execution.

86) Requests, depositions and other papers in cases examined by Prize Courts and by the Supreme Prize Court, as well as the proceedings of these Courts, are free from stamp and other duties. Copies of documents and other papers of the prize law-suits 40 cop. per sheet, are to be paid except by prosecutor. No compensation is prescribed for carrying a suit into either the lower Prize Courts and into the Supreme Prize Court.

Part III.

Proceedings in suits for adjustment of losses sustained by reason of seizure, destruction, loss or damage of merchant ships and cargo; for restitution to original owners of ships and cargo retaken back from the enemy; and for the payment of prize money and expenses by such original owners; and for ffixing the amount of prize money for the capture of enemy's ships and cargo by merchant ships; and on the distribution of such amounts.

87) In suits: (1) for adjustment of losses suffered by reason of seizure, destruction, loss or damage of merchant ships and cargo; (2) for restitution of ships and cargo, retaken back from the enemy, to their original owners and for payment by the latter of prize money and expenses; and(3) for fixing the amount of prize money allowed to merchant ships, for the capture of enemy's ships and cargo, and for the distribution of such prize amount - the proceedings will be conform to the Rules, given in P. 60-86 of these Regulations, with such exemptions or amplifications as may be stated further (P.88 - 93).

88) Proceedings in suits for compensation of losses suffered by reason of seizure, destruction, wrecking or damaging merchant ships and cargo, are initiated in Port Prize Courts only on requests of those suffering the losses or their duly authorized agents. The rights of civil parties in such cases belong to persons prejudiced (or their proxies) and to the prosecutor, as representative of the Treasury.

89) Actions, mentioned in P.88, are judged and decided on ground of evidence submitted or brought out by the parties, without suspending the proceedings in actions of confiscation or liberation of property seized. Decisions in cases claiming losses may be declared at the same time as the decision in regard to confiscation or liberation of property seized, or also separated from it. Appeals from decisions in cases to recover losses may be lodged within the period of a month, and the entering of an appeal will suspend the execution of the decision against which appeal is taken.

90) Actions for restitution to original owners of merchant ships and cargo, retaken from the enemy and on fixing the amount of expenses to be paid by the latter, are examined and decided in Port Prize Courts; in Naval or Fleet Prize Courts such actions may proceed only in case the original

owners (or their authorized agents be present; if not, the case will be turned for further proceedings to a Port Prize Court.

91) To take part in actions designed in P. 90, the original owners of the property, retaken by force, the captain of the ship, which retook said property and the prosecutor will be authorized to take part in the trial as interested parties. In the consideration of these cases the Port Prize Courts will, if necessary, summon the absent owners by advertisements and when the owners (or their authorized representatives) appear, or on the expiration of the term fixed for their appearance, the Court will decide on the case in principle. Petitions of appeal against such decisions can be lodged at any time within a month after such decisions may be given.

92) Restitution of property, retaken from the enemy by force, to the original owners is admissible: (1) Before the Court decision is given and has obtained legal validity - only if the owners have deposited as security a sum equal to the amount of expenses they may be obliged to pay (P.45, 46, note and P.66), and (2) after the Court's decision has become valid - only after if the owners have paid the amount of expenses fixed by the Court's decision. The sale of such property, retaken from the enemy by force, is admitted - besides the cases mentioned in P.67 and 82 - also when the original owner may request that it be sold. If a property, which ought to be returned, is turned in to the Treasury (P.82), the latter must pay all expenses.

93) Actions brought to fix the amount of prize money for the capture of enemy's ships and cargo by merchant ships, and for a distribution of such amounts, are examined in Port Prize Courts. Such actions may be undertaken by persons belonging to the crew of the ship having made the capture, and the proceedings take place with such persons and the prosecutor as

interested parties. Appeals against the decisions of Prize Courts in such cases may be lodged within a month term after decision may be given.

(Annex to P. 26 of the Regulation on Naval prizes.)

Instruction
in the manner of stopping, searching, seizing, transferring and delivering of seized ships and cargo.

1) Vessels of the Imperial Navy, acting according to the Regulation on Naval prizes, will, in regard to the order of stopping, searching and seizing merchant ships, and to the transfer and delivering of such ships and cargo seized, will take for guidance the following rules in addition to such other declarations and dispositions as may be made by the Government in the course of war.

Note. It is to be further noted that in neutral waters and in other waters, excluded from the sphere of hostile action by special international agreements, according to Par.16 of these Regulations on Naval prizes, it is not allowed to execute stopping, searching and seizing of ships and cargo.

Chapter I.

Stopping.

Part I.

Order of Stopping.

2) In order to stop a ship met at sea, the ship of the Imperial Navy must, while approaching, hoist her flag and fire a blank shot at that ship. A signal by the international code can be also made.

At night, at time of firing, the blank shot, the distinctive and peak lights must be showing.

Part II.

Resistance to stop.

3) If the ship met with does not stop for the blank shot, a shell must be fired across the bow. In case of further resistance, it is permitted to fire on and pursue the resisting ship in order to foree her to stop.

When commencing fire directly on the ship, it is recommended to fire the first shot over it between the masts. However, such consideration is not obligatory, especially if the ship pursued has an advantage in speed, which might permit her to escape.

Any ship, which has shown an evident intention to escape, so entailing consequent pursuit and use of force is subject to seizure; the commanding officer may however, in his discretion and on his own responsibility, carry out the search of the vessel stopped and base further action on the results of the visit and search.

Chapter II.

Visiting.

Part I.

Preliminary action.

4) For the visit and search of a ship the commanding officer shall appoint an experienced officer and several men, including a member of storekeepers force. If officers are available, two of them, more or less acquainted with foreign languages, will be detailed to assist.

5) It is desirable that several parties of officers and men be appointed beforehand and trained for this work; officers and men of such parties, carrying out visit and search, are to be armed with revolvers. It is advisable to agree beforehand on some simple code of conventional signals. (by oar, handkerchief or a small flag, etc.)

When the pursuit begins, officers assigned to carry out the visit and search will get their parties ready and will inform themselves of the position by longitude and latitude of the Imperial vessel.

6) The Imperial vessel will approach closely to the ship stopped, observing all necessary precautions.

Note. It is necessary to keep in mind undersirable consequences of a collision; the ship stopped may be an enemy's ship; hostile actions must be expected, as for instance the probable desire to damage the war vessel by collision.

7) After sending away the boarding party, the Imperial vessel will, during the visit and search, occupy such a position as to be able to have her boat in view for the entire time and to see all that is going on on board of the ship. The guns of the vessel will be loaded and the gun crews at their stations.

Part II.

Officers on board.

8) On approaching the ship stopped, while yet in their boat, the boarding party will note the ship's name and the port to which she belongs. One officer and two men will go on board. If two officers are sent to make the visit, they will both go on board with one sailor.

Note. The rest of the boarding party will go on board only when the inspection of the ship's documents is finished and the search of the ship begins; their number depending on the size of the ship and the judgement of the officer in charge,(i.e. four, six or more men.)

9) The junior of the boarding officers will remain the whole time on the upper deck and has not the right to go below. His duty is to watch all that may go on, on board of the ship

visited, have an eye on his boat and pay attention to signals from his ship. The enlisted men going on board with the officer, will assist him. The inspection of the documents and ship is made by the senior of the inspecting officers. If only one officer makes the visit, the duties as laid down for the Junior Officer will be performed by the senior of the two enlisted men accompanying him.

10) The relations of the officers and men of the boarding party toward the captain, crew and passengers of the ship visited, must be courteous and in accord with the dignity of their military profession.

If the ship stopped should resist visit and search, she will be seized.

Part III.

Inspection of ships papers.

11) The inspection begins by inviting the captain of the ship stopped:

a) to state the name and nationality of his ship;

b) to name the port of destination and the port of departure of the ship;

c) to produce the ship's log and all documents in regard to the ship and cargo.

12) In the examination of the ships papers, the boarding officer will pay special attention to the log book, in order to learn all circumstances of the voyage, the position on the chart where the captain places his ship and the last entries in the log book.

13) In the examination of the documents regarding the nationality of the ship, the inspecting officer will note the port of registration, her register number, the names and nationality of the owners, the place and date of her construction; he will also note whether she has been bought from an enemy's subjects

after the declaration of war, with the attempt to conceal enemy ownership.

14) In examination of the papers regarding cargo, the boarding officer will determine the kind and quantity of goods, the places from which and to which they are being transported, the names and nationality of the shippers and consignees. It is important to ascertain: if there is military contraband among the goods shipped, and who is the owner of the cargo: enemy subjects or neutrals.

15) In examining the Documents relating to the crew and passengers, the boarding officer must try to ascertain the nationality and character of each, in order to find out if there be not among the passengers any soldiers or officers of the enemy and if any of the crew be not subject to arrest in virtue of Par.18 of these Regulations on Naval prizes.

16) Having examined the ship documents, the officer inspector invites the Captain to produce the mail he carries and will search for the correspondence of the enemy government, as well as in general for all mail addressed to enemy's ports.

17) The officer personally makes notes of all documents submitted to him, and has copies made of matter of particular importance. During inspection of the ships papers, he has also the right to question the captain, navigator and members of the crew, as may seem proper to him.

Part IV.

Consequences of the examination of ship papers.

18) The visiting officer may suspend the inspection and seize the ship in the following cases:

a) If the ship is an enemy ship;

b) If there be no ship's papers, especially such which show the ship's nationality and verify the circumstances of her cruise; or if the ship's papers be thrown overboard, or destroyed in any other way;

c) If among the documents there be such, which lead to the belief that the ship belongs to the enemy;

d) if the officer concludes that the Documents are falsified;

e) if it appears, from the inspection of the documents, that the ship was bought by a neutral purchaser from an enemy's subject with reasonable presumption that the sale is fictitious and made in order to cover enemy's property.

19) When the visiting officer is convinced that the ship documents are in perfect order, that the ship is really a neutral one, that no military contraband, destined to the enemy, be among the cargo, and in general that the ship is in no way subject to seizure, he will immediately leave the ship, with observance of the rules, indicated further in PP. 28, 29 and 30 of these Instructions.

20) In case any doubt may arise as to the trustworthiness of the information obtained by the examination of documents, especially in the case when the ship is bound to an enemy's port, or when, from the general character of the cruise, the courses taken by her and the place where she was overtaken, it may be presumed that an enemy's port is the final destination of the ship, or of her cargo, the inspecting officer will make inspection of the whole ship, or carry out a search, in order to ascertain that there is no military contraband among the goods shipped.

Part V.

Searching ships.

21) The detailed inspection or searching of a ship is carried out by the visiting officer with the assistance of the men necessary, who will leave the boat when ordered by the officer.

22) The number of such assisting men may be 4, 6, 8, or more,

depending on the size of the ship stopped and on the judgement of the officer. If the men of the party in the boat are not in sufficient number, the officer will ask by signal that more men be sent him from his ship. The men for such visiting parties must be selected among the more quick, experienced and intelligent of the crew.

23) The inspection of interior compartments offers many difficulties and may cause complaints on the part of neutral persons unjustly molested. That is why an officer executing search must at first carefully decide what cargo, by reason of suspicious documents, appears to be most likely meriting seizure, and will turn his attention at first to that cargo. The behaviour of the officer and his men must be considerate, without however sacrificing any requirement from the requirements of his duty and service.

24) During the inspection of interior compartments, the officer will insist that the captain of the ship be present during all proceeding and only in cases of emergency will he permit an assistant to represent the captain.

25) The captain present at the search must, on request of the inspecting officer, open himself all locked and enclosed spaces, which the visiting officer may desire to inspect, and give information as to what trunks, cases, or packages must be treated with precaution, and how such trunks, cases, or packages are to be opened when the officer has designated such of them for a more detailed inspection. In case the captain refuses to open any of them at the officer's request, the ship is subject to seizure.

26) During the inspection or search, the inspecting officer can, in order to facilitate his work, address all kinds of questions to passengers or crew, if he thinks that he can in this way obtain the necessary information concerning the ship and cargo. It is advisable to pay attention to certain ex-

terior signs, such as the marks, which the steamers of various companies bear on their funnels and which may be covered with paint, etc.

27) The officer will cease further inspection, when he has gained the conviction that among the cargo, there is no military contraband, nor on the ship anything suspicious. Everything which had been removed from its place, must be carefully and speedily put back, in accordance with request of the captain.

Part VI.

Ending the inspection.

28) Having finished the inspection the officer makes in the ships log, in Russian, entries stating: the time of the inspection, the latitude and longitude, the name of his ship, the name of her commanding officer and the result of the inspection. The entries may be made in accordance with the model given in the annexes to these Instructions.

29) Before leaving the ship, the officer requests the captain of the ship to give him a written statement (in his own language), declaring that he has no protest, nor claim to make as a consequence of the boarding of his ship; if the captain has any such complaint, the officer will request him to make the complaint in writing.

30) Leaving the inspected ship, the officer must inform the captain that the permission to continue his voyage will be given him only after the officer is on board of the Imperial ship and has made his report to the commanding officer. The officer will make a detailed written report of the results of the inspection.

31) If the ship is to be seized, the officer will inform his ship of that by a signal and taking with him the ship documents, the captain and other persons, whose statements may be necessary, returns on board of his ship.

Chapter III.

Seizure.

32) The seizure of ships and cargo depends exclusively on the judgement of the commanding officer of the Imperial ship. The following order of proceeding will be observed:

Part I.

Commission.

33) A Commission will be formed on board of the Imperial ship, comprising three officers (the officer having made the inspection being one of them); this Commission draws a detailed report on the proceedings and on what may have been discovered during the inspection and submits the report for the approval of the commanding officer.

Part II.

Protocol Drawing.

34) The report is drawn up in Russian. It must contain in detail: designation of the nationality, kind and name of the ship; names of the ship's captain and of the owners; number of crew and nationality of the men; all circumstances which in connection with the stopping of the ship; all Documents produced by the captain and their contents; all circumstances which accompanied the inspection of the ship and of her documents; any information obtained on the cargo and on all that was found on board of the ship; all statements of the captain, the supercargo, the boatswain and other people questioned.

Part III.

Protest of the captain.

35) The contents of the report will be verbally translated to the captain and he will be invited to sign it. His signature is however not obligatory. The protocol must bear the

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mention that it had been translated and read to the captain.

The protest or complaint of the captain (in written form) must be annexed to the report and any divergencies explained.

Note. Taking into consideration that the drawing up of the report, questioning the captain and the crew may take a long time, the Imperial ship has the right to compel the merchant ship to proceed in an indicated direction and, following her, to carry out all these proceedings while under way.

Part IV.

The decision of the commanding officer.

36) After the report has been drawn up and signed by members of the Board, it will be submitted to the commanding officer, who endorses it, and decides the question of seizing the ship or cargo, in accordance with the following considerations.

37) The following vessels are subject to seizure:

(1) All war and merchant vessels of the enemy (See sections 9 and 10 of these Regulations).

Note: If, due to special agreements concluded by the Imperial Government, certain enemy vessels are not subject to seizure, they will nevertheless be taken, if engaged in acts specified in paragraph (2) of this article (See Article 10 of these Regulations).

(2) Neutral vessels:

(a) If engaged in transporting to the enemy any war munitions, explosives, or war forces of the enemy (Article 11 of these Regulations).

(b) If engaged in transporting to the enemy other articles of military contraband in quantities exceeding by either volume or weight, one half the cargo.(Article 11 of these Regulations).

Note. If the quantity of such contraband be less than half of the total cargo, the ship will be detained only for the time necessary to deliver this contraband. This delivery may be effected, according to the judgement of the commanding officer, either at the time of seizure, or in some port to which the vessel may be taken. (Article 14 of these Regulations).

(c) If taken in the act of breaking an actual and declared blockade (Articles 2 and 11 of these Regulations)

(d) If offering armed resistance to visit and search (Article 11, paragraph 3 of these Regulations).

(e) If they have taken part in hostile actions of

the enemy (Article 11, paragraph 4 of these Regulations).

(3) All suspicious vessels sailing under a neutral flag (See Article 16). A vessel engaged in any of the following acts, or in similar acts, will be considered as suspicious:

(a) If the vessel does not stop the engines or Leave to, when ordered by the war vessel, so making it necessary to pursue her, or to use force to stop her (Article 3 of these Instructions).

(b) If the vessel has no papers, or has false or suspicious papers (Article 18, paragraphs 2, 3, & 4 of these Instructions).

(c) If there is reason to believe that the vessel has passed by a fictitious sale to a neutral subject after declaration of war (Article 18, paragraph 5, of these Instructions).

(d) If the vessel, after being stopped, offers resistance to visit and search, or if her captain has refused to open any closed spaces when requested by the inspecting officer.(Par.10 and 25 of Instructions).

Part V.

Cargo.

38) The following kinds of cargo are subject to seizure:

(1) Goods belonging to the enemy, transported in enemy's ships (P.10 Reg. on nav.pr.);

(2) Enemy and neutral goods carried by neutral ships which have violated their neutrality (P.12 Reg.nav.pr.), viz:

(a) Goods on neutral ships which have taken part in hostile actions of the enemy;

(b) On vessels which have offered armed resistance to stopping, searching or seizure;

(c) On vessels caught in the act of breaking blockade.

(3) All contraband articles with exception of such objects necessary for the defense or maintenance of the neutral

ship herself (Par.12, p.1 and Par.13, Regulations on nav.pr.).

When ships and cargo, are seized the rule must be observed that personal effects, destined for the sole use of the crew and passengers, are not to be seized (P.10, p.1 Reg. nav.pr.).

With exception of the above mentioned cases, the following rules will be observed:

(1) The neutral flag covers enemy cargo, military contraband excepted (P.2, p.2 regul.nav.pr.);

(2) Neutral cargo, military contraband excepted, is not subject to seizure when under enemy's falg (Par.2,p.3 and Par. 10, p.2, Regul.on Nav.pr.).

Chapter IV.

Conveying.

Part I.

Order of conveying.

39) Vessels and cargo seized, in the discretion of the commanding officer of the Imperial vessel, may either be conveyed to a port or to the active fleet by the cruiser herself or may proceed independently under command of a Russian officer with Russian crew, according to rules given in Par.351 - 353 of the Naval Statute (book X Code of Nav.Regulations). In case the seized ship proceeds independently, her original ship documents and the documents regarding the seizure shall remain with the commander of the cruiser, but the officer in charge of the seized vessel receives copies of them.

Part II.

Destruction of a ship seized.

40) In the following and in other similar extraordinary cases, the commanding officer of the Imperial vessel has the right to burn or to sink the vessel seized, previously taking off the crew, and, if possible, taking on own board, all, or part

of the cargo on board, as well as such documents and other articles which may be necessary for the examination of the case in the Prize Court:

(1) when the bad condition of the ship seized makes it impossible to take care of her;

(2) when there is danger that the enemy will retake the ship;

(3) when the ship seized be of extremely little value and her transfer demands too much time and expenditure of fuel;

(4) when the transfer be difficult on account of the great distance from the port, or on account of blockade of ports of destination;

(5) when the proposed transfer of the ship seized might compromise the naval operations of the Imperial vessel, or threaten danger to her.

A full report of the circumstances which caused the commanding officer to order the destruction of a ship seized, will be drawn up and signed by him and by all officers, and forwarded at the first opportunity, to his immediate superiors.

Note. Although by Article 21 of these Regulations, it is allowed to burn or sink a ship seized on personal responsibility of the commanding officer, the latter shall however, in no way incur, responsibility, if the vessel seized be actually subject to confiscation as prize, and if the extraordinary circumstances of the given case demand absolutely the destruction of the ship seized.

Part III.

Exchanging ships.

41) If the ship seized, is to be destroyed in accordance with preceding articles, but is superior in condition and seafaring qualities, to the Imperial vessel, the commanding officer of the latter has the right to exchange his ship for the prize, and burn or sink his own ship instead.

Part IV.

Entering neutral ports.

42) The Imperial ship, whilst conveying prizes, may enter ports of neutral Powers which have not, in neutrality declarations (or in any other official acts) forbidden the entrance to its ports by men-of-war (with prizes) of the parties at war.

Equally, an Imperial vessel may take shelter in a port of a neutral Power, with the ships captured by her, in case of bad weather or in an emergency (for instance engine broken down, lack of food, pursuit by superior enemy forces); in regard to the duration and to other conditions of her stay in the neutral port, the commanding officer will submit to the rules established by the local authorities.

Chapter V.

Delivery.

Part I.

In Russian ports and to the active fleet.

43) Having conveyed the ship or cargo seized to a Russian port, the officer in charge will deliver them to the local naval authority (or in his absence, to port, custom or police authorities), turning over at the same time all documents and persons arrested with the ship, for the final settlement of the case.

In case the ship and cargo seized be conveyed to the active fleet, the delivery will be made to the squadron commander.

The competent naval, or other, authority will open the documents sealed up, take charge of the receipt, inventoring and safe-keeping of the property delivered, and also to the sale by public auction of such articles, which, by their

character or condition, do not admit safe keeping.

During these proceedings the following persons have the right to be present: the commander, or one of the officers, of the Imperial vessel having made the seizure, the captain of the seized ship and the owners of the ship and cargo seized, or their representatives, if they happen to be in the vicinity.

All such persons present have the right to make statements and depositions in regard to the action of the local authorities, who receive and dispose of the property seized.

Part II.

In foreign ports.

44. In case a seized ship or cargo be conveyed into a port of an allied power, the delivery will be made to the local Russian naval attaché or to the Russian Consulate, or to any other agency which, by virtue of an agreement of the Russian Government with the competent foreign authorities, has been entrusted with the care of prizes.

Part III.

Informing authorities.

45) In all cases of seizure of ships and cargo, or of their conveyance to a port and corresponding delivery, the commanding officer of the Imperial vessel must, at the first opportunity, immediately inform by telegraph the Minister of the Navy.

Example of Form used in Report of Visitance Search.

"(Month, day) 1914 in Latitude ----, and Longitude---, the Imperial Russian Armored Cruiser "Rurik" under command of Captain -------, stopped the steamer (sailing vessel, bark, schooner, etc.-) sailing under the neutral Netherlands flag. The steamer immediately stopped her engines (or sailing vessel hove to). The visit showed that the steamers name was -----, the ships documents (designating them) were found in order,

and there was no contraband on board. The visit and search lasted for two hours, from xxxxx till xxxxx.

Signed - Lieutenant xxxxxxxxx."

Annex to P.53 (Note) of the Regulations on Nav.Pr.

Rules.
on the appraisal and
sale of prizes.

1) The appraisal of war vessels of the enemy's navy is made in accordance with special formulas.

All questions regarding status of the vessel as to whether it is a war vessel or not, are decided by the Admiralty Council.

2) The appraisal mentioned in the preceding article, includes the value of all articles forming the armament and outfit of vessels taken from the enemy, with exception of precious stones, gold, silver, paper-money and other valuables, which may form part of the cargo.

All such objects of value are appraised and may be sold separately from the ship, under general provisions.(Par.4 and following).

3) For the appraisal of ships according to the Rules given in P.1, the commander-in-chief, or the commandant of naval station, will appoint a Board composed of Naval officers, naval constructors and engineers of the Navy.

4) The appraisal of other vessels and cargo confiscated as prizes, besides those mentioned in P.1 and 2 of these Rules, and of recaptured vessels and cargos of our Navy (P.34 and 92 of Regulations on Naval Prizes), as well as of seized property liberated, but unclaimed (P.82 Reg.Nav.Pr.), will be made by order of the chief commander in chief or of the Commandant of Naval Station, under supervision of a deputy appointed by him, by sworn appraisers, and in case there be no such, by experts, at least two in number. The appraisal must be made in the presence of an official of the customs service.

The appraisal of goods confiscated as prizes, when they have been seized by trading ships (P.15 and 43 Reg.Nav.Pr.), will be made on an order of a Prize Court, under supervision of a Deputy appointed by the Court.

5) The appraisal made according to above rules, with the opinion of the Deputy and of the customs official annexed to it in such cases when it may be necessary (P.4), will be submitted to the Naval Officials, or to the Prize Courts, who may have issued the order to execute it.

6) The sale of goods confiscated as prizes, if the Naval Department does not want to keep them (P.33 Reg.Nav.Pr.), as well as of such property which was liberated from seizure but not claimed in time (P.82.Reg.Nav.Pr.), will take place in accordance with rules established for the sale of goods, confiscated for violation of Custom service Regulations (Code of laws bk.VI, Custom Service Statute, ed.1910, P.1113, 1173, 1215 and 1263), with such modifications and supplements as may be further mentioned.

7) The sale will be allowed and confirmed by the authorities mentioned in P.5, or by Prize Courts, and will take place under the supervision of deputies (as for appraisal); it can take place also elsewhere than the Custom-House precincts, but invariably in the presence of a customs official.

8) The sale of goods, subject to rapid detorioration, can be allowed without the formality of confirming the appraisal and with other exceptions from rules, if it be necessary.

9) The appraisal and sale of property seized, made before a decision as to its confiscation, and the appraisal and sale of private property recaptured, in cases foreseen by P.23, 24, 67, 71 and 92 of Regulations on Nav.Pr.), will take place according to these Rules, but only on an order and under approval of the authorities mentioned in said PP.or of the Prize Court, and under the supervision of a deputy, appointed by the Court

or by those authorities as may be appropriate.

10) During the course of all proceedings of appraisal and sale, the persons, mentioned in P.23 of the Regulations on Naval Prizes, may be present and submit their statements and explanations.

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OFFICE OF NAVAL ATTACHE'

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Berlin, September 22, 1914.

No. 241.

From: Naval Attache, Berlin.
To: Director of Naval Intelligence.

SUBJECT : German rules in regard to International Law.

The attached translation of the "Reichs-Gesetzblatt No. 50, dated August 3, 1914, was made by Commander Belknap U. S. Navy.

It has been stated by a high official of the Foreign Office that Germany will shortly protest to the neutral powers who permit the interruption of their commerce from other neutral countries by the enemy. The protest is on the ground that such neutrals are indirectly doing unneutral service against Germany.

This note will be primarily directed against Holland, as the Dutch ships bearing food stuffs to that country from America have been sent in by English or French men-of-war and their cargoes removed and bought in by their captors. The question is also one that will come before the authorities of the United States sooner or later.

In this connection the German rules as laid down in paragraph 23 and 35.

Attention is also invited to the appendix to prize regulations in regard to armed merchant men of the enemy.

/s/ Gherardi.

This document has been modified, altered and added to. See "Prize Rules — German" for list of changes. G.H.D.

REICHS - GESETZBLATT

1914. No. 50. pp.275-300.

Published at Berlin 3 August 1914.
Contents: Prize Ordinance, p. 275-300.

(No.4428) Prize Ordinance of the 30th of September 1909.

I approve the following prize rules, and direct that the sea commanders of My Navy in war shall carry out the laws of prize according to these rules. In so far as departures therefrom may be necessary in special cases in war, recommendations will be laid before me. I empower you (the Imperial Chancellor) to issue the necessary instructions, and to make alterations, so long as they are not of essential consequence.

Rominten, 30. September 1909.
(Sig.) Wilhelm!

For the Imperial Chancellor.
(Sig.) von Tirpitz.

CONTENTS.

Section I. General Instructions.
II. Enemy Ships and their Cargoes.
III. Contraband of War.
IV. Unneutral Service.
V. Blockade.
VI. Procedure in Visiting, Searching and Capture.
VII. Treatment of the Crew and Passengers of Captured Vessels.
VIII. Treatment of Captured vessels and Seized Goods.
IX. Rights and Duties of the Prize Officer.

Promulgated in Berlin, Aug. 3, 1914.

P R I Z E R U L E S.

SECTION I.

General Directions.

1. The Captains of H.M. Ships during a war have the right, in conformity with the following instructions, to visit enemy or neutral merchant vessels, and neutral to search them, and to seize them, as well as the enemy and neutral goods found on board, and in exceptional cases to destroy them.

During an armistice this right of capture is suspended only when expressly agreed.

The legality of the capture of merchant ships ("Bringing in"), of the seizure of goods, and also of the destruction of neutral ships or of goods from their cargoes will be determined later by judgement of a prize court. Prize court proceedings may be instituted also by an interested party if the seizure made is released by the Captain himself (see 97). The prize court will adjudge as to confiscation, or release with or without damages; in case of the destruction or release of the prize by the captain himself, as to damages.

The right of capture does not apply to neutral public vessels. Enemy public vessels come without further formality under the laws of war (see, however, 7.).

Public vessels are the vessels of war as well as those employed in the service of the state and under state control. Vessels which are otherwise the property of the state will be similarly regarded.

The necessary distinctive features of vessels of war are:-

War flag (together with the pennant, as a rule), commander commissioned by the state, whose name appears in the Navy list, and military disciplined crew. See articles 2, 4 and 6 of the VII Convention of the 2nd Hague Conference.

The right of capture does not hold:-

(a) Within neutral waters, I.E. within a sea area three sea miles wide, measured from the low water coast and the islands and indentations appertaining thereto. As appertaining are:- Islands which are not farther than six sea miles distant from one of the mainland coasts of the same state; indentations whose coast is exclusively in the possession of the neutral state and whose opening is six sea miles or less wide.

(b) Within those waters which are by convention closed to operations of war or to ships of war - These are:

( ) The suez Canal, including its entrance harbors and a sea area of three sea miles beyond them (Article 4, Section 1, of the treaty of Constantinople of 29 October 1888).

( ) The Bosporus and the Dardanelles, so far as Turkey is not herself co a belligerent. Treaty of London concerning narrow seas of July 13, 1841; Article 10 of the peace of Paris of 30, March 1865 and Appendix I thereto;

Article 2 of the Treaty of London of 13 March 1871; Article 63 of the Treaty of Berlin of 13 July 1878.

( ) The waters of Corfu and Paxo, so far as no other power than Greece, Great Britain, France, Russia, Austro-Hungary, and Germany are parties to the war (Article 2 of the Treaty of London of 14 November 1863, and Article 2 of the Treaty of London of 24 March 1864).

( ) The mouths of the Danube (Article 52 of the Treaty of Berlin of 13 July 1878).

( ) The mouths of the Congo and Niger and the coastal waters adjacent thereto (General agreement of the Berlin Conference of 26, February 1888, Articles 25 and 33).

The right of capture may also be no further exercised when a merchant vessel during the course of pursuit or while under visit and search reaches the waters referred to in (a) and (b).

A ship seized in violation of the foregoing provisions is to be released immediately, especially at the request of the neutral government.

4. The purpose of visiting and searching of a merchant ship is to determine:-
(a) To what nationality the ship belongs.
(b) Whether there is contraband on board.
(c) Whether it is assisting the enemy by unneutral service.
(d) Whether it has been guilty of a breach of blockade.

The visit and search shall be made only when the captain believes that results will follow. All measures are to be carried out in a form whose observance, even against the enemy, will comport with the dignity of the German Empire, and with a regard for neutrals comformable to the usages of International law and German interest.

5. Neutral ships under convoy of their men-of-war flag are exempt from visit and search. The commander of the Convoy has to give the captain in writing at his request, concerning the character of the ship or her cargo, any information which could be ascertained by searching.

If the captain has reason to believe that the commander of the convoy has been deceived, he will inform him of his reasons for his suspicion. In such case it is the duty of the commander of the convoy alone to have an investigation. He must state the results of the investigation

in a protocol of which a copy is to be given to the officer of the belligerent ship. Should the ascertained facts in the opinion of the commander of the convoy justify the seizure of one or more ships, the protection of the convoy must be withdrawn from them. Should on the other hand the commander of the convoy believe that he may still answer for the innocence of the convoyed ships, the captain may only enter a protest against this decision; he will then report the case to the Admiral Staff, for the settlement through diplomatic channels.

It rests with the commander of the convoy whether or not to permit a representative of the captain to take part in the investigation.

6. Exempt from seizure are:-

(a) Hospital ships, etc., according to convention X of the 2nd Hague Conference.

(b) Vessels engaged exclusively in the coast fisheries, or in the service of local shipping traffic so long as they take no part whatever in hostilities. (Convention XI, 2nd Hague Conference.) #

The coast fisheries are not restricted to the territorial waters of the respective states; the matter includes the entire fishing with the exception of the declared high sea fishery.

(c) Vessels engaged in religious, scientific, and benevolent work (Convention XI, 2nd Hague Conference). &

(d) Vessels whose voyage is made for carrying a flag of truce, or for the exchange of prisoners.

(e) Enemy merchant vessels which at the beginning of hostilities are making passage from a German or allied port to their destination, or to some other port designated for them and are provided with a pass; unless they have departed from their prescribed route without sufficient justification. (Convention VI, Article 1, 2nd Hague Conference).

This exemption is not enjoyed by China, Montenegro and Russia for the ships and vessels concerned of their flags.

& Ditto.

7. The mails found on board neutral or enemy ships at sea from neutrals or belligerents, whether of an official or private nature, are inviolable. In case of the seizure of the ship, they are to be forwarded with the least possible delay by the captor (Convention XI, Articles 1 and 2, 2nd Hague Conference).#

The requirements of the preceding sentence do not apply in case of blockade to mails which are addressed to or from blockadeed ports.

The inviolability of mails does not exempt neutral mail steamers from the laws and usages of war on the sea, nor from capture of ship; but they shall be searched only when urgent, with all possible consideration and despatch.

8. If the capture of ships and goods is not upheld by the prize court, or if they are released before prize court proceedings are instituted, the parties interested have claim for damages, unless there were sufficient grounds for the seizure (See 13 (c) and 14 (c).

The latter is always the case when any person found on board the ship has destroyed or concealed ships papers, or when two sets, false, or falsified ships papers are found on board, so far as the said irregularities have connection with circumstances of weight in deciding between the seizure or release of the ship.

9. The captain is not authorized, in return for a payment of damages, to requisition ships or goods which are not subject to seizure or capture, against the consent of the interested party.

Mail of the following states does not enjoy this privilege, China, Montenegro, and Russia.

S E C T I O N II.

Enemy Ships and their cargoes.

10. Enemy ships, with the exception of those named under 6, are subject to capture. Concerning enemy public vessels, see 2.

11. The character of a ship, whether enemy or neutral, will be determined by the flag which she has a right to carry.

Which flag a ship has the right to carry is proven, under the navigation laws of nearly all seafaring states by some official document* ships-register, nationality-certificate, Lettre de Mer. Acte de Francisation Seeletter, Pass, Patent, License, etc.), which each merchant vessel must have on board.

When the nationality of a ship can hot unquestionably be determined especially if the document necessary to indicate the right to carry the flag of the nation concerned is missing, the ship is to be treated as hostile.

* In the original German the parentheses is as follows,- (Schiffer, Registar, Nationalitäts-Zertifikat, Lettre de Mer, Acte de Francisation, Zeebrief, Pass, Patent, Lisbrief, etc.)

12. As enemy ships are further to be treated than those which after the beginning of the hostilities have been transferred from a hostile to a neutral flag, provided;

(a) either the captain is not convinced that the transfer would have been made had there been no outbreak of war, as for instance, in case of inheritance, or building contract;

(b) or the transfer is effected while the ship was in passage or in a blockaded port;

(c) or a repurchase or return agreement is reserved;

(d) or the conditions are not fulfiled upon which the right to carry the flag depends, according to the legal requirements of the state concerned.

13. When the transfer to a neutral flag has taken place within 30 days before the outbreak of war, the ship is to be treated as hostile;-provided:

(a) Either the legal requirements necessary to the validity of the transfer have not been fulfilled, so that an actually valid transfer to the neutral flag has not taken place.

(b) Or there is good reason to believe that it can be proved before the prize court that the transfer took place to relieve the ship of the consequences of her character as an enemy ship so especially when the ship after the transfer is further employed on the same route as before.

(c) Or the transfer document is not on board, unless sufficient evidence is shown that the transfer would have also taken place without war (see 12 (a); the seizure of the ship is such a case gives rise to no claim (See 8).

14. When the transfer to a neutral flag took place earlier than 30 days before the outbreak of hostilities, the ship is to be treated as hostile only when :

(a) the transfer took place later than 60 days before the outbreak of hostilities, provided further-

(b) the transfer is only conditional or incomplete or not in conformity with the legal requirements of the participant countries, or the result is that the control of the ship or the earnings from her employment remain in the same hands as before; and when besides

(c) grounds exists for the belief that it can be proved before the prize court that the transfer was effected in order to relieve the ship of the consequences of her character as an enemy ship.

This especially, may be taken for granted when the transfer document is not found on board; the bringing in of the ship in such case never gives rise to a claim for damages (See8).

15. When the captain is not in a position to determine to which flag a vessel which has been transferred to a neutral flag formerly belonged he is authorized to assume that she belonged to the enemy flag.

16. A neutral ship is to be treated as an enemy ship further when it:-

(a) engages in a voyage which is permitted only after the outbreak of war, or within two months before;

(b) forcibly resists the measures of the law of prize against such ship force of arms is to be employed until resistance ceases; mere attempt to escape does not constitute forcible resistance (See, however, 83).

17. An enemy ship captured is subject to confiscation.

18. The following portions of her cargo are subject to confiscation:-

(a) The enemy's property.
(b) The merchandise belonging to the captain and the owner, when the ship was captured against resistance

(c) Contraband and the merchandise belonging to its owner, according to Section III.
(d) In case of breach of blockade to confiscable merchandise according to 80.

19. Those portions of the cargo are subject to seizure also, when the captain refrains from beginning in an enemy ship so far as they are not without question proved to be neutral goods.

20. (a) The captain will regard the goods found on board an enemy ship as enemy goods, unless the neutral character of the goods is clearly shown.

(b) The character of the goods found on board an enemy ships as neutral or enemy goods, is determined by the nationality of the owner. If he have no, or as much neutral as hostil nationality, the character of the goods is determined by the comicile of the owner. Goods which belong to a stock corporation will be regarded as enemy's or newutral according as the corporation has its headquarters in a hostile or neutral country.

The proof property portions of the cargo are and whether they are neutral goods will be in general hardly be determinable on board.

(c) The character of goods carried as freight on board an enemy vessel continues as enemy goods until the arrival at destination, regardless of any change of ownership during the voyage after the outbreak of hostilities.

(d) Neutral goods may be transferred to enemy ownership during the voyage.

S E C T I O N III.

CONTRABAND

A. ARTICLES OF CONTRABAND.

21. The following will be regarded as contraband of war, without any official declaration, under the designation of absolute contraband articles and materials:-

1. Arms of every kind, including hunting weapons and all recognized parts belonging to them.

2. Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, as well as their recognized parts belonging to them.

3. Powder and explosives which are especially intended for war use.

4. Gun mounts, ammunition, carriages, limbers, supply wagons, field forges, and their recognized parts.

5. Articles of clothing and equipment distinctly military.

6. Harness of all kinds distinctly military.

7. Mounts, draft and pack animals capable of use in war.

8. Carping equipment and its recognized parts.

9. Armor plate.

10. War ships and other war crafts, as well as such parts as from their special nature can be used only on board a vessel of war.

11. Tools and equipment which have been constructed exclusively for the preparation of war material or for the manufacture and repair of arms and land or sea war material.

2. Absolute contraband will include further those articles and materials wh ch shall be expressly declared as absolute contraband by the German Empire.

3. As contraband of war, without necessity for being so declared will be regarded the following which are capable of use for war as well as for peace purposes, under the designation of articles and materials conditionally contraband.

1. Food.
2. Forage and grain suitable for animals feed.
3. Articles of clothing, cloth, and footwear suitable for military puposes.
4. Gold and silver minted or in bars, and paper money as well.
5. Vehicles of any kind suitable for use in war and their parts.
6. Ships, boats, and vessels of any kind, floating docks and equipment for dry docks and their parts.
7. Fixed or rolling railways material, telegraph, radio and telephone material.
8. Airships and flying machines, their recognized constituent parts, as wellas accessories, aticles and material which can be recognized as of use for aeronautic and aviation purposes.
9. Fuel and lubricants.
10. Powder and explosives which are not expressly intended for war purposes.
11. Barbed wire and tools for fixing it in place and cutting it.
12. Horseshoes and farriers equipment.
13. Harness and saddles.
14. Binoculars, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments.

As "food" shall be considered all material, solid and liquid, serving as food for human beings, the expression "paper money" includes banknotes, but not bills of exchange, nor checks; boilers and machinery come under No. 6 of the list; all "fixed railway material" includes among other things, rails, ties, turntables, bridge-parts.

24. Conditional contraband also are those articles expressly so declared by the German Empire.

25. The declarations referred to in 22 and 24 will be communicated to allied and neutral governemnts and to the captains of H.M. Ships.

26. Articles and materials which cannot be employed for war purposes connot be declared contraband of war.

27. The following articles cannot be declares contraband of war:-
1. Raw cotton, raw wool, raw silk, raw jute, raw flax, raw hemp, and other raw materials of textile industries, and also the yarn spun from them?
2. Oil bearing nuts and seed; copra.
3. Caoutchuc, resin, rubber and gum, hops.
4. Raw hides, horns, bones, and ivory.
5. Natural and manufactured fertilizers, including nitrate and phosphate suitable for agricultual purposes.
6. Ores.
7. Soil, clay, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, brick, slate, and roofing tiles.
8. Porcelain and glassware.
9. Paper and material prepared for its manufacture.

10. Soap, dye-stuff, including material exclusively intended for its manufacture, and varnish.
11. Chloride of lime, soda, caustic soda, sulphuric acid, sodic sulphate in cakes, ammonia, ammonia-sulphate and copper-sulphate.
12. Machinery for agriculture, mining, textile industries, and book printing.
13. Precious stones, semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl and corals.
14. Tower and wall clocks, clocks and watches, other than chronometers.
15. Fancy goods and jewellery.
16. Feathers of all kinds, hair and bristles.
17. Articles of household furnishings and decoration, office furniture and equipment.

8. Further as not to be regarded contraband of war are the fol owing:-

1. Articles and materials which serve exculsively for the care of the sick and wounded; provided, however, that in case of urgent military necessity, they may be requisitioned for use upon payment therefore, if they have the destination set forth under 29.

2. Articles and materials which are intended for the use of the ship on board which they are found, or of the use of the crew or passengers of the ship during the voyage.

B. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TREATMENT OF CONTRABAND.

9. Articles of absolute contraband are subject to seizure when it is evident that they are destined for the hostile country or for a country occupied by the hostile forces. It makes no difference whether the delivery of these goods be accomplished directly, or by trans-shipment or forwarding by land/

0. The captain must regard the hostile destination as indicated without further proof:
(a) when the merchandise is destined to be unloaded in a hostile force, or for delivery in a hostile port.
(b) when the ship will touch only at enemy ports, or fall in with enemy forces before she will reach neutral port to which the merchandise is consigned.

1. If the ship has articles of absolute contraband on board, the data in the ships papers concerning her further voyage are to be accorded full credence, unless the ship has plainly deviated from the route designated in her sips papers, without being able to justify it, or facts appear which establish beyond doubt that the sian data in the papers is fals. (See 37, sentence 1,).

2. Articles of conditional contraband are subject to seizure as far as the conditions of No.35 are fulfilled, when it is clear that they are destined for the use of the forces or the supply depots of the enemy state, unlee in the latter case, according to the evidance of circumstances, these articles cannot actually bu used for the war in progress. Gold and silver, in coin or in bullion, as well as paper money, in consequence always to be regarded as capable of use in the war.

Administrative authorities which are not directly subject to the central government (as for example city and local governments), are not to be considered as administrative authorities of the state.

3. The captain must, in the absence of circumstance to the contrary, regard the hostile destination as evident.:-
(a) When the consignment is addressed to an enemy authority, or
(b) to a dealer situated in the enemy country of of whom it is known that he is a supplier to the forces or to the administrative authorities of the enemy state of articles of questionable character or source, or
(c) whenconsignment is addressed to a fortified place of the enemy, or,

(d) to another place which serves the enemy forces as a base of operations or supplies.

Merchant vessels themselves are, however, not on that account to be regarded as destined for the enemy forces, etc., because they are proceeding to one of the places referred to under (c) and (d); on the contrary there must be still other circumstances in order to justify the assumption of a hostile destination, according to 32.

34. When under the conditions of 33 there is apparently no clear case, the captain will assume a hostile destination in the sense of No. 32 only when there is a well grounded prospect to prove its existence.

35. Articles of conditional contraband are subject to seizure only on board a ship which is on the way to the enemy country or a place held by the enemy or to to enemy forces and when these articles are not to be discharged in an intermediate neutral port, i.e. a port at whcich the ship must call before reaching any final destination.

36. When a ship has conditional contraband on board, the data in the ships papers concerning her further movements and the ports of discharge of her merchandise are to be are to be accepted without reserve, unless it is clear that the ship has deviated from the course laid down in the ships papers, without sufficient justification, or facts are evident which establish beyond doubt that the data mentioned of the papers are false.

37. When the ships papers contain no data concerning the further movements of the ship, or leave it optional with her to touch at a hostile port, the captain may assume that she is on her way to a hostile port.

When the ships papers contain no data concerning the ports of discharge of articles of conditional contraband or leave it optional with the ship to discharge these articles in an enemy port, the captain may assume - so far as the ship may or will touch at a hostile port, the articles in question are to be dischargedin that port.

8. If the hostile territory has no area coast, the provisions of nO. 35 do not apply, and it is necessary in such case for the conditions of 32 to be fulfilled, to justify the seizure of articles of conditional contraband.

C. TREATMENT OF THE SHIPS AND OF THE CONTRABAND.

39. When a ship carries articles which are subject to seizure as absolute or conditional contraband, she is liable to capture on the high seas or in the water of the belligerents throughout the entire duration of her voyage even when she has the intention to call at an intermediate port before reaching the hostile destination.

40. Seizure cannot be made on the ground of a previous carrying of contraband w ich has al eady been fully completed.

41. Ships which are themselves contraband are subject to confiscation. A ship brought in because of carrying contraband is subject to capture when the contraband, in value, weight, volume, or freight charges, constitutes more than half the cargo.

42. In the cargo, subject to confiscation are:-
(a) Articles which may be seized as absolute or relative contraband.
(b) Merchandise belonging to their owner.

The rest of the cargo of a neutral ships, inclusive of any goods, is not confiscable.

3. The seizure of the articles indicted in 42, (a) and (b) must be incident to the regular bringing in of the ship. For exceptions, see 46 and 47.

4. When a ship upon being visited has no knowledge of the outbreak of hostilities or of the contraband declaration applicable to her cargo, the contraband may be seized by bringing in the ship, but is subject to confiscation only with reimbursement for damages, while the ship and the other cargo are exempt from confiscation. #

The same holds when the master had acquired the information in question, but had not been able to discharge the cantraband in a port; it is not to be accepted as an objection that he would have had to deviate from his course to do so.

When an enemy ship upon beingunder these circumstances is brought in the contraband goods on board are subject to confiscation so far as they are enemy good, without damages.

In judging whether the knowledge in question existed, it is to be taken into consideration

(a) that the state of war is made known immediately in German, allied, and enemy ports, as far as they have telegraphic connections;

(b) that the beginning of hostilities is made known immediately to neutral governments by telegraph and is by them immediately in the same way commuicated to their port authorities.

(c) that the declaration as to contraband is published in the German Empire upon the outbreak of hostilities and is communicated to allied and neutral governments by telegraph, who will communicate it to their port authorities etc., without delay;

(d) that the contraband declaration will not become known in enemy ports at least for the present.

The captain can abstain from the seizure of a ship carrying contraband which is not herself liable to confiscation under 41, when the master is ready to deliver over the contraband to him.

The delivery of the contraband is to be entered in the log book of the ship visited; the Master of the ship must deliver to the captain for the prize court proceedings an attested copy of all relevant papers.

The captain is authorized to destroy the contraband so delivered to him.

Concerning the law for the seizure of the parts of the cargo mentioned under 42 without bringing in the ship, see 121.

In case of No. 44 this law does not apply to the merchandise belonging to the owner of the contraband.

S E C T I O N IV.

U N N E U T R A L S E R V I C E.

A. MINOR CASES.

48. A neutral ship renders the enemy unneutral service when she:-

(a) carries out the voyage, departing from her usual employment expressly for the purpose of conveying persons enrolled in the hostile forces, or for carrying information in the interest of the enemy;

(b) with the knowledge of the owner, character, or master has on board a complete subdivision of enemy troops, or one or more persons who will assist the enemy's operation during the voyage.

The captain is among other things empowered to assume this when a ship equipped with radio-telegraphic apparatus is claerly found to be engaged in the transmission of war information within the area of operations and does not comply with and express prohibition.

49. Reservists, recruits, and war volunteers proceeding to their places of mustering in are not to be regarded as "persons enrolled in the hostile forces".

50. By "transmission of information" is meant any communicating or information, whether written or oral, or by signal or radio-telegraphy.

51. m So long as the circumstances anmed in 48 exist, the ship is liable to capture and confiscation.
Of the cargo, only the merchandise belonging to the owner of the ship is confiscable. Concerning the law for seizure without bringing in the ship, see 121.

52. The provisions of No. 51 do not apply if the ship when visited had no means of the outbreak of the war, or when the master after acquiring such knowledge has not been able to disembark the persons carried.
Concerning the question whether such knowledge exists, see 45, (a) and (b).

53. Every person enrolled in the forces of the enemy who are found on board a merchant ship may be made a prisoner of war, even when the ship herself is not liable to capture.

54. Persons who without being enrolled in the enemy forces assist the operations of the enemy directly during the voyage (48 b) may be taken prisoner only upon simultaneously bringing in the ship.

B. SERIOUS CASES.

55. A neutral ship further renders unneutral service to the enemy

(a) when it directly takes part in the hostilities, against such a ship, force of arms is to be used, until its unneutral procedure ceases:

(b) when it is under the order or control of an agent of the enemy government installed on board the ship;

(c) when it has been charactered by the enemy governmentl

(d) when it is actually and expressly designated for the transport of enemy troops or transmission of information in the enemy's interest.

This applies, in contrast to 48, not to one particular voyage, but on the contrary to a contunued employment of the ship for the particular purpose. So long as such employment exclusively continues, unneutral service is rendered, even while the ship lying idle, neither carries troops, nor transmits information.

56. So long as circumstances named in 55 continue, the ship is to be treated as hostile (See 17 to 20.)

The merchandise in the cargo belonging to the owner of the ship is also confiscable. Concerning the right to seize the confiscable part of the cargo without bringing in the ship. (See 19).

S E C T I O N V.

BLOCKADE.

57. Upon declaring a blockade, the naval commander must report as soonas practicable to his superior and besides directly to the Chief of the Admiral Staff. He must take all possible steps to make the fact of blockade known generall as quickly a possible.

8. The blockade must be limited to the coasts and harbors of the enemy or in his possession; the blockading force must not bar the passengers to neutral ports and coasts.

9. To be legally binding, the blockade must be effective impartially administered, and declaremand made known in the manner prescribed.

0. The blockade is effective when it is maintained by a force which is sufficient acutally to prevent access to the hostile coast.

The question whether a blockade according to the number and station of the blockading force with reference to the geographical situation before it, is actually effective, is subject in every single case to test by the prize court. It will be denied when, among other things, the sea traffic of a blockaded port with any other blockaded port can be maintained. (See 71).

. The blockade is impartially administered when it is maintained equally against the merchant shipping of all flags.

. The naval commander of the blockading force may permit neutral ships of war to visit a blockaded port and later to leave it. Permission granted to one ship of war, however, does not furnish any ground for another ship of war to claim a like permission.

. A neutral ship in distress has the right, after communicating with a commander of the blockading force to enter a blockaded harbor, and later to leave it, upon condition, that cargo shall neither be discharged nor taken on there. The blockading force can instead, however, itslef extend the assitance of which the ship is in need.

. The declaration and publication of the blockade are made according to 65 to 71 , and 74 and 75.

. The blockade declaration is issued either by the government of the blockading power or by the neutral commander.

It must contain:-
(a) The day of beginning of the blockade.
(b) The exact geographical limits of the blockaded coast.
(c) The period of time which will be allowed the neutral ships, and when must be the least sufficient, for them to leave port.

56. When the blockade was begun later, or has less wide extent than is stated in the blockade declaration, the declaration is void and therewith the whole blockade legally not binding. In such case the issue of a new declaration is necessary, in order to make the blockade legally effective at least for the future.

If the blockade began earlier or extended wider than stated in the blockade declaration, the blockade is legally binding only from the time and coastal extent which were indicated in the blockade declaration.

If the declaration omits to state the period for leaving port, a neutral ship has the right of free of passage outward from a blockaded port, a neutral ship has the right of free, unless she has previously, with knowledge of the blockade, broken it by entering. The Naval Commander can supply any data lacking at any time by publishing and communicating a suplementary declaration to the local competent authorities.

57. The blockade declaration is to be made known:-
(a) To neutral powers by the government of the blockading powers through diplomatic channels. The Neutral powers have to provide for making the blockade known within their borders, especially in their ports;
(b) To the local competent authorities through the commander of the blockading forces. These must on their parts as soon as possible communicate the declaration to the foreign conculs of the blockaded ports or coasts for the information of the citizens of the neutral countries and the ships there.

The communications can be made in any way, so far as it is made certain it reaches the hands of the local competent authorities. It is sufficient in any case to inform the port authorities.

58. If on account of the omission of the commander of the blockading force the information has not been given to the port authorities, a neutral ship has the right of free passage out of a blockaded port, unless it has, with previous knowledge of the blockade, broken it by entering.

The naval commander may make up for the notification in question at any time.

59. To make the blockade legally binding according to 59, the notification under 67, (a), suffices for ingoing ships; as long as this has not been done, the blockade declaration must be especially communicated to each ingoing ship, according to 74. For outgoing ships, the notification of 67 (b) is sufficient.

0. Should a blockade be extended beyond its original limits, a new declaration must be issued and made known, covering the area over which the blockade has extended.
When a blockade, after being raised, is again established, a new declaration and notification is necessary.

1. If a blockade is voluntarily raised, or narrowed in its extent, this is to be made known as provided in 67.
A blockade is not raised when the blockading force is temporarily withdrawn on account of heavy weather.

2. A ship can be seized for breach of blockade only when it had knowledge of the blockade, or such knowledge on its prt can be assumed.

3. In judging whether the knowledge existed or not, are to be considered:-
(a) The progress and reach of the notification (see 67);
(b) That the blockade declaration in German and allied ports will be published as soona as possible.
(c) That the existence of the blockade will not be known immediately in the enemy ports.

4. Should a neutral ship # apprach a blockaded port without having knowledge of the existence of the blockade or when such knowledge can not be assumed, the declaration of blockade is to be communicated to him by an officer of one of the blockading ship. He must enter in the ships logbook the notification, under the date and hour and the ships position. Therewith the blockade is legally binding for that ship, so far as the declaration and natifiaction come into position.
The notification to the commander of the convoy is binding on all the convoyed ships.

5. If the enemy has made it impossible for the commander of the blockading force to communicate the declaration to the competent local authorities, every neutral ship leaving a blockaded port is entitled to the speciall notification provided for under 74.
If such is once given and the ship returns to the blovk-aded port, then all other vessels leaving this port will assumed to have knowledge of the blockade.

6. A breach of blockade is to be assumed as existing when a ship breaks through the blockaded zone, or attempts to break through with intent to reach or leave a blokkaded port.

If a hostile ship is captured under these circumstances, there is nor breach of blockade; the neutral part of the cargo is therefore not cinfiscable.

By blockade zone is to be understood the dajacent sea area which is controlled by the vessels of war which are charged with maintaining effectiveness of the blockade.

The width of the blockade zonem and its position as well, degends upon the military and geographical conditions, as also upon the number of the disposable ships; but it may not, according to 58, be so situated that a neutral port or a coast is accessible only by breaking through the blockade zone.

A ship amy be captured for breach of blockade not before it has reached the blockade zone in or outgoing.

A ship that has committed a breach of blockade is liable to capture so long as it is pursured by one of the ships of the blockading force. Capture is, however, no longer permissible when the blockade is raised or the pursuit given up. The latter is not of itself the case, when the ship has reached a neutral port.

It is not a violation of blockade by entry when the ship is acutally on the way to an open port, even when the ship intends to proceed thence to a blockaded port on her cargo will be forwarded to such a port.

m A ship that has just made itself liable for violation of blockade is subject, in addition to capture, to condmenation. Her cargo is also confiscable unless it is proved that the shipper at the time of shipping the merchandise neither knew nor could have known of the intention to violate the blockade.

In case of doubt, the captain will regard the whole cargo as confiscablea.

Concerning the law of seizing the confiscable parts of the cargo apart from the bringing in of the ship (see 1212.

S E C T I O N VI.

Procedure in Visiting, Searching and Capture.

The captain must as much as possible avoid diverting a ship under a neutral flag from her course during the visit and search; he shall especially endeavor to cause the ship the least possible inconveniences, especially will he in no circumstances require the master to come on board the man-of-war, or that a boat, men of the crew, the ships papers, etc., be sent on board.

If the captain intends to visit a ship, he will cause her to stop by means of signals and howling of the sireen. Ensign or pennant are to be displayed not later than the time of this signal. by night the first is to be illuminated. During the pursuit the display of the war ensign is not necessary, the flying of any merchant flag desired is permissible.

If the ship does not stop upon signal, two successive blank charges are to be fired, and of necessary a shotted charge over the ship.
If the ship then does not stop, or makes resistance, the captain will compel her to stop.

When the ship has stopped the captain will send on board an officer, accompanied by a second officer and not more than three men as witnesses and for assitance, in an unarmed boat, amnned with usual crew and carrying the flag. The officers of the boarding party will carry side arms, the men no arms. The remainder of the boats crew will have their small arms in the boat.

If the weather makes boating impossible, the captain will prescribe a given course to the ship, in case he has serious suspicion of her, and will follow himself, until it is possible to carry out the visit.

Usually in this the officer goes directly on board, accompanied only by the officer sent with him, and ask politely, but definitely, for the ships papers to be produced; if the master declines, he orders their production. A further refusal justifies the capture of the ship!

The officer submits the papers to a thorough examination proving the idenity of the ship, as far as it is possible without making an exact examination, with the data in the papers Name on the bow, funnel marks, house flag, name on boats and bouys, etc., and her nationality, age, home and departure ports, destination of the ship, kind and destination of the cargo, etc.,

If the officer upon examining the papers forms the opinion that the ship is not liable to seizure, he releases her, with the approval of the captain, and after making an entry in the ship's log book and certificate of nationality (Visiting ship, time, place of visit, reason for release, name and rank of the captain and of the boarding officer). Before releasing the ship, he makesrequest of the master for a written declaration whether and what objections he has to the carrying out of these measures.

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If the officer forms the opinion upon examining the ship's papers that the ship is suspicious, he will proceed to seach. This consists of the carfully fizingthe agreement of the ship with the data in herpapers (alterations in exterior features, distinguishing marks, draft marks, name-boards, are to be noted.) and testing of the correctness of the data in the papers concerning the relation of the ship and cargo. The search will be made by questioning the Master, crew (if change of flag is suspected, compare the signatures of the crew with those in the muster roll, provided the law concerning the flag determines the national composition of the crew). and passengers, with whom, however, no vompulsion by threst is to be used; and by examining the ship and cargo. This will be done with the assistance of the boat's crew, which will be increased if necessary and - if he does not refuse - with the attendance of the master, who will cause the locks and packings to be opened, or suggest the most appropriate way of opening. Any injury is to be avoided as far as possible.

If the master has any objections to make, the officer will make his comment upon these in a brief report. The captain will forward this declaration, with his own endorsement, immediately to the Chief of the Admiral Staff.

If the making of the search is proved to be necessary but at the time is not practicable to carry out, the ship will be searched later at a suitable place. If this causes serious disadvantages to the ship to be searched, the captain will proceed to the provincial capture. (see 97.)

If the officer is convinced by the search that the ship is not liable to capture, he will proceed carefully to restore the previous condition of the ship and the cargo, according to 88 and 89. Claims of the master for damages are if possible to be regulated before the ship is released.

If the search shows that only a part of the cargo is confiscable, the captain will decide whether he will capture the ship or only seize the questionable part of the cargo, according to 1212 or release the ship without further proceedings. A renunciation of the seizure in return for a payment is not permissible. (see also 46).

4. If the search, after the hearing of the master, shows such circumstances that the captain believes that the condemnation of the ship may be expected he will as a rule capture the ship. (see 119).

5. The capture will be effected by communicating a protocol to the master, taking possession of the ship with a prize crew, and hoisting the war flag. If taking possession of the ship and therewith the hoisting of the war flag is not permissible, the ship will be directed to haul down her flag and regulate her speed and course according to the orders of the captain.

6. The captain will report concerning the capture as soon as possible directly to the Chief of Admiral taff. The report must contain the name of the master of the ship, the flag carried at the time of visiting, time, place and reason for capture. The prize officer will receive a copy of the report when the ship is brought in.

7. If proof appears, after the capture of the ship has been made, that it was wrongly captured, she is to be released without delay, according to 92. The report mentioned in 96 in this case also, with the data concerning the reasons for release, is to be rendered ans by the Chief of Admiral Staff transmitted to the prize Court having jurisdiction.

. If a ship that has been captured by the enemy has been retaken, before confiscation or employment in hostile undertakings by him, she is to be released if no ground exists from the German standpoint for her capture. Report of the release is to be made directly to the Chief of Admiral Staff.

S E C T I O N VII.

TREATMENT OF CREW AND PASSENGERS OF CAPTURED SHIPS.

99. If a ship is captured under 16,b, (resistance) or 55,a, (taking part in hostilities), those persons who without being enrolled in the enemy forces have taken part in the hostilities or have exerted forcible resistance, may be dealt with according to the customs of war. The other persons of the crew will be made prisoners of war. Concerning the crews of armed merchant ship, see appendix.

00. If a ship is captured under 10 to 16, a, as an enemy ship, or under 55, b, c, d, because of unneutral service, the master, officers and members of the crew as far as they are of the enemy's nationality, - will not be made prisoners of war, if they bind themselves on the strength of a formal written promise to engage in no service, during the period of the war, that they may have any connection with the hostile undertakings of the enemy.

So far as the crew belong to a neutral state, they are to be released unconditionally.

If the master and officers have neutral nationality, they are to be released if they give a formal written agreement to take service in no enemy ship during the period of the war.

01. If a neutral ship is captured according to 39, for cantraband, or under 77, 78, for breach of blockade, or under 51, for unneutral service, the entire crew - including the master and officers - will be released unconditionally.

02. The release will be accomplished by discharge from on board when the prize is delivered. The necessary witnesses are however to be held. The names of the conditionally released enemy and neutral persons are to be reported direct to the Chief of Admiral Staff, f r communication to the hostile power.

03. Passengers on board captured ships are to be left free from restraint and with the exception of necessary witnesses are to be released as soon as practicable.

04. a) The treatment of prisoners of war will be governed by article 4 to 20 of the supplement to Convention IV, 2nd Hague Conference, as far as the conditions of war on the Sea permit.

05. b) Master and crew of captured ships - as far as they have not been made prisoners of war - have nevertheless to continue the performance of their previous duties until their release. The use of force, if in any way possible, is to be avoided. In other respects they remain in full enjoyment of their rights as far as the circumstances of the war do not require otherwise.

c) The passengers of captured ships shall be restricted in their rights only in serious cases, for instance, on account of rendering unneutral service. (see 54).

5. When circumstances require it, persons found on board captured ships may be removed to another ship, - even on board the war ship. Their retention on board the war ship may not be extended longer than absolutely necessary.

S E C T I O N VIII.

TREATMENT OS CAPTURED VESSELS AND SEIZED GOODS.

6. The captain must immediately upon the capture of a ship or the seizure of goods take the measure which are necessary for their security and for the prize court proceedings.

7. If circumstances require a quick separation of the man-of-war from the captured ship, the officer commanding the prize crew (prize officer) is to be entrusted with these measure.

8. The captain must immediately take possession of the ship's papers, that is all papers which are found on board and may serve as evidence before the prize court.

The papers will be arranged in the same condition in which they were found and signed by the captain and the master: papers and list will be sealed with the seal of the man-of-war and of the master and, together with a statement of the condition of the shi and cargo and a copy of the report required by 96, will be given to the prize officer for safe kseping and delivered later to the prize officer.

If the master refuses his signature or seal, this is to be noted at the end of the list.

If the papers are found later, of if any have been destroyed or thrown overboard in the presence of witnesses, statements in the matter are to be drawn up with the witnesses, and submitted to the prize officer.

9. Concerning the money and valuables found on board, a list, confirmed in writing, according to 108, of which the master will retain a copy, will be drawn up and later delivered to the prize office.

The captain is to see that proper steps are taken that no one may appropriate to his own use anything from the cargo, the ship's equipage, stores, and cargo. The ship, equipage, stores and cargo, as well as the personal and material auxiliary mean, are to be handled and managed with the greates of care.

0. H.M. ships and allied men-of-war and captured prizes may in case of necessity, fill their needs from the cargo, equipage, and supplies of captured hostile ships, giving receipts therefor, so far as the articles are concerned proved unquestionable to be neutral goods.

In regard to neutral shipsm this is only permissible when either the Master can be persuaded to give order what is necessary as a purchase or in accordance with No. 46 or the matter concerns articles which are liable to confiscation and, under 117 or 121, would be taken on board in case of the destruction or release of the neutral ship. Violations would give rise to legal claims on the part of the neutral powers concerned.

The captain will provide for taking the ship the quickest and safest way into a German port or one of an allied power.

A prize may be taken into a neutral port only when the neutral power permits the bringing in of the prizes. Aprize may run into a neutral port always on account of unseaworthiness, heavy weather, or shortage of fuel or stores. In these latter cases she must leave the port again as soon as the cause which entering no longer exists.

The captain gives the prize officer appropriate sailing orders in writing, and so makes up the prize crew that it is possible for the prize to take the ship in.

The captain is authorized to employ a ship which has just been captured as hostile under 10 and 16, as an auziliary vessel, or, if its sending in seems not to the purpose or unsafe, to destroy it. The same holds for a ship captured under 56, if it is cartain that an unneutral service of serious nature can be proved before the prize court.

The conversation into a man-ofewar is connected with the requirements of Convention VII 2nd Hague Conference.

The captain is authorized to destroy a neutral ship which has been captured because of contraband under 39 or under 77, 78 because of breach of blockade, or under 51 because of unneutral service, only when:-

a) when it is subject to confiscation (see 41, 21, or 80 and besides
b) taking it in would cause dnager to the man-of-war or risk the success of the undertaking in which she is engaged. This is to be assumed among other things, when/
) the ship cannot be brought in on account of her bad condition or because of shortage of stores, etc.
) The ship can not follow the man-of-war and there fore recapture is probable, or
) The proximity of an enemy force makes the recpature of the ship probable, or
) the man-of-war cannot spare sufficient crew.

14. Before the captain decides to destroy the ship he will consider whether the injury thereby done to the enemy will outweigh the damages that will be paid for the simultaneous destruction of the no-confiscable part of the cargo. (see 18, 42, 56, and 80).

15. If aneutral ship should be destroyed when, according to the decision of the prize court, the special circumstances named under 113, b, did not exist, the owners of the ship and cargo - whether these be confiscable or not - have a claim for damages. If the circumstances in question did exist, but the destroyed ship or neutral goods be shown not confiscable the respective owners have also a claim for damages.

16. Before the destruction, all persons on board, if possible with their goods and chattels, to be placed in safety, and all the ship papers and other articles of evidence which in the opinion of the interested parties are of value for the judgement of the prize court are to be taken over by the captain.

17. If circumstances permit the salvage of parts or equipment their choice is to be determined first by the requirements of the man-of-war; second, with the regard to the damages to be paid.

18. In sinking ships care is to be taken if possible to make no destruction for neutral shipping.

19. If the captain believes that a captured ship neither can be brought in nor sunk, he must release it. uner 92.

20. If the captain release a captured enemy ship (see 112), or desists from bringing herin, the parts of the cargo in such case, under 19 and 56, to be seized may be destroyed.

21. If the captain releases a captured enemy ship (see 113), or desists from bringing her in, he may only seize and, as the case may bem destroy, the confiscable part of the cargo when the taking the ship in would probably imperil the man-of-war or endanger the success of the undertaking in which engaged.

The transferred or destroyed articles are to be noted in the log book of the visited ship; the captain will procure a copy attested by the Master, of all papers appropriate to the purpose. As soon as the transfer or destruction has been accomplished and formalities are completed, the Master will be allowed to proceed on his voyage.

If the foregoing right be exercised when, in the judjement of the prize court the special circumstances in question did not exist, the owners of the goods always have a claim for damages The same holds when the seized goods are shown to be non-confiscable.

In every case of seizure of goods without bringing in theship the provisions of 96,108 and 109 apply, without mentioning that in case of 46 and 121 the prize office receives only copies of papers The goods are, under 131, to be desired at the earliest opportunit

23. In every case of destruction of ship or goods, there are to be sent to the Chief of Admiral Staff as soon and as safely as possible, for transmission to the prize court jurisdiction?)

a) the papers and other articles of evidence,

b) a statement of the destruction, the reasons therefor, and all attendant circumstances.

The Chief of Admiral Staff is besides to be informed as soon as possible of the destruction of a neutral ship, by a brief telegraphic report direct to the principal data.

S E C T I O N IX.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PRIZE OFFICER.

24. The prize officer commands the captured ship and with regard to her, has the rights and duties of the Captain of the man-of-war captor. He will take care, before all else, for taking the ship in safe and for the observance of requirements of Sections VII and VIII.

25. He provides for continuing the ship's log book, and will himself keep a journal from the time of coming on board, inwhich all events concerning the voyage, the ship, the cargo, and the personnel are to be entered.

26. He must apprehend and prevent any attempt of the ship's crew to regain possession of her, unnecessary use of force is to be avoided.

27. He may take goods from the cargo, in the Master's presence and against a receipt, which the execution of his orders may require.

28. If necessary, the prize officer may transcript persons and, as far as he is empowered under 110, parts of the argo to another vessel; the reasons he must enter in the log book. A transshipment is always warranted when it is done in the interest of the safety of persons or preservation of thecargo.

29. If it is not possible to take the ship into the port ordered, he will seek another into which the prize may be taken (see 111,) If this also is not possible, he will proceed to destroy the ship, under the provisions of No. 112 to 118, as soon as the safe salving of the persons, papers, and articles of evidence on board the ship has been accomplished. The requirements of 123 are to be observed.

30. Directly after arrival in a port, the prize officer will telegraph for further instructions to the Chief of Admiral Staff.

31. If the port reached is German or belongs to an allied or neutral power which allows generally the bringing if of prizes the prize officer will deliver the prize there. The delivery in a German Port will be made to the competent port authorities, otherwise to the consular general representative of the Herman Empire or of an allied power with simultaneous delivery of the papers, reports, and other means of evidence, for further transmission to the prize office. At the same time the persons who under 102 are to be let go free are to be released, so far as they ar e not to be retained as witnesses.

APPENDIX TO PRIZE REGULATIONS.

The Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy.

Berlin, 22 June 1914.

A.1512. II.

Order for the Naval Commander and captains concerning their procedure upon meeting armed merchant ships in war.

1. The exercise of the rights of visit, search, and seizure, as well as every attack, on the part of an armed merchant ship against a German or unneutral merchant ship constitutes piracy. The crew is to be proceeded against according to the regulations for procedure extraordinary under the laws of war.

2. If an armed merchant ship of the enemy makes armed resistance to measures of the right of prize, such resistance is to be broken with all means. The responsibility for any damages which the ship, cargo and passengers may thereby suffer rests with the enemy government. The crew are to be treated as prisoners of war. The passengers are to be released except when they have demonstrably taken part in the resistance. In the latter case, the procedure extraordinary in the laws of war is to be employed against them.

(By) Supreme Command.

/s/ V. Pohl.

T R A N S L A T I O N .

O R D E R .

regarding Changes in the Prixe Rules of September 30th 1909 (Reichs Gesetxblatt 1914, page 275,441, 481, and 509).

Of April 18, 1915.

[As published in DEUTSCHER REICHSANZEIGER UND STAATSANZEIGER, No. 92; Berlin, Wednesday 21 April, evening, 1915.]

In retaliation of the rules by England and her allies which deviate from the London Declaration concerning International Law at Sea of the 26th of September 1909, I approve for the present war the following changes in the prize rules of the 30th of September 1909 with the amendments of October 18th, November 23rd and December 14, 1914.

The Sections 21, 23, 27, 33, 35, 40, as well as the supplement to 23 will be placed by the following rules.

21. As absolute contraband of war the following objects and materials are to be considered:-

1. Arms of all kinds inclusive arms of sporting purposes and recognizable parts of same.

2. Projectiles, cartridges, of any kind, and their recognizable parts and ingredients.

3. Powder and explosives of any kind.

4. Gun barrels, gun cartridges, limbers, ammunition wagons, field kitchens, field bakery wagons, provision and ration wagons, field smithies, search-lights, search light implements, and recognizable parts of these articles.

5. Range finders and recognizable parts of same.

6. Binoculars, telescopes, chronometers, and nautical instruments of any kind.

7. Military uniforms and military equipments recognized as such.

8. Riding, draught and pack animals which can be used in war.

9. Military harness and saddlery articles recognized as such.

10. Camping utensils and parts of them recognized as such.

11. Armor plates.

m12. Lead (in pig form), plates or lead pipes.

13. Barbed wire and tools required for its erection and cutting.

14. Tin plaste.

15. War ships and other war craft and such essential parts of them which according to their special character can only be used on war cfart; ships tin material and shipbuilding.

16. Submarine sounding signal apparatus.

17. Aeroplanes and aircraft of any kind, their recognizable compenent parts and accessories recognized as such, objects and material which can be recognized as intendted to be used for aerial Navigation.

18. Tools and implements used in the manufacturing and repairing of arms and war mateiral

19. Turners lathes. Of any kind.

m20. Wood for underground work.

21. Coal and coke.

22. Flax.

23. As relative contraband of war the following articles and material which can be used for warlike as well as peaceful purposes, are to be considered.

1. Provisions.

2. Forage and fodder of any kind.

3? Articles of clothing which can be use for military purposes, clothing and shoes.

4. Animal wool, raw or worked up, as well as w woolen carded yarn.

5. Gold and silver coinded and in buillion, as well as paper money.

6. Vehicles of any kind which can be used for war purposes, especially all motor vehicles.

7. Rubber tires for motos vehicles, as well as all articles and material used in the manufacture and repair of same.

8. Caotchouc and gutta-percha and articles prepared for same.

9. Fixed or rolling railroad material, telegraph, radio and telephone material.

10. Fuel material, except c al and coke; lubricating material.

11. Sulphur, sulphuric acid, nitric acid.

12. Horse shoes and utensils for making them.

13. The followinh ores:- Wolframite and Sheeite, molybdane, nickel, chrome, hematite iron, mangaesand lead ores.

14. The follwoing metals: wolfram, molybdenum, vanadium, nickel, selen, cobalt, hematite, raw iron, manganese, alumi um, copper.

15. Antimony and its sulphuric combinations and oxides.

16. Iron Alloys (ferric combination) inclusive wolframite - molybdenium - manganese - vanadium - and chrome iro .

17. Harness and saddle equipments.

18. Leather, prepared and unprepared, as far as it can be used for saddlery, harness, military shoes and other military uniforms.

19. Tanning material of al kinds, inclusive of the extracts used in the process of tanning.

20. Woods of all kinds, raw and worked up, excepting wood for underground working; carcoal tar.

21. Ships, boats, and water craft of a l kinds, floating docks and constructions for dry docks, as well, as the parts of them/

27. The following articles cannot be declared as contraband of war:-

1. Raw cotton, raw silk, raw jute, raw hemp.

2. Rosin, varnishm hop.

3. Raw hides, horns, bones and ivory.

4. Natural and artificial fertilizers.

5. Earth, clay, burnt lime, chalk, stones inclusive marble, brick, clate and tiles, for roofing.

6. Porcelain and glass.

7. Paper and material for the manufacture of the same.

8. Soap, paints inclusive the materials for the preparation of the same ans varnish.

9. Chlorids of lime, soda, caustic, soda, sulphides of sodium in cakes, ammonia sulphate of copper.

10. Machines for agricultural and mining pruposes, for the textile industries and machines for printing purposes.

11. Precious stones, half precious, stones, pearls, mother of pearl and corals.

12. Clocks and pcket watches, except chronometers

13. Fancy goods and Stationary.

14. Feathers of all kinds, hair and bristles.

15. Objects for living apartments and ornamentation of homes; office furniture and o fice supplies.

33. In so far as circumstances are not against it, the hostile destination noted in 32 is to be assumed in:-

(a) If the cargo is directed to an enemy government Office or dovernmental authority (Behörde), or to an agent of the same, or to a trader of whom it is known that he furnishes the articles in question, or prepares products from the same, to an enemy, or to an administrative office of an enemy government.
(b) If the cargo is sent "on order" or to a consignee whose name cannot be discovered from the ships papers, or to a person so journing in enemy country, or in territory occupied by the enemy.
(c) If the cargo is directed to a fortified place of the enemy, or to a place which serves the enemy forces as a base of operations or supply basis.

Merchantships as such are not to be assumed as intended ~~to confiscation~~ for the enemy forces or for administrative places of an enemy governement, simply because they are en route to places specified in c.

35. Objects of the relative contraband of war are subject to confiscation only on ships en route to an enemy territory or territory occupied by enemy forces, providing that the articles in question are not ontended to be discharged in a port which the ship touches before reaching her final destination.

The limitation of "Absatz 1" does not hold good:
(a) If the presumption of No. 33 b are evident, or,
(b) If the ship is directed to a neutral country of which it is known that the purchases of the enemy articles of the kind in question from there.

40. A confiscation can not be based on a formerly carried out and finished trip on which contraband was carried. If, however, the ship has carried contraband to the enemy territory, contrary to the statements of the ships papers, she is subject to seizure and confiscation until after the war.

This order takes effect after its publication.

WILHELM.

von Tirpitz.

Great Headquarters,
April 18, 1915.

Germany

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EUROPEAN WAR 1914. SITUATION TO SEPTEMBER 23, 1914.

Need not be returned. 13136

Z 340 September 23, 1914.

NORTH SEA

The principal successes in the North Sea during the month have been accomplished by submarines. The sinking of the small cruiser "HELA", south of Helgoland by a submarine was attended by little loss of life, as other vessels in the immediate vicinity rescued the crew. At the Reichs-Marine-Amt I was informed that they had not received the report of the capatain and he was not yet in a condition to make one.

English light cruisers and destroyers have been in the vicinity of Helgoland at various times during the past three weeks, but the German light ships have profited by the lesson of the "Action off Helgoland" of August 28th and have not followed them up again to fall victims to a fast force of heavy ships lying in wait to the rear.

Fast cruisers have proved to be a very important part of the fleet for scouting and mining and the Germans do not want to loose any more in minor actions. Only torpedo craft and vessels of no military value are cruising outside the mine fields.

The sinking of the three English cruisers "ABOUKIR", "CRESSY" and "HOGUE", by German submarines, twenty miles N.W. of the Hoek of Holland is reported as coming from London official publications.

The severe weather conditions for the past week have lent themselves to successful raids by torpedo craft and submarines and German naval officers tell me that they look to the winter and to approaching periods of thick weather

to give them opportunities for cruiser raids and torpedo successes.

The position of the English armored cruisers which were sunk point to their being part of the supporting force of the patrol already reported as extending from Yarmouth to the Dutch Coast.

B A L T I C .

The passenger steamers between Germany , Denmark and the south of Sweden continue to run regularly.

The German Baltic Fleet has been out and conducts drills and exercises. Reports of the German Baltic fleet passing Gothland in an easterly direction have come from foreign sources.

German cruisers and destroyers have been into the Gulf of Bothnia north of the Aland Islands and sank the Russian steamer "ULFABORG" after taking off her passengers.

M E D I T E RR A N E A N

According to the somewhat unreliable news which comes to Berlin, the conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean are most significant.

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It is stated by the Reichs-Marine-Amt that the British Admiral in the Eastern Mediterranean, Troubridge, was relieved of his command for his failure to destroy the "GOEBEN" and "BRESLAU" before they reached Constantinople. Newspaper accounts, all unofficial, state that Rear Admiral Souchon, formerly commanding the German Mediterranean Squadron is now in command of the Turkish fleet, that Rear Admiral Limpus, formerly head of the British naval mission in Turkey, accompanied by the members of the mission, have gone to Sebastopol and are to remain there for the

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present in touch with the Russian Navy and that Rear Admiral Mark Kerr, head of the British Naval Mission in Greece has been given command of the Greek naval forces afloat.

The British Eastern Mediterranean fleet is reported to be using Corfu and Zakynthos as bases.

Operations in the Western Mediterranean and the Adriatic are reported to be in charge of the French naval forces assisted by a few English ships with the principal base at Malta. A number of English cruisers are reported as having passed East through the Suez Canal to search for German cruisers.

The Reichs-Marine-Amt gives out the following information which comes from British sources. They can not get information from their Asiatic Squadron, or the outlying cruisers directly:-

(The German cruiser "EMDEN" of the Chinese station, which had entirely disappeared from the horizon of vision for 6 weeks, appeared suddenly on the 10th of September in the Gulf of Bengal, took 6 ships, sunk 5 of them and sent the sixth of them to Calcutta with her vrew. The English cruiser "PEGASUS" operating from "ZANZIBAR as base, destroyed Daressalem, sunk there the gunboat "MOEWE". "PEGASUS" when lying before the bay of Zanzibar this morning, having her engines cleaned, was attacked by the "KOENIGSBERG" and made completely unserviceable. 35 of the English crew were killed.

From competent source the following, bearing on this, has been received: The "MOEWE" was not in any case a "fighting" gunboat. She was a surveying boat and equipped as such. At the beginning of the war she was considered without any fighting value and therefore put on peace footing. The English small cruiser "PEGASUS" has an armament of eight 10 c/m quick fire guns, while our small cruiser "KOENIGSBERG" has one of ten 10.5 c/m quick fire guns.

The English Admiralty further makes known:- "The English auxiliary cruiser "CARMANIA" sunk on the 14th of September an armed German steamer, probably "Cape TRAFALGAR", or "BERLIN" after a two hours engagement. "CARMANIA" had nine men killed. To this London report the competent source publishes:- S.M. auxiliary cruiser "CAPE TRAFALGAR" has been sunk near the Brazilian coast after a severe fight with the English auxiliary cruiser "CARMANIA". The crew has been daved by the German steamer "ELEONORE WOERMANN". Finally the English Admiralty publishes the following:- In the night from the 14th to the 15th of September a German steamer made the

attempt to sink the English gunboat "DWARF" by means of a bomb on the Kamerun River. The attempt did not succeed and the steamer was captured. On the 16th of September another German steamer tried to ram the "DWARF". "DWARF" was only slightly damaged. The German steamer was destroyed, also two boats with explosive material.".

N o t e.

It is rumored that about the same time that the " U 15 " was sunk, another boat failed to return. This was the " U 36 ". Confirmation is lacking.

The newspapers have said that the English cruiser "PATHFINDER" was sunk by a German submarine, but I have no confirmation of this.

Need not be returned.

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(See Paragraph 4. Instructions of October 31. 1900)

SUBJECT Four Submarines added to 1914 Building Programme - Italian Navy.

From T *No.* 241. *Date* September 23, 1914.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ------- *Date* ----------

1. In addition to the 6 Submarines reported in "T"-152 of May 27, 1914, there will be built in this year's Italian Naval Programme, 4 more submarines of 730 tons. These boats will be built at Fiat San Giorgio, Spezia, and will bear the following names:-

AGOSTINO BARBARIGO, ANDREA PROVANA,

SEBASTIANO VENIERO, and CIACOMO NANI.

These ships, however, have not, as yet, been laid down, and no particulars are yet at hand.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE.
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OCT 19 1914

(See Paragraph 4. Instructions of October 31. 1900)

Need not be returned (3)

SUBJECT Royal Decree re - Composition of Italian Fleet and Flag Officers thereof.

From T *No.* 242 *Date* September 23, 1914.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ------- *Date* ----------

1. There is forwarded herewith copy together with a translation thereof of Italian Royal Decree, dated August 30th, 1914, relative to the Composition of the Italian Fleet and its Flag Officers.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
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OCT 19 1914

Art. 1.

The Naval forces of the State will be constituted as follows:

a) of one or more squadrons composed each of 2 or more divisions;

b) of divisions of School-Ships;

c) of a Torpedo Flotilla;

d) of divisions for special service.

The squadrons as well as the divisions, when these are more than one, are distinguished by consecutive numbers.

The training divisions and the special service divisions are distinguished by the work which they are to perform.

Art. 2.

A Vice Admiral will command each squadron with the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron is moreover generally in command of the 1st Division of that Squadron.

The Commander of each Division, except in the above case, will be a Rear-Admiral with title of Division Commander.

The duty of a Chief of Staff of a single Squadron or of several Squadrons can be entrusted to a Rear-Admiral, who can also assume the command of a Division.

Art. 3.

The training ships are formed into divisions as desired. The respective Captains are generally under the direct orders of the Ministero della Marina.

Art. 4.

The destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines and parent ships are all placed in the Torpedo flotilla in command of a flag officer with the title of Inspector of Torpedos - his flag being hoisted on the appropriate ship, and is genrrally under the orders of the Minister of the Marine.

Art. 5.

At any time when exercises caused either by military or political reasons are carried on, the Commanders of training divisions and the Inspector of Torpedos can, at the discretion of the Minister of the Marine, be placed temporarily under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of a special Squadron or of any one of the regular Squadrons.

Art. 6.

The Commanders of the special service divisions are always under the direct orders of the Minister of the Marine.

Art. 7.

In case more Squadrons are formed, and these should, by direction of the Minister of the Marine, be united to work in concert, then this single force will be considered as a fleet under the Command of an Admiral, or else under the Command of the Senior Vice-Admiral of the Squadrons'Commanders or moreover by another Vice Admiral.

The flag officer placed in command of a fleet will assume the title of Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. Such title will only be assumed by the flag officer in command of a single Squadron when such Squadron consists of 3 or more divisions.

Art. 8.

The organic constitution of the Squadrons and Divisions and of the Torpedo Inspectorate, is, as a rule, fixed for one financial year, but may vary in force of ministerial dispositions, as military, naval or political exigencies may require.

Art. 9.

The administrative position of the ships assigned to the Squadrons and Divisions and to the Torpedo Flotilla, will be that of being placed proportionally, as a rule, in reserve and in full commission from time to time as ordered by the Ministery of the Marine.

Art. 10.

Royal Decrees of January 28, 1904, No. 25, February 5, 1911, No. 103, September 18th, 19111, No. 1053, May 2, 1912, No. 439, and December 22, 1912, No. 1387, respectively, are hereby abrogated.

WE order that the present Decree duly bearing the State's Official Seal, be inserted in the official files of Laws and Decrees of the Kingdom of Italy, enjoining by these present to whomever it may concern, to observe and cause to be observed the present Decree.

Rome, August 30th, 1914.

(Sgd.) VITTORIO EMANUELE.

German army

Sg .25

Need not be returned 13136 (4)

I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W.

War College Received Oct 10 1914

Z 948 September 23, 1914.

Answer to the Memorandum of the American Embassy of September 13th 1914.

1. The English Government has declared its readiness, in accordance with Article 3, Article 4, (Section 4), Article 5, of the Hague Conference of October 18th 1907, realtive to the treatment of enemy merchant ships, either to return all those German merchantships (not convertible into warships) which at the beginning of hostilities found themselves in British ports, or have and still run into British ports without knowledge of the outbreak of war, as well as their cargoes, or to pay the owners damages (if claim is made) at the end of the war. On the basis of this declaration the German Government promises herewith that it will give those English merchant ships and their cargoes which found themselves in the same corresponding position the same treatment. The German Government looks for an expression on the part of the English Government, when, and according to which principles the English Government intends to pay damages to German ship owners, as Germany intends to pursue the same course in these points.

2. The British Government desires, in accordance with Article 6 and 7 of the Hague Conference of October 18, 1907, relative to certain limitations in the law of prize taking to liberate the crews of the captured merchant ships upon their word, but reserves the right to accord them after their liberation, no more favorable treatment than is accorded other Germans who have settled in England, to also take them prisoners again under the same suppositions as in the case of the latter. The German Government desires an explanation as to what is to be understood by this reservation. According to the interpretation of the German Government these crews of captured merchant ships are not only to be released from captivity, but should be, if they so desire, returned to their homes without molestation. This may be ascertained from the context as well as the relationship of the two articles in question, as also from the reports of committees to the Conference. Then according to it the regulations emanating from the British Government regarding the treatment of Germans settled in England could not be employed in the treatment of crews of captured merchant ships belonging to Germany.

3. The German Government considers it as self-evident that the preceding agreements are not only applicable to ships in the ports of both home countries, but also to merchant ships in ports of the colonies of both countries.

Berlin, September 18, 1914.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

59
.23
(67)

Subject Control of the press in war.

From W. *No.* 70. *Date* September 23, 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. xxxxxxx *Date* xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

On August 9 the press of Japan was admonished not to publish anything relating to military or naval affairs, locations or movements of vessels or troops, matters relating to military secrets, etc.

On August 16 (the day the ultimatum to Germany was made public) the same subjects were barred by official order of the Navy Department (See No. 58 of August 25, 1914) and War Department.

Since the first admonition, not one item of naval or military news has been published, so far as I have been able to ascertain, except the very meagre and indefinite items given out officially. Most of these items, particularly those referring to the army, are without date or names of places, organizations, etc. They simply say that at a "certain place" at a "certain time" such and such thing occurred.

On September 16 an order was issued by the Foreign Office prohibiting the publication of matters "that may affect international relations." This order has met with violent opposition from the press, but so far has not been revoked.

The possibility of military news becoming public through the press seems to have been reduced to a minimum.

59
.23
(57)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
RECEIVED
OCT 28 1914

American Embassy,

LONDON.

13085

September 23rd, 1914.

From: Major Thomas C. Treadwell, U.S.M.C.

To:

Subject: Organization and Training of Royal Naval Divisions at Crystal Palace.

The Admiralty took over the Crystal Palace about Sept. 8th, to be used in connection with the organization of a Royal Naval Division to be composed of three brigades, consisting of a Marine Brigade and two Naval Brigades, the nucleus of which was found in existing reserves for the Naval Service which could not be used afloat at present.

After providing for all present and probable future needs of the fleets at sea, there remained available a large number of men belonging to the Royal Marines, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, Royal Fleet Reserve, and Royal Naval Reserve. A part of these have been organized into one Marine and two Naval Brigades, the whole comprising the infantry of one division called the Royal Naval Division.

The Marine Brigade, whose organization had been provided for before the outbreak of war, was at first maintained at a strength of 3,000, and has already been employed on active service at Ostend, where it was landed and occupied that place for about ten days. The two Naval Brigades were organized at first at a strength of 3,750 each, eight battalions in all. The three brigades have started training to fit them for service abroad if required in the next year. In the meantime, they will be organized and trained under the Admiralty, and remain available for service afloat should any unexpected needs arise.

The Royal Naval Division will be completely equipped by the Admiralty, with field hospitals, transport, ammunition columns, signal companies, cyclists, motor-cars, and machine guns. An aeroplane squadron from the Naval Wing will be available when required.

If at any time the Naval situation becomes sufficiently favorable to enable this force to be definitely released by the Admiralty for Military duty, it will be handed over intact to the Army for general service. It is thought that the training, discipline, experience and quality which a large part of the personnel already posses, should after five or six months special instruction in field duties, produce a highly efficient division, and that the prospects of the Royal Naval Division winning distinction on the Continent are therefore good.

The Marine Brigade of the division which is not at Crystal Palace is already organized and trained, and therefore available for immediate service if required, and as stated has already had service at Ostend, but it is desired to recruit it up to 5,000 men.

OCT 23 1918
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The first strength of this Naval Division was placed at 10,000 men, but it was decided at request of War Office to raise the strength to 15,000 men. Vacancies therefore existed for 5,000 men, and recruits have been coming in rapidly to bring division up to full strength,

On Sept. 22nd, the two Naval Brigades were quartered in the wings, and outbuildings of the Crystal Palace, while the main part of the Palace was used for mess halls, Y.M.C.A. rooms, drill halls, etc. The large grounds connected with the Palace - about 200 acres - afford extensive drill grounds, and on this afternoon nearly 4,000 men were drilling there in infantry and recruit drills.

The men appeared to be of good quality and were in blue naval uniforms and caps, with "Royal Naval Division" on cap-band, It is understood that before being put in the field the Naval Brigade are to be provided with a khaki uniform similar in cut to the Naval uniform. Few of the men were provided with arms. There were detachments of about 200 recruits that had just come in.

The Crystal Palace and grounds, other than men's quarters, are still open to the public on payment of a shilling admittance, so that excellent opportunity is afforded to observe the organization and training of this Royal Naval Division.

H. Travers

Germany

Need not be returned.

59
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WAR COLLEGE
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OCT 16 1914

S U B J E C T :- GERMAN POLICY IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AT SEA.

From:- Z No. 955 Date:- September 24,1914.

Replying to O.N.I. No. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

It is reported that in the opinion of Grand Admiral v o n T i r p i t z, the German main force should seek to bring the English fleet to action, while Admiral v o n M ü l l e r, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, and Admiral v o n P o h l, Chief of the Admiralty Staff hold that the fleet should not be exposed to a chance of a crushing defeat, at any rate, at the present time. The E m p e r o r is in accord with the latter opinion.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

54
(2)

Subject Flag officers in Japanese active fleet.

From W. *No.* 71. *Date* September 24, 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. xxxxxxx *Date* xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

The Flag Officers in the Japanese fleet as reorganized for the war are as follows :-

Vice Admiral T. Kato, Commander-in-Chief (with 1st Squadron)
Vice Admiral T. Yamaya, Division Commander 1st Squadron.
Rear Admiral T. Tsuchiyama, Division Commander 1st Squadron
Rear Admiral S. Fujimoto, Commanding Torpedo Flotilla, 1st Squadron.
Vice Admiral S. Kato, Commanding 2nd Squadron.
Vice Admiral S. Tochinai, Division Commander 2nd Squadron.
Rear Admiral T. Kamimura, Division Commander 2nd Squadron.
Rear Admiral K. Okata, Commanding Torpedo Flotilla, 2nd Squadron.
Rear Admiral K. Tsuchiya, Commanding 3rd Squadron.

When the reserve ships were incorporated in the active fleet the flag officers of the reserve squadron were not assigned to the augmented active squadrons, but other flag officers were assigned from shore duty. The commander of the 1st squadron torpedo flotilla, Rear Admiral Fujimoto, was commanding the Yokosuka torpedo division before the war, but the other torpedo division commanders were passed over and Rear Admiral Okata was ordered to command the torpedo flotilla of the 2nd squadron, he having been on shore duty.

While the flag officers in the fleet are without question able, they have had but little experience as flag officers afloat, and it seems strange that such officers as Dewa, Shimamura, Yoshimatsu, etc, both <u>able</u> and <u>experienced</u>, should not

be utilized in the fleet in war.

Of the flag officers in the active fleet prior to August 1 none had ever flown his flag prior to December 1, 1913 (See No. 92 of Dec. 9, 1913) and of those ordered since none have had flag duty in the active fleet prior to these orders.

59
.24

S U B J E C T :- E U R O P E A N W A R 1914-
GERMAN SUBMARINE "U 21 " sinks
British cruiser "PATHFINDER". (3)

From:- Z No. 253 Date:- September 24, 1914.

Replying to O.N.I. No. - - -

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

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.25 (1)

Need not be returned.

SUBJECT EMPLOYMENT OF COAST DEFENCE TROOPS. 13136

From Y *No.* 134 *Date* September 25, 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date*

The coast defense troops are mobile marine infantry, corresponding somewhat to the U. S. Marine Corps and somewhat to the Coast Artillery, wearing the uniform of blue jackets and coming under the cognizance of the Department of Marine, have been withdrawn from the coast towns and dockyards, and are now on the firing line with the soldiers. A barracks of them was noticed at St. Denis, and another at Pierrefitte, and several of the wounded were seen coming into Paris.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

59
.2 (2)
13136

SUBJECT DEFENCES OF CITY OF PARIS INSIDE FORTIFICATIONS.

From X *No.* 135 *Date* September 25, 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date*

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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OCT 23 1914

1. In addition to the strong outer fortifications of Paris, and the "enceinte rebrauché" connecting them, the city of Paris has taken the following precautions against a surprise raid of Uhlans or other small body. Three-fourths of the gates of the city have been closed to traffic and barred with stone walls and rifle trenches. Through the gates remaining open a limited traffic is allowed, but only a narrow staggered way is kept clear, and stone walls, trenches, chevaux de frise and felled trees are built up to the narrow way and in readiness to be completed all the way across in little time. Similarly, on the outlying roads trees have been felled to prevent passage.

These precautions are available only against a small body, of course, and not against an attack in force. The old barrier all around the city is being adapted for use as a shelter for riflemen by cutting a standing trench in the side of the ten foot high earthworks.

2. Supplies of every sort are pouring into the city, and live stock in herds of thousands of cattle and sheep are being brought in and pastured immediately outside the gates in the fields.

59
.26

GERMAN TREATMENT OF OCCUPIED FRENCH TOWNS.

Need not be rec'd.

Y 137 September 26, 1914.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
RECEIVED
OCT 16 1914

In the course of two days' automobile trips through the country to the eastward of Paris occupied by the Germans in their advance and now evacuated, about twenty towns and villages of various sizes were passed through. Contrary to the general press reports, the German treatment of these towns seemed to be all, with one or two exceptions only, that would be expected of the most chivalrous enemy. In all the towns, houses were injured by artillery fire, but that was incident to the occupation of the town by hostile troops, and was as often done by the French against the Germans, as by the Germans against the French. In the village of Marcuil sur Ourcq there was complaint that the village had been pillaged, but no external signs of damage were visible. In the town of Senlis, considerable damage had been done to one end of the town. Here artillery fire had been destructive, but in addition some twenty houses had been destroyed by burning by the Germans. This, as well as the execution of its mayor, held as a hostage, was, it is understood, due to alleged firing by the citizens upon the German soldiers occupying the town. Whether this alleged firing was true or not could not be determined. These were the only instances of great damage that were encountered, except, of course, such military precautions as blowing up bridges. Large towns, such as Meaux and Compiègne, showed to the eye no evidences even of hostile occupation.

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OBSERVATION OF FRENCH ARTILLERY ACTION, AT VIC SUR AISNE , SEPTEMBER 23, 1914.

Y 136 September 26, 1914.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
RECEIVED
OCT 16 1914


In the course of an automobile trip made from Paris to the front, passing along the line Compiègne-Soissons at the front, movements of numerous bodies of troops to and fro well in rear of the line were observed, but no general action was taking place, except a heavy artillery duel. Opportunity was offered to observe this duel from the position of the French battery, and for an hour the fighting was watched. Reference to the sketch herewith will make plain the points observed.

The German batteries were at C on a hill on the other side of the river R. Their rifle trenches were at K some hundred yards in front. The advanced French infantry line was in well-sheltered trenches at D. The Main road through the valley is shown at S. French decoy guns, very well sheltered and widely separated, at K, a reserve battery of 75 mm French guns at A, and the main firing batteries of eight 105 mm guns at B. The German guns at C were plainly visible through field glasses, and were employing direct fire against the decoy guns K. The French battery at A was located for direct fire, but well screened and had not opened fire; its position had not been discovered by the Germans. The main firing battery at B was concealed by a rise of ground in front, was employing indirect fire, and had not been discovered by the Germans, although they had been firing for several hours. Spotting and rangefinding was being done from the station at O. A Y-shaped binocular spotting glass was used by the observing officer, and communication with the guns was by field telephone. No rangefinder was visible.


The guns were firing regularly at the rate of about once a minute for each of the eight guns, and each shot was carefully spotted. The firing was carried out as regularly and coolly as though at maneuvers and each shot was carefully spotted and noted. Shrapnel shell was being used, evidently with high explosive charge as shown by the dense black smoke of the detonations, which were clearly visible over the German lines. The range was too great to permit of any observation of damage done to the Germans, but it seemed to the observers that the French shell were bursting a little too high to be thoroughly effective. The action of the shells was excellent, each one seemed to give good detonation. The observers were not allowed to get close enough to the guns or to the control station to examine the apparatus. Powder charges gave little smoke .

The German guns were firing regularly, but as their fire was directed at the decoy guns, which were out of sight of the observers' position it was impossible to observe their efficiency of fire and the functionning of their shells.

The fact is here noted, as accords with hearsay reports from many, that the German guns employ direct fire while the French guns employ indirect as far as possible. The German guns, as seen through glasses, were indifferently protected by gunpits; the French guns, sheltered by the rise in the ground slightly, were not protected, but simply in battery in the open field.



Profile of French + German positions



Plan of French arrangement of batteries

N. N. I. 33.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Need not be returned.

59
.27

AR COLLEGE,
CEIVED
. 16 1914

SUBJECT E U R O P E A N W A R 1914- GERMAN SUBMARINE " U 9 " sinks British Armored cruisers "ABOUKIR" "HOGUE" and "CRESSY".

From Z No. 352 Date September 27, 1914., 19

Replying to O. N. I. No. ---------- Date ----------, 19

According to official notice of the Admiral Staff of the Reichs-Marine-Amt, the German submarine " U 9 " sank the three British armored cruisers "ABOUKIR", "HOGUE" and "CRESSY" on the morning of September 22, 1914, Lat. 52° 30' N. Long. 3° 26' E.

The commanding officer of the " U 9 " was Kapitän-leutnant O t t o W e d d i g e n .

The following is the official report:-

AR COLLEGE,
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OCT 16 1914

" Early on the morning of September 22, the " U 9 " was about 30 sea miles north west of Hoek van Holland, steaming approximately in a south westerly direction. The sea was quiet, the weather clear, a little foggy. About 6 a c'lock three large hostile cruisers were sighted from the boat, which, at large intervals, ~~steaming along side each other~~ - abreast - approached from the opposite direction. " U 9 " concluded to attack first the ship in the center, carried out this intention and torpedoed this cruiser - it was the "ABOUKIR". The cruiser sank in a few minutes.

When the other two cruisers steamed towards the place where the "ABOUKIR" had sunk, the " U 9 " made a successful torpedo attack on the "HOGUE". This cruiser also disappeared in a short time in the water.

The " U 9 " now turned towards the "CRESSY". Immediately after the torpedo shot the "CRESSY" capsized, floated a little while yet, bottom up, and then sank. The whole engagement lasted from the first torpedo shot to the last about one hour . Not a single shot was fired from the English cruisers.

Statements of the British press that accompanying ships (Begleitschiffe) of German submarines were in the neighborhood of the place of engagement, and under the Dutch flag at that, are as untrue as the tales of surviving Englishmen that the cruisers had been attacked by several German submarines and that several of them were destroyed by the fire of the cruisers. As a matter of fact only the " U 9 " was present.

After the sinking of the "CRESSY" several British cruisers, torpedo craft, etc. arrived on the scene and several destroyers pursued the submarine. On the evening of the 22d - not far from Terschelling Banks - the " U 9 " was still being chased by destroyers.

At dark the " U 9 " succeeded to get out of sight of the destroyers. The following day the boat arrived with her triumpant crew in her home port. ".

The particulars may be expected later, but the following is approximate:-

The torpedoes were fired at close range, i.e., about 500 metres. After firing her first torpedo which sank the "ABOUKIR", the " U 9 " submerged her periscope, shifted position and then torpedoed the "HOGUE" which was by that time lying near the scene of the disaster and sending out boats. The " U 9 " again submerged, shifted position and when the "CRESSY" came up, was ready for her. Two torpedoes appear to have been fired at the "CRESSY" in rapid succession. The " U 9 " is an old type of submarine with two tubes and four torpedoes. She had therefore no more fighting value until she could get a new outfit of torpedoes.

After having fired her last torpedo the " U 9 " submerged totally and moved away from the scene remaining under water until dark when she took up her course for Wilhelmshaven at which port she arrived without further incident.

The happenings on the English ships reported in Germany are merely copies of the English press accounts and have no special value.

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Nation.....TURKEY. Name of Port.....CONSTANTINOPLE.
Report from U.S.S.SCORPION.
Date of Report.....September 28,1914.

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1. (a) The Dardanelles were closed yesterday until further notice,both for entrance and exit. The reason given by the Ottoman Government is that the fleets of England and France,belligerent governments,are cruising at the entrance of the Dardanelles and visiting vessels of commerce to the prejudice of the advantages resulting from the straits being left open.It is announced that this closure will be maintained until the above mentioned fleets withdraw from the entrance to the strait and bring to an end this unnatural state of affairs.

(b) The real reason is that the British Government had notified the Ottoman Government that the fact that the Turkish Naval vessels were being partially manned by German officers and men,was looked on with disfavor and suspicion,and that the Turkish men of war so manned would not be allowed outside the Dardanelles.I am informed,on good authority,that a Turkish Torpedo Boat proceeded out of the Dardanelles on the 26th.,and was turned back by the British Fleet. Thereupon the General commanding at the Dardanelles, who is German,after conference with the Admiral on the Sultan Selim (Goeben),Admiral Suchon,who is also German,and in command of the Turkish Fleet,closed the strait and planted the additional mines necessary to close the channel.

2. On the authority of the Italian Naval Attache,about 250 additional mines have been received for use in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

3. Vessels of the Turkish Fleet proceed daily up the Bosphorus and outside the Black Sea,the large vessels usually returning before nightfall.This has been going on for about a week.Hitherto no Turkish vessels of war went into the Black Sea,unless on some exceptional occasion.I am informed that whenever such a vessel went into the Black Sea,in previous times,the Russian Government immediately demanded an explanation from the Turkish Government.

4. The Turkish Active Fleet now consists of the SULTAN SELIM (GOEBEN),the battleships Hairedin-Barbarossa,and Torgud Reis,the MIDILLI (BRESLAU),and five destroyers.Also several torpedo gun boats and torpedo boats.

The Hamidieh and Medjidieh are in the Golden Horn having taller wireless masts installed.

The Messudiyeh is at the Dardanelles,but is said to have had her guns removed for use in the batteries.

5. The English Fleet,outside the Dardanelles,consists of about sixteen vessels of war - practically the British Mediterranean Fleet. The destroyers keep a close watch,night and day,on the entrance to the Dardanelles,and investigate all merchant vessels entering or leaving.They scud under the lee of the Island of Tenedos and to leeward of other islands in the Aegean.I saw a number of these vessels last week.An officer of one of the destroyers said that it was their intention to take the Goeben and Breslau if they came out,as they considered them still as German vessels of war,in spite of the fact that they were flying the Turkish Flag.

6. The latest information in regard to the Turkish Army,now mobilized,is as follows:-

The Army consists of 13 Army Corps,each composed of 3 divisions,or 27 battalions,or from thirty to forty thousand men.

Nation.....TURKEY. Name of Port...Constantinople.
Report from U.S.S.SCORPION.
Date of Report.....September 28,1914.

The Army Corps are situated as follows:

1st. Constantinople.
2nd. Adrianople,said to be coming down this way.
3rd. Dardanelles,Straits area.
4th. Panderma,(Sea of Marmara.This is the Smyrna Army.
5th. Angora Army.Now at Haidar Pacha,Marmara,opposite Constantinople.
6th. Aleppo Army.Now at San Stefano,west of Constantinople, on the Marmara,and to the northward.
7th. Red Sea.
8th. Syria.
9th. Azeroum,towrad Asiatic Russian frontier.
10th. Sivas,Asia Minor.Moving to Samsoun.
11th. Russian frontier.
12th. Mosul.Moving west toward Constantinople or Syria.
13th. Bagdad.

7. Additions,or corrections,to the list of vessels contained in my report of September 18,1914.

Add to list of German vessels: Nora Stinnes,about 4000 tons; Derindje,about 5000 tons;Patmos and Ermingarde,Eben~~Carcovado~~ is being fitted as a hospital ship.

Turkish Merchant ships:The Belgian King has been sunk;the Samsoun and Gayret are mine layers,the Nileufer is a mine depot ship.

The following Turkish Ships have been added to the list of those available for the transport fleet:-

Constantinos	1500 tons.	Hilal	500 tons
Guzel Gherid	680 tons.	Mired	340 tons
Prince Alexsandre	300 tons.	Tereki	140 tons
Mambeli Ada	270 tons.	Erdek	300 tons
Bahri Ahmer	———	Fahir	480 tons
Kinali	130 tons	Nessi	———
Altai	———	Milrne	———
Espagan	———	Saghditen	———
Ieshil Ermak	———	Leaxs	———
Kessendire	———	Teheran	———
Namse	———	Seyar	2150 tons
Ontematz	1500 tons.	Sebah	———
Ilmigrad	2150 tons	Stambeul	———
Alexander	1500 tons	Temedos	———
Dirindje	———	Patmos	———

L. McCauley. Jr.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

59
.28
(1)

SUBJECT TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS FROM AFRICA TO FRANCE.

Report not be returned

From Y ✓ *No.* 138 *Date* September 28, 1914.

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date*

At the beginning of the war the 19th Army Corps of 60,000 men, including native troops from Africa, were brought from Algiers to France. The following translation of an article from "Le Temps" of Sept. 17th gives an idea of the protective measures taken by the navy to cover this operation. It is noted that passenger liners were used as transports. No definite details of these operations have been ascertained, other than the following general account.

"The sending back to France of the 19th Corps was effected in ~~open~~ complete secrecy; it was not known that it had been commenced until it had been completed. Very well arranged measures had been taken; troops from Tunisia in particular had been brought by rail to Algiers and fleets of seven to eight passenger steamers with twelve thousand men sailed, each squadron escorted by a division of battleships, while smaller units kept guard at a distance. And yet the operation was effected in presence of difficulties. Upon the outbreak of the war, two German cruisers, faster than any other war ship in the Mediterranean, - the GOEBEN and the BRESLAU - had manifested their presence by bombarding Bône and Philippeville, with the idea that the concentration for the transports was being effected at these towns and at Bizerta. Their act had all the less effect as they did not pursue it, but proceeded in haste to the western basin of the Mediterranean, after first meeting the British battle cruisers, which let them pass, war not having yet been declared between Germany and England."

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.] Need not be returned.

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SUBJECT EUROPEAN WAR 1914.--

The Prison Camp at Alten Grabow.

COLLEGE
CEIVED
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From Z (0) No. 262 Date September 28, 1914., 191

Replying to O. N. I. No. _____ Date _____, 191

The site selected for this camp, Alten Grabow, is used in peace time as a maneuver camp for cavalry. Geographically it is about eighty miles from Berlin and situated between the cities of Brandenburg and Magdeburg, about fifteen miles from the latter city, with which it has railroad communication, a single track line. The camp is in the center of a large plain, the soil sandy and covered in the immediate vicinity with a thick growth of pine trees.

The camp at the time of our visit had been established only four days and in some respects it was incomplete. Here were quartered about six thousand prisoners, five thousand of them being French and the balance Belgians and some few English civilians who were in Germany at the outbreak of the war and were quarantined in this prison. Among the French were many soldiers from the French possessions in North Africa, Algeria, etc.

The prisoners were quartered in the long wooden barracks which existed on the ground for the use of the German troops when stationed here for maneuvers. These buildings were long, simply constructed sheds without windows and having large double doors at either end. They were without any flooring, only the bare hard packed earth. Each one housed three hundred men. They were under the immediate charge of one of their own non-commissioned officers who was held directly responsible for the orderly, clean condition of his building and the ground in its immediate vicinity.

For bedding they were given an abundance of straw. This was placed upon the ground and upon this the prisoner lay, covered with the straw and his own clothing. Blankets had not been served out to them, save to the wounded, of whom I will speak later. Many of these French and Belgian soldiers when captured were found to have their civilian clothing on beneath their uniforms. This, of course, was taken from them. The money which they had in their possession they were permitted to retain and with this they purchased postcards, cigarettes, etc. Posted conspicuously in each building was a simply worded order written in French to the effect that they were prisoners of war and that they must keep the grounds and buildings in a sanitary condition. Minor infractions would be punished by the officer commanding the camp and assaulting the sentry would be punishable by death. The ground about the camp was covered with a sparse growth of thick grass which with the traffic of thousands of feet would soon be worn off. The soil, as mentioned before, was sandy. This would of course drain the water off rapidly and give a dry surface.

The water was from artesian wells and pipe lines were laid along the streets with numerous spigots, from which they could obtain water for drinking and washing. The use of this was unstinted.

At either side of this compound and about fifty feet from the building were latrines built for the prisoners' use. These were long trenches dug in the earth about six feet in depth, with a rough framework to sit upon, the sides and top covered with rough boarding and open front screened. Lime was used as a disinfectant.

The food was plain and sufficient in quantity. The

day of our visit they had bread, coffee and milk for breakfast. For dinner, a stew with a vegetable and bread, and for supper a vegetable, bread and coffee. The kitchens were in one corner of the compound and each barrack came as a body and had the food served out to them. The wounded were served first. Each man was supplied with a cup, bowl and spoon, no knives or forks were permitted. All prisoners were searched on arrival and any knives found were confiscated.

They were permitted to write to their homes and friends a postcard containing four lines with news only concerning themselves or whereabouts. No news about the war or any political expressions were allowed.

It was evidently a mistake made by those at the front or distributing point for these prisoners that any wounded were sent to Alten Grabow. Not being expected, they had made no provision for them. There were some three hundred received however, and of these fifty per cent. were hospital cases. They had quartered them in a wooden building which had hastily been equipped with iron cots, mattresses, bed linen, etc., It was ill ventilated and lighted, uncleanly and from my limited observation they lacked proper nursing. Every morning their wounds were dressed and enlisted men of the hospital corps detailed in attendance. It was the intention of the authorities to remove these wounded the next day to hospitals in Magdeburg. The remaining one hundred and fifty were convalescent, had no open wounds and were to remain at the camp.

The general demeanor of the prisoners was good. They seemed, as far as they could be, contented with their lot. In talking with several, they had no complaints.

The difference physically between the prisoners and their captors was most noticeable. The French and Belgians of small stature, clothed in their ill-fitting uniforms and presenting an appearance of being ill nourished and weakly, made a striking contrast to the German soldier who was guarding them.

The German soldiers detailed for duty at the camp were quartered outside of the stockade and at the main entrance was the guard house. Throughout the camp, sentries were placed. A guard of one German soldier to every ten prisoners was the number detailed.

The prisoners were detailed for various duties throughout the camp, such as policing the compound, unloading of supplies from the trains, etc. Another large compound for the reception of more prisoners was under construction. This work was being done by the prisoners. The commandant informed us that they would shortly be employed in the manufacture of bricks with which the new barracks were to be constructed. Those of wood which they now occupied were to be reinforced by bricks, rendering them habitable in winter. Both of these large compounds were enclosed by barbed wire nailed to posts eight feet in height.

N. N. I. 33.

Need not be returned.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

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SUBJECT EUROPEAN WAR 1914- THE VALUE Of EFFICIENT PRESS CENSORSHIP.

From Z No. 361 Date September 28, 1914. , 19

Replying to O. N. I. No. ———— Date ———————————— , 19

From our Military Attaché at the Field Headquarters I have the following which is as applicable to the Navy as to the Army:-

" The war goes on exactly as in maneuvers with the addition of the losses, naturally great. It is the real test of training and equipment. The foreign newspapers give all the information desired by this country. There are trained men here for every duty required".

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Need not be retained
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American Embassy,

LONDON.

September 29th, 1914.

RECEIVED
OCT 33 1914

From: Major Thomas C. Treadwell, U.S.M.C.

To:

Subject: Notes on Recruiting, mobilization and training in Scotland, and at Newcastle and York, Sept. 24th-27th, 1914.

The figures on recruiting as given out by the Director of Recruiting for the first six weeks to Sept. 15th, show that the total number of recruits raised waw 501,580; the number contributed by each country and the percentage to the male population in each case being as follows:--

England	296,751	2.41%
Scotland	64,444	2.79%
Ireland	20,419	.93%
Wales	19,966	1.94%

The above shows that Scotland led for the first six weeks in percentage of recruits, and it is probable that this lead has been maintained to date, as the Scottich regiments are popular and recruits are coming in these rapidly.

In Edinburgh there was a camp of three battalions of Royal Scots and Cameron Highlanders at Holyrood Park. At Edinburgh Castle were two battalions of the Edinburgh regiment being recruited.

At Dunfermline were a large number of troops quartered in buildings and camps in different localities of various Scottish regiments, This place is apparently to be a divisional camp.

At Stirling were several battalions of the Argyle and Sutherland Infantry.

It is understood that these were also large bodies of troops collecting at Inverness, Aberdeen, Perth, Dundee and Glasgow. The great Forth Bridge and the Naval station at Rosyth were strongly guarded. All passengers crossing the Forth Bridge are required to have their hand baggage placed in the guard's van as a precaution against any one attempting to drop a bomb to damage bridge. There were a large number of colliers and several cruisers off Roysth on the 25th but no battleships.

At Newcastle there is a divisional camp at Cosforth Park, a large walled enclosure about 5 miles from the city, with a large

number

number of troops comprising battalions of the Border, Yorkshire, Northumberland Fusiliers, Durham L.I., and R.F.A., R.E., and Signal troops of the Territorial Force. There was a very large number of recruits here not yet in uniform.

At York were camps at Place Newton and Strensall of Yorkshire Hussars and Transport Column.

There is movement to get men now in camp in many localities into barracks, or public buildings, or to construct huts for their accomodation.

The recruits for Lord Kithhener's New Army are now being assembled in many different localities in Great Britain and Ireland, and will no doubt as quickly as possible be mobilized in divisional camps. The location of these divisional camps is not definitely known, and they have probably not all as yet been selected by the War Office. TherNew Army of a million men will be composed say of 40 divisions, in addition to cavalry brigades, unattached artillery and auxiliary troops. A number of divisional camps or mobilization centres will be required for this force, and from present indications the following positions seem to have been selected for some of them:--

Southampton.	)
New Forest (Lyndhurst)	)
Cosham	) Regulars and Colonial Forces
Havant	) for Expeditionary Service.
Winchester	)

Aldershot	6 Divisions or more
Salisbury Plain	A number of divisions
Colchester	1 Division or more
Northampton	1 " " "
Newcastle	1 " " "
Dunfermline	1 " " "
Dundee	1 " " "
Stirling	1 " " "
Crystal Palace	Royal Naval Division.

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WHY THE ENGLISH COMMERCIAL WAR AGAINST GERMANY MUST FAIL.

By Philipp Heineken,
General Director of the North German Lloyd.
(Translated from the Berliner Tageblatt of Tues. Sept.29,1914.)

By the exceptionally brilliant success of the subscription to the war loan, the German people have shown that they are as good financially as they are in military equipment to carry on this existence-threatening war to a successful determination. Our finances have proved unexpectedly strong. The calculations of our enemies that our supply of money would soon run short, have been confounded. We alone of all the great nations have so far gone without a moratorium. The capacity of trade and industry for resistance has demonstrated itself to a marked degree in spite of many difficulties, and in many quarters which at the beginning of the war were hard hit by the sudden overturning of conditions, an improvement in the situation already is reported. Advanced prices and loss of employment are kept within very moderate limits and are above all much less than in England, where, for example, the price of sugar has been more than doubled and in cotton-spinning, the greatest industry of the country, where hundreds of thousands have been thrown out of work. On the whole, we may say that up to now all th hopes of our enemy that the war would before anything lead to our economical ruin, have been fundamentally deceived.

Notwithstanding, it is not to be denied that there are among us people who regard the future in this respect gloomily. The presumptuous selfconsciousness with which England has brought this commercial war upon us, the arrogance with which she has declared that German commerce has been swept from the sea and that our starving out has already begun, has made some impression upon anxious hearts. The temporary stagnation of German shipping in port appears to those people, who have only a dim idea of the determining factors in the trade and economy of the world, as foreboding a time to come in which the black, white and red flag shall have disappeared from the ocean. They see before them an era in which the invested billions that the diligent hands of our sixty-seven million population have year in and year out produced and spread all over the world will be no more, and that the raw materials and food stuffs which we must import will be brought to us under foreign flags, and paid for in coin instead of with goods. This view is absurd. One need only consider carefully all the consequences to be clear that it is only a fantastic picture which English commercial jealousy and English greed have painted on the wall. It is the real truth that the motive to destroy the German Empire's commercial world position was for England the real cause of this war. For this end alone has England, while engaging with us in hypocritical negotiations for an understanding, with France and Russia prepared for war against us by land and sea, even down to details, in order to bring upon us also the fate of Spain and Holland. The rapid rise of Germany in the last decade and the crowding out of the despite industrious of England from all markets has set in with such energy that in England it was said this competition could no longer be met by the inherent power of the nation but was only to be broken by exterior force. It was about that that England went to war. The neutrality of Belgium had as much to do with it as a trade agreement with Hayti! These are facts concerning which no one will let them-

selves be deceived, least of all the business-like people of North America, against whom without doubt the next English war of annihilation is destined if that against Germany be accomplished. Only a brief consideration of the conditions as they are today and as they must be after the war shows, however, that this endeavor cannot lead to that end, not even if we - which is already out of the question - should submit.

Concerning the situation today, it is quite true that German shipping - the great companies especially - is in a sad condition. Their business is tied fast, their ships are idle; a few are sunk, or "good prize" in the hands of the enemy. It is, thank God, financially strong and determined enough to hold out through this critical time so as, the moment its flag may be again unfurled, with redoubled force to go to work again. So long can the magnificent great German steamers lie quietly in neutral harbors where they have found refuge. There is no necessity whatever to accept the offer of the Americans, who would gladly acquire a merchant marine at a cheap price, and sell these ships to them. "Hold out" is the word, and as long as we can do this, our readiness for the instant when peace is concluded is as good as secured. Germany is the second among the great shipping nations of the world and her capacity for ship building has for a long time been equal to that of the English shipyards, in fact, in many respects surpassing. There is power enough active here to make good quickly all damages which the war may cause even at the worst, the territory taken away from us won back with new energy; and as with shipping, so with the export industry. We will not speak of the extent during the war to which the way is open for our export through neutral countries. In any case only a reduction, not an entire suspension of our goods traffic can be declared. The high position of our technique, the scientific education and ability of our chemists and engineers, the completeness of our organization, which have made our advance in the world market possible, are not to be pushed out of the world. A diminution of dividends during the war, that is all we have to fear. After the war, the factors which have made our industry great will make themselves felt with double weight, and instead of losing we have every prospect of gaining still more.

In this connection, it happens that it is already recognized in England how badly this commercial war which has been unchained against us has cut into their own flesh. England and Germany have hitherto been the best mutual customers. The trade of England with her allies France and Russia together scarcely reached the sum of her own trade with Germany alone. England sold recently every year to us about 1800 million Marks of goods, while she took from us about 1400 million Marks in merchandise. A tenth of the entire trade of the United Kingdom was in the exchange with Germany alone. The peculiarity of this trade exchange was that our requirements from England consisted mainly of raw materials, which we can in part draw from elsewhere, or of manufactured materials, which also we can replace through our own sources. The German importation into England, on the contrary, consisted mostly of half-manufactured materials, to replace which English industry is not equipped and the lack of which must cause them a great disturbance. This difficulty will make itself the more felt disagreeably the longer it exists. It show especially that the disturbance of international trade such as a great war brings makes itself felt on all that take part, and the enormous reduction

of the English export which, according to English statistics, in August alone amounted to the sum of 600 million marks, says plainer than everything else how seriously the English economy politicians have erred. In the war the English shipping companies also have no luck. The great shipping companies Cunard and White Star, for example, have had to turn over their best ships as auxiliary cruisers, and the passenger and tourist business has dropped to a condition very little remunerative.

It need hardly be mentioned that the danger of starving out Germany will not for a long time be so serious as English politicians have portrayed. In England which depends for its food entirely on overseas importation, there is plainly no understanding of the German agriculture. To show how we surpass the English in this respect, it is only necessary to mention that our cattle number by the latest count 20 million head of beef and 21 million swine, while England has only 5 1/2 million beef and 1 million swine. So in the year harvested about 12 million tons of rye, 5 million tons of wheat, 4 million tons of barley, 10 million tons of oats and 56 million tons of potatoes, while in England the harvest in all these foodstuffs together did not reach 10 million tons. We, therefore, can hold out a long while before any distress appears. In important foodstuffs such as sugar we have a superfluity, while England, which depends on our import, is already in distress. Further, arrangements have been made to provide for our need in fodder, which we draw from abroad.

And now one hears in German industrial circles discussions concerning the efforts that the English government is making by sending out samples and travellers to all neutral countries, for example South America, while during the war the German relations are buried. Nobody doubts that all these efforts will be only temporary and without success. The quality of German political economy and of German wares, which in ever increasing amount in the last decade has undermined the sole mastery of the neglectful and easygoing English industry will, as soon as free competition again enters upon its rights, successfully supervene. With such small means the work of a great people is not to be killed nor smothered. That which one fears and which it is desired to annihilate, our vitality and our willingness to work, will come through the ordeal of this war brilliantly, and our ships which, loaded with goods, will after the war spread all over the sea, will show to the deceived Albion that the black, white and red flag is no more to be swept off the sea.

(11-14-14.)

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
RECEIVED
OCT 28 1914

American Embassy,

LONDON.

September 30th, 1914.

From: Lt. Col. R. H. Lane, U.S.M.C.

To:

Subject: Seen at Shorncliffe, Folkstone, Dover, Deal and Canterbury, Sept. 26th and 27th, 1914.

Shorncliffe.

Shorncliffe camp is a large permanent post, on the London, South Eastern and Chatham Railway, three miles west of Folkstone. It is situated on a plain above the cliffs overlooking the Straits of Dover. It is normally the Headquarters of the 10th Infantry Brigade. It was the station of the 1st Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 2nd. Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers, 3rd Hussars, 125th, 126th and 127th Batteries Royal Field Artillery, 4th Field Company Royal Engineers, 32nd Company Army Service Corps, 11th Company Royal Army Medical Corps, and attachment of the Army Veterinary Corps.

There is a hospital near Sandgate where wounded from the front are being received.

The buildings are extensive and most are of brick construction, accomodating about 5,000 men. There are separate barracks for companies, and these are grouped by battalions or other units. Each battalion has separate peace and mobolization equipment sheds. The parade grounds are large and afford ample room for training.

The Hythe Musketry School is about 3 miles distant. There are rifle ranges at Hythe.

Shorncliffe was made one of the training centres for the New Army, and is the headquarters of the new 35th. Infantry Brigade. A number of service battalions, (17th Norfolk, 9th Suffolk, 9th Essex, 5th Royal Berkshire) of different regiments, field artilley batteries, companies of engineers, and other auxiliary troops are being organized there. It is estimated that there are 15,000 troops now at the station. Half or more of these are without uniform, and others have incomplete uniforms. They appear to have been at the post long enough to be organized into companies and battalions,

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and to learn to march fairly well. Some battalions are distinguished by cloth devices about three by five inches sewn on the left sleeve of civilian coat.

There was no training or drilling going on at the time of my visit, Saturday afternoon. According to Army Orders the training of the men of the New Army should be for six days of the week, eight hours per day. However, battalions and companies were being marched to the beach, each man with his towel over his shoulder, where allthe men stripped and were sent into the water.

I saw several thousand men stripped, affording an opportunity of judging the physical characteristics of the troops. The physical average was higher than that of American recruits, in chest development these men seemed to be superior.

Judging from the civilian clothing worn, from the bearing and appearance of these men, I would say that in intelligence, adaptability and social habits, these men are inferior to an equal number of American recruits.

A number of newly formed battalions and other units were in camp. In regard to camp sanitation the latrines are on the night pail system. There are screened from wind and view by wooden frames covered with burlap, with no overhead covering. There appeared to be no system of covering contents of pails with earth or lime. However they were clean and free from odour.

Provision was made for scrubbing clothes, two long scrubbing table boards were slightly inclined inwards, draining into a metal trough which carried off the waste water. Water was piped to camps.

Folkestone.

There appeared to be no troops in the town.

Observations from the cliffs and elsewhere failed to disclose any fortifications, temporary or permanent. The pier was closed to the public, but no guns or other means of defence were visible. There appeared to be no means of closing the entrance to the small harbor, in which there was a large Ostend steamer, the "Victoria", a very small steamer, and a few fishing boats. There were no naval vessels in sight.

Dover.

Dover is the peace headquarters of the 12th Infantry Brigade, 4th Division Eastern Command, and is the peace station of the 1st Battalion Royal Lancaster Regiment, the 2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, and 2nd Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. There are also stationed at this port companies of Royal Garrison Artillery and Royal Engineers (Fortress) Regular and Territorial.

At present there is a battalion each of theRoyal Essex Regiment and Royal Fusiliers, and other battalions, as well as companies of Royal Garrison Artillery, Royal Engineers, etc. Approaches to camp were closed, and it was impracticable to get view of camps or barracks. At a rough estimate there were between 5,000 and 10,000 Troops in the barracks and in camp.

The port is strongly fortified by works on the heights on each side of the town, but as these and all approaches have been closed to the public, it was not practicable to obtain a view of them On the Western Heights, there is the Drop Redoubt and the Citadel, both sheltering guns and barracks, and on the Eastern Heights there is a hospital, barracks, and no doubt numerous guns. On the heights north east two guns are visible and have the appearance of having been recently mounted, they are of about nine inch calibre.

All piers were closed to the public. On the breakwater, just to the north of the Southern entrance, there are two guns mounted, apparently six inch Naval guns with shields. On the Admiralty Pier, about one quarter of a mile from the shore there is a work that has the appearance of a concrete barbette, in which there is one heavy gun visible, there may be others.

All other defences were concealed and it was impracticable to obtain any information of them.

The following Naval vessels were in the port on Saturday, Sept. 26th.

Two older light cruisers, probably of the Apollo class, now mine layers. No mines were visible.
One light cruiser, the Active.
" " " Pathfinder class.
" " " Diamond class.
In dock, a cruiser, probably the Vindictive, and an auxiliary vessel about 3,000 tons.
Torpedo destroyers, six of F.class, 1 of B class and 1 of C. Class.
.Trawlers, supply vessels, tugs, and other auxiliaries

On Sunday morning one of the cruisers and a few of the F. class destroyers had left, while five destroyers of the B and C. class

class had entered. Channel steamers and other merchant vessels were arriving and departing frequently, all using the southern entrance. The northern entrance was probably closed either by obstruction or mine, or both,

The lights at the southern entrance were kept burning all night, and the beam of a search-light was kept across the entrance all night. A large tug patroled slowly back and forth just outside the entrance during the night. Aeroplanes passed overhead frequently, patroling the coast.

The dockyard was closed, also the heights commanding a view. There were no submarines visible, although there may have been some in the dockyard. The facilities of the yard are very limited and appear to be temporary.

A field camp site for a battalion was observed at St. Margarets, about 4 miles north of Dover. Wood had been collected and water piped. About a quarter of a mile along the road, a signal company was in camp.

Deal.

Off Deal, which is an open roadstead, two torpedo gun boats and a large hospital ship were anchored.

There is a depot for blue-jackets near Walmer Castle. Judging from the number of men on liberty there is a large number at that place, the majority belonging to the Reserve, but many wore cap ribbons of ships.

The Depot of the Royal Marine Light Infantry is situated at Deal. It consists of the South Barracks, North Barracks and of theRoyal Marine Hospital and East Barracks. Only the south Barracks were open to visators. A battalion of seven hundred men was paraded there. For smartness and bearing, these men were superior to any I have seen, but in physical development and maturity they were on the average inferior. The buildings are extensive, and if fully occupied should accomodate 3,000 men.

Canterbury.

Between Deal and Canterbury there were many troops, both in camp and billeted in the villages. It appears that most of the billeted troops are Territorials.

The barracks at Canterbury were not open to inspection but it is estimated that they should accomodate about 5,000 men. It is the headquarters of the 4th Cavalry Brigade.

The 5th and 6th Battalions, East Surrey Regiment (Territorial) are billeted in the city.

The camps about the city appear to be occupied by companies of Royal Engineers and Army Service Corps.

It is estimated that there are about 8,000 troops in, and immediately around Canterbury. About half of these are without uniforms.